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Terror politics in
Indonesia
By Scott B MacDonald
In early August, the JW Marriott Hotel in
Jakarta was bombed. The bomber was an Islamic radical
who drove a van into the front of the hotel, killing 12
people and wounding more than a hundred others. Most of
those killed or injured were Indonesian. The Marriott
bombing follows the Bali bombing of last October, two
other bombings in Jakarta (one at the parliament), and
an alleged plot to kill the country's president,
Megawati Sukarnoputri.
Although Indonesian
authorities are reluctant to admit it, the rise of
Islamic terrorism runs the risk of polarizing society
and endangering the relatively secular nature of the
government. It also casts a large shadow over the future
of the country's fledgling democracy as well as the
attractiveness of Indonesia as a place for foreign
investment. While the Indonesian government is a
considerable distance from being ousted from power,
local radical Islam and its foreign links to al-Qaeda
and Jemaah Islamiya (JI) represent a very challenging
problem with long-term implications for Southeast Asia's
largest country as well as the rest of Asia.
There are two sides of the coin in looking at
Indonesia and Islamic terrorism. On one side of the
coin, Indonesia has a long tradition of a tolerant form
of Islam, which has functioned as a support for
political stability. It has also been a pillar of
Indonesian nationalism, a force that helps bind the
country together. This was especially the case during
the struggle for independence in the 1940s. During the
Suharto years, Islam was carefully controlled and there
was an emphasis placed on maintaining a secular society,
able to accommodate a Muslim majority, but carving out a
tolerance for the Hindu, Christian and other smaller
religious communities. With the end of the Suharto years
and the advent of Indonesian democracy, the role of
Islam in society suddenly became more central. Indeed,
with the departure of East Timor, the overall numbers of
Muslims as a percentage of the total population
increased.
The other side of the coin is that as
the Islamic face of Indonesian society has become more
distinct and more mainstream, the door has also opened
for radicals within the same community to emerge from
the shadows, developing international ties to
like-minded groups and recruiting more followers.
Certainly the shift to a more open political system has
brought about a higher degree of uncertainty in
Indonesia. Together with the round-robin of presidential
leadership since 1997 and tough economic times until
recently, radical Islam has become attractive as it
projects a clear-cut, simple answer to complicated
issues.
Another aspect of the rise of radical
Islam in Indonesia is that the political class is
seeking to manipulate this force. With the unpopularity
of the United States' war against Iraq and the close US
alignment with Israel vis-a-vis the Palestinians,
another Islamic people, radical Islamists have been
quick to articulate their views and to find a
sympathetic audience in the majority of Indonesians.
This by no means infers that most Indonesians favor
radical Islam or the creation of a theocratic state
along the lines of Iran, or are inclined to attack the
West and its allies. What it does mean is that radical
Islam touches a sensitive spot in the country's identity
- the West has long looked down on Islamic peoples. In a
sense, there is a feeling of grievance. After all, the
Dutch long colonized Indonesia and took its natural
resources. Western companies made money in the country,
and Suharto was long supported by the United States. In
addition, it is argued the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) made life miserable for many Indonesians with its
poorly conceived economic policies.
The danger
is that elements of the political elite are still
playing to radical Islamic groups, or at the very least
pandering to public sentiment vis-a-vis the unfairness
of an international order dominated by the United
States. The comments of Vice President Hamzah Haz in
calling the United States the "king of terrorists for
its war crimes in Iraq" certainly must be seen in this
context. Haz was responding to international criticism
that Indonesia had been lenient in sentencing Abu Bakar
Ba'asyir, the spiritual leader of JI, to only four years
in jail. Haz is the leader of the conservative Islamic
United Development party (PPP). He has, in the past,
been willing to be seen courting some of the country's
more radical Islamic figures.
While some groups
are playing to the Islamic radicals, others remain
strongly opposed or are waiting for their turn to take
advantage of potential weakness in central authority.
Megawati is conducting a war against Islamic separatists
in Aceh (on the northern tip of Sumatra) and is seeking
to contain separatists in other regions. At the same
time, presidential elections loom early next year. If
the president slips in conducting the war, if she pushes
too hard on Islamic groups in a predominantly Islamic
country, or if she appears to be in the lap of the
United States, her political prospects are likely to
weaken. Moreover, she must tread softly with the
military. Any loss of power from the civilian part of
the political spectrum could be gained by the military,
one of the few cohesive institutions in the country. In
the past, it has also been one of the most influential.
If civilian leadership is inadequate, there are leaders
within the armed forces that might be tempted to step
into the picture, probably in the shadows, much like
Indonesian puppet plays.
What complicates
matters for Indonesia is that it is not a small,
insignificant country. Rather, it is a pivotal nation,
located astride major lines of communication and trade
between East Asia and the Middle East and Europe. It is
also the world's largest Islamic nation and a major
producer of oil and natural gas. For all these reasons,
what happens in Indonesia matters. Consequently, the
approach of the Megawati government to radical Islamic
terrorism is a concern to more than just the local
population. It is a point of concern to Washington,
Tokyo, Beijing, Manila, Singapore and Manila. The
failure to implement Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
money-laundering regulations, which are aimed at hurting
illegal financial activities in the country - which
could aid Islamic terrorist groups - gives the
impression that Indonesia is soft on tackling the
problem.
Perceptions remain important in a
globalized era - like it or not. This is important for
attracting foreign investment as well as how the country
interacts with the rest of the region. While the United
States has often pushed Indonesia too hard and has
certainly played to the sense of Islamic grievance,
Indonesia's political elite also has to consider its
responsibility to its citizens in providing sustainable
economic development, a better standard of living and
clear government. Supporting men with bombs willing to
kill their fellow Indonesians in grisly acts of violence
is not going to build a better future for the country.
Scott B MacDonald is senior consultant
for KWR
International Inc (KWR), a consulting firm
specializing in the delivery of research, communications
and advisory services. Posted with
permission.
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