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Asia's proliferation
dilemma
By Brad Glosserman
(Used by permission of Pacific Forum CSIS)
SINGAPORE - The bomb blast at the JW Marriott
hotel in downtown Jakarta is only the most recent
reminder of the ruthless cruelty of international
terrorism. The topic dominates every discussion of Asian
security. Those talks have become increasingly sharp in
the face of a rising death toll worldwide and growing
fears that these groups will get their hands on weapons
of mass destruction or the materials to make them.
Most attention has focused on efforts to go
after the terrorists themselves, the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq, counterterrorism programs in Southeast and
Central Asia, and the new doctrine of preemption. But
checking the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
requires a strategy that targets both users of WMD and
their suppliers. While Hollywood's favorite plot usually
has a ready-made weapon falling into the hands of a
terrorist organization, in real life a terrorist or a
would-be proliferator focuses on buying technology and
components, almost all of which is available on the
international market. It's a lot more boring.
Unfortunately, it's a lot more likely to be successful.
Export controls are designed to cut off that
supply. In simplest terms, they are procedures adopted
by countries to regulate and monitor the trade in
weapons and weapons-related, or dual-use (civilian and
military) technologies. While these controls by
themselves can't stem the danger of proliferation, a
recent study by the University of Georgia's Center for
International Trade and Security (CITS) concludes that
"they can and do play an important role in slowing it,
delaying a security threat while other forces
[diplomacy, economic, and potentially military] can be
brought to bear".
A variety of export control
regimes are already in existence. Four schemes - the
Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement
- provide the foundation for multilateral efforts, but
they are hampered by a growing number of states that
don't have effective national controls, widely differing
views about the nature of the WMD threat, and the
inability of any scheme to quickly adapt to new
proliferation concerns. This last problem is especially
acute for the dual-use items deployed in civilian and
military sectors. These problems, concludes the CITS
study, "are likely to significantly reduce the
effectiveness of multilateral control efforts in the
coming years".
The problems are becoming
especially acute in Asia. The region has resumed its
economic growth, and economic development has yielded
significant indigenous technological capacity. Trade
continues to provide the underpinning of growth: the
region accounts for 25 percent of global merchandise and
20.8 percent of the world's commercial services. As a
result, East Asia now has 11 of the world's 20
megaports, including seven of the top 10. Economic
integration is also critical: intra-Asian trade takes up
about 45 percent of the region's total trade.
At
the same time, East Asian governments are spending
increasing amounts of money on their militaries. Despite
an overall decrease in military spending worldwide after
the end of the Cold War, East Asian spending climbed
from $95 billion to $130 billion from 1988 to 1998. In
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, military
expenditures jumped 52 percent in real terms over the
same period. Most of that spending is going to
technological capacity needed to modernize their
militaries. More worrisome still, much of it is
indigenously produced, making development of a regional
export control mechanism even more urgent.
A
final concern is the rise of terrorist forces in Asia.
Southeast Asia has become a second front in the war
against international terror, with groups like Jemaah
Islamiyah, al-Qaeda, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
and the Abu Sayyaf operating throughout the region and,
even worse, establishing links among one another.
Scott Jones, an expert on export controls,
argues that "growing trade interdependence, increasing
indigenous design and production capabilities [ie, a
growing pool of potential and actual sensitive
technologies suppliers], expanding military budgets,
intensified technology transfers to and from the region,
and an ever-expanding share of the cargo trade market
represent the regional challenges to the configuration
and effective execution of nonproliferation export
controls."
The region's dependence on trade for
development highlights the dilemma for governments
contemplating export controls: they are extremely
reluctant to endorse any measure that might undercut
growth prospects. And while that is the chief problem,
it isn't the only one. Some Asian nations lack the
capacity to set up effective monitoring systems. Others
are skeptical about surrendering any sovereignty to
international institutions; the fear that abstaining
from a sale will only help a competitor with less
scruples increases the skepticism.
Nonetheless,
there are reasons to be optimistic. At a recent Council
for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)
meeting in Singapore, Seema Gahlaut, an export controls
expert at the University of Georgia who has studied
European Union export controls, noted that those
governments overcame many of the same obstacles.
Creation of an internal market opened borders as did the
economic integration of East Asia. Perceptions of the
threat differed from state to state, and the ability of
member governments to regulate exports varies widely.
Even among the most advanced countries, the ability to
monitor transactions is diminishing as globalization
proceeds; firms, capital, and labor become increasingly
transnational; and information technology makes borders
increasingly permeable.
Yet even facing these
daunting challenges, EU nations found common ground and
set up an export control regime. Gahlaut points out that
the union governments concluded that the costs of
inaction far outweighed the benefits. The most important
rationale was acknowledging the need for confidence
among its trading partners. Establishment of a credible
and effective export control scheme demonstrated the
EU's seriousness and its commitment to fighting
terrorism. It allows EU companies to forge more
"technology-embedded" business relationships and stay on
the cutting edge of emerging technologies. And, not to
be forgotten, it also safeguards the EU itself. As the
Bali and Jakarta blasts reminded governments in
Southeast Asia, it is not only the US that is a target
of international terrorism.
The EU program
provides uniform regulations on export controls, but
licensing decisions are made at the local level. That
retains local authority and undercuts sovereignty
objections. Information on licenses that are denied are
shared with all member states; this should eliminate
fears that one company will benefit from the security
consciousness of another. Licenses issued by one country
will be respected by all other EU governments.
Critically, all information on licenses and denials is
available in a standardized format and is shareable.
Taken together, the EU program should increase
trade by standardizing procedures and eliminating
concerns about the "trustworthiness" of European
companies while enhancing national security.
The
EU scheme could serve as a model for East Asia. The
CSCAP working group on Confidence and Security Building
Measures has put export controls on its agenda and will
be studying the applicability of the European experience
for East Asian governments.
This track-two
effort is likely to find traction on the official,
track-one level. At the Singapore meeting, Chinese CSCAP
members stressed their country's commitment to
developing a better export control regime. They saw the
effort as a critical part of China's attempt to
modernize its economy and to build better relations with
the United States. This is a promising development and
could signal a broader shift in thinking throughout the
region. China-US cooperation in this area could also
serve as a model for broader regional cooperation.
They may get help from another partner. Japan
has been instrumental in helping push regional
coordination on the export controls issue. Jones, of the
University of Georgia, credits Tokyo with playing a "key
leadership role in nonproliferation export controls".
Japan launched an Asian Export Control Initiative in the
1990s, Official Development Assistance guidelines
include nonproliferation factors, and the government has
helped raise awareness of the issues involved through
multilateral and bilateral seminars and training
programs.
Japanese efforts to spearhead export
controls is an excellent example of burden-sharing
within the US-Japan security alliance. It can pay
dividends on another front as well. Opportunities to
increase coordination and cooperation between Japan and
China should never be missed. An aggressive and well
developed export controls regime could enhance
Asia-Pacific security on two fronts: by cutting off the
technology that permits the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and by increasing mutual confidence
among regional governments.
Brad
Glosserman is director of research for the Pacific
Forum CSIS. He can be reached at bradpf@hawaii.rr.com
(This article is used by permission of
Pacific Forum CSIS
E-mail pacforum@hawaii.rr.com).
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(Aug 21,
'03)
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