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Unhappy anniversary for US-Indonesia
ties
By Gary LaMoshi
DENPASAR, Bali - It has been an exciting two
years in the relationship between the United States, the
world's only remaining superpower, and Indonesia, the
nation with the world's largest Muslim population.
The good fortune that paved Megawati
Sukarnoputri's path to her father's old job just weeks
earlier fated her to be the first foreign leader to
visit the White House after the September 11, 2001,
attacks. That visit established some enduring
themes:
The US would seek Indonesian support for the "war on
terror" for symbolic and strategic reasons.
Renewed US aid to Indonesian's largely unreformed
military would be a focus for that support.
Indonesia would be coy about the presence of
terrorist organizations on its soil and adamant about
denying links between terrorism and Islam.
Over
the past 24 months, those themes have been played out
with such great skill that not only has each nation
failed to get what it wants, but each has suffered
serious damage to its interests, and the bilateral
relationship has deteriorated. Happy anniversary!
Cracked embargo
The post-September 11
meeting between George W Bush and Megawati went as well
as could be expected for this pair of presidential
offspring who jointly comprise a full wit. Megawati got
nearly a half-billion dollars in aid that cracked the
embargo on military assistance; Bush got a photo
opportunity with a Muslim national leader who denounced
terror as well as those who would equate terrorism and
Islam.
Despite support from the United Nations,
Indonesia was among the most vocal opponents of the
US-led invasion of Afghanistan. Jakarta's US Embassy was
the site of fiery protests denouncing the US war on
Islam that Indonesian leaders pointedly tolerated,
though threats of violence such as "sweeping" Westerners
out of Indonesia were condemned. Indonesia denied it had
terrorists, despite violence directed at civilians
across the archipelago, from communal warfare to bombs
at the Jakarta Stock Exchange and churches on Christmas
Eve.
Bilateral relations were frosty publicly
and, embassy sources say, politically, though security
forces welcomed renewed links with Uncle Sam. The US
also cherished these rekindled contacts, even though the
military remained unrepentant about past abuses while
undertaking new ones. For instance, in November 2001,
elite Kopassus troops murdered Papuan independence
leader Theys Eluay.
The security forces,
politicians and the West argued about whether there were
terrorists operating in Indonesia even after the
evidence from Omar al-Faruq, an al-Qaeda operative
seized in West Java. Then the Bali bombings in October
last year changed the debate.
Pages
turn
After Bali, Megawati appeared on television
and dared utter the T-word. Police vigorously pursued
the bombers with the help of investigators from
Australia, the United States and other friendly nations.
The security forces withdrew their support from violent
groups such as Laksar Jihad, which recruited fighters to
kill Christians in the Malukus and Sulawesi. An
anti-terrorism law quickly went on the books. Everyone
seemed to be on the same page, more or less.
The
invasion of Iraq changed things from Indonesia's
perspective. The US "war on terrorism" looked much more
like a war on Islam. Public protests in Jakarta were
more muted, but politicians again felt compelled to
condemn the United States. This new attitude didn't
change Indonesia's expectations for US aid as well as
investment by US companies and spending by US tourists
despite concerns about security that last month's
Marriott bombing in Jakarta confirmed. (Indonesia
nevertheless condemns Western travel warnings against
visiting the country.)
Indonesia, for its part,
has disappointed the United States and its allies. Local
politicians have sought to exploit situations for their
own purposes. (Gee, what a shock that must be to the
folks in Washington!) The police have failed to prevent
two high-profile attacks targeting Americans (many
victims were Indonesians, but it's the thought that
counts), the Bali and Marriott attacks. Local and
expatriate populations are aware of the threat even if
they're not cowed by it; that's a partial victory for
the terrorists.
The armed forces, which the
United States saw as the most viable national
institution and the one it hopes to influence, hasn't
changed. In addition to the Theys murder, investigators
found that the armed forces were behind the ambush
outside the Freeport-McMoran complex in Papua (see Indonesia's gold standard, September
7, 2002). That incident gave the US Congress ammunition
to delay the resumption of aid to the army. Trials for
atrocities in East Timor whitewashed the military's
role. After the Marriott blast, there was a brief move
to upgrade last year's anti-terrorism law to a more
draconian measure modeled after the Internal Security
Acts found in Malaysia or Singapore, which would have
given security forces more clout. The military has also
resumed the war in Aceh, meaning the armed forces are in
charge of the two areas with resources of greatest
interest to the United States. Whether that's
coincidence or design is open to question, but the US
blueprint envisaged more influence over the generals at
this point.
Trial separation
The
verdict in the trial of alleged Jemaah Islamya leader
Abu Bakar Ba'asyir displayed the sense of mutual
disappointment and frustration between Indonesia and the
West. US officials complained privately that the
four-year term for Ba'asyir was too lenient, and
Australian Prime Minister John Howard said so publicly.
Those comments elevate Ba'asyir's claims of
martyrdom and offer confirmation that his prosecution
and other anti-terrorism measures are part of a Western
conspiracy against Islam. They also underline the
Western assumption that courts follow the direction of
politicians. The verdict suggests political leaders are
reluctant to alienate what they contend is a tiny
minority of radicals.
Islamic leaders also fail
to speak out against the alleged fringe: when a lawyer
for convicted Bali bomber Amrozi said he planned to
appeal his client's death sentence on the grounds that
he "only wanted to kill Americans and Jews", no
mainstream leader stood up to denounce the sentiment.
However, don't think mainstream Muslim organizations are
insensitive. They scolded police for using the term
Jemaah Islamya (since it translates as "Muslim
community") in connection with the Marriott attack, even
though confessed members of the radical group implicated
their colleagues in the bombing.
Indonesians
also bristle at the criticism of their judicial system,
pointing out that Ba'asyir was convicted and death
sentences have been handed down in the Bali cases, all
in transparent trials under the world spotlight,
something the United States hasn't managed in two years
since September 11. The justice minister blamed the US -
and questioned its commitment fighting terrorism - for
not providing greater access to Hambali, al-Qaeda's
alleged kingpin in Southeast Asia. Since Indonesia-born
Hambali was captured, Indonesia has complained about its
inability to question him, alternating with
announcements that it dispatched teams to do so, and
lobbied for his eventual return for trial in his
homeland. The verdict in the Ba'asyir case probably
lessens that possibility dramatically.
Indonesian Vice President Hamzah Haz unwittingly
summed up the sad state of the relationship between his
country and the West when he criticized the United
States for backing Muslims (as the head of an Islamic
party, Haz and others tend to ignore the 20 million to
50 million Indonesians who are not Muslims) into a
corner. He warned the US not to punish Indonesia for the
actions of a few radicals - and not to withhold
investment that Indonesia so desperately needs.
After two years of engagement on the terrorism
issue, the United States and Indonesia are talking past
each other, neither side is getting what it wants, and
the terrorists continue to prosper. The US can help the
situation by dropping its focus on the Indonesian
military that's failed to seize its good fortune (or
thinks it can get away with anything in the eyes of
kindly Uncle Sam) and finding new subjects to discuss
besides terrorism, but Indonesia has the real heavy
lifting to do.
Unfair as it may seem,
Indonesia's main complaints - US favoritism toward
Israel and the Iraq occupation - are things over which
it has little control and, more to the point, have
little real impact on Indonesia, which should be focused
on its own shattered economy and security. Thrust into a
potential leading role in the global war on terrorism,
two years on, Indonesia's leadership has led the nation
to a position as one of terrorism's leading victims.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
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