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SPEAKING
FREELY
East Timor's future in the
balance
By Damien Kingsbury
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online
feature that allows guest writers to have their say.
Please click here if you are
interested in contributing.
MELBOURNE -
As the United Nations winds down its presence in East
Timor ahead of next May's departure, the fledgling state
is still wrestling with forces that could offer it a
stable future or, should matters not be well managed,
tear it apart. More than ever, East Timor's future is in
the balance.
Since its vote for independence
from Indonesia and subsequent destruction by TNI
(Indonesian military) -backed militias in 1999, East
Timor has in many respects staged a remarkable recovery.
In large part this has been due to United Nations and
foreign non-governmental organization (NGO) assistance.
A walk along the streets of Dili now reveals that most
buildings have been repaired and are in use, businesses
thrive and there are more cars, trucks and motorbikes
than ever before. In the towns and countryside, such
development is a little slower but still at impressive
levels compared with two, much less three, years ago.
Most important, where until 1999 there were
businesses and vehicles, most East Timorese were
second-class citizens in their own homeland, and few had
access to the benefits of development that the territory
experienced under Indonesian rule.
Development
is not just about material progress, but also social and
political participation, representation, accountability
and freedom. And it is upon such political development
that the growth and security of material progress
depends.
If East Timor's future is in the
balance, then, there is much in its favor. Perhaps key
among this is that, in their wisdom, the East Timorese
chose to have a ceremonial rather than executive
president. This means that critical state decisions are
not in the hands of just one person, even if that person
is Xanana Gusmao. The reality is that Gusmao will not be
president forever, and his eventual replacement might be
much less benign or genuinely popular.
The moral
authority of the presidency, though, weighs well against
the government executive, which in turn is balanced by
the elected legislature from which it is drawn. An
executive drawn from an elected legislature is always
accountable, and must always perform at a level that
would not result in a vote of no confidence.
The
rule of an independent legal system, without which no
state can function effectively, is also in place as a
balance against legislative or executive caprice.
However, with little time for training, this branch is
not yet living up to its full potential.
No
state can claim political development without a loyal
but critically active opposition, which East Timor is
developing. The Democratic Party and Social Democrats in
particular provide a real, socially progressive
alternative to the governing Fretilin, and may well
force Fretilin into a coalition after the next
elections. Indeed, the common assumption, especially
about the Democrats, is that they are in reality the
"reform faction" of Fretilin.
After two positive
voting experiences, East Timor's people, too, have taken
the democratic process to heart. For a people whose
education levels were low under Indonesian rule, a
situation that is improving only slowly, people from
often surprisingly humble backgrounds are well able to
articulate their political views and desires. This alone
is perhaps the most positive sign for the future.
However, against these positive attributes, East
Timor's political ledger also records some serious
negatives, which together have the potential to undo the
positive work that has taken place since UN
intervention, and which could leave the country in
chaos.
Most potentially damaging is the growing
unpopularity of the Fretilin government, due to its
perceived arrogance, elitism and allegations of abuses
of power. Although Fretilin took about two-thirds of the
seats in the new legislature and so clearly won
government, it did so largely because it represented the
core of the older pro-independence movement. The gloss
of that victory is now long faded.
In that the
Democrats and Social Democrats are a viable opposition,
they are so on the basis of their members having been
present during the Indonesian period (many being drawn
from the East Timorese student resistance). Therefore,
they have a perceived sense of connectedness with many
ordinary, if still predominantly urban, East Timorese,
as a consequence of being present during that time.
However, beyond a vague ideological position,
neither party has developed any coherent set of
policies, beyond succumbing to World Bank pressure to
borrow for infrastructure projects. East Timor almost
certainly cannot afford to borrow, and such projects are
not likely to return an economic benefit. It is
unfortunate then that the one opposition policy position
that appears concrete is not especially well considered.
In that East Timor has received a lot of
financial and professional assistance from the
international community, international attention is now
focusing elsewhere. Much has been achieved in three
years, but not enough to replace the professional class
that, until 1999, largely derived from the rest of
Indonesia. In that respect, East Timor will most likely
undergo a slump in professional expertise when the UN
leaves. Given the sometimes uncooperative responses of
the Fretilin government to a number of international
organizations, this slump is not likely to be picked up
by non-UN agencies.
In particular, elements of
the former Internal Political Front, the clandestine
urban wing of the armed resistance under Indonesian
rule, have not accommodated post-independence civilian
rule very well. There is a belief among some East
Timorese that certain members of this former
organization believe they remain a law unto themselves.
In an environment in which there are real
grievances against the government, and in which economic
development still leaves many expectations unfulfilled,
there is fertile soil for planting the seeds of
destabilization. This task has been admirably undertaken
by the so-called Committee for the Popular Defense of
the Republic of Democratic Timor L'este (CPD-RDTL).
As noted in the Jakarta Post almost two years
ago, the CPD-RDTL is in essence a front organization for
Indonesian irredentists who wish to see East Timor's
independence fail. Not surprisingly, while the CPD-RDTL
draws on some disaffected East Timorese youth and a few
ex-members of the guerrilla force Falintil, it is also
notable for its significant numbers of ex-militia
members.
The CPD-RDTL does promote issues that
are of genuine concern to ordinary East Timorese, but
its tactics of violence, intimidation and extortion
recall precisely those used in Europe, especially
Germany and Italy, in the 1930s. Populism linked to
violence is the stuff of fascism, and the CPD-RDTL is
neo- Nazi in all but name. Having earlier said it did
not recognize the UN in East Timor, or the outcome of
the ballot for independence, the policy position of the
CPD-RDTL is now quite unclear. But its actions have
been, at best, malignant.
Drawing on a similar
source of organization in West Timor, cross-border
smuggling and continued threats by members of the
Integration Struggle Troops (PPI) militia to "plant the
red and white in East Timor" especially destabilizes the
border districts of Bobonaro and Cova Lima. This also
reflects the underlying reality of tension that exists
between Indonesian and East Timor, not least among
sections of the TNI, despite official Indonesian
pronouncements to the contrary.
Having made a
large and costly investment, the international community
is unlikely to stand by and watch East Timor be overtly
destabilized or fall victim to unilateral action such as
a coup. If anything, the strategic location of East
Timor both in the archipelago and astride a deepwater
shipping and submarine channel also means that the
United States in particular will want to see the place
remain stable, which in turn means having an accountable
government. The recent presence of US warships just off
Dili, including an aircraft carrier, was a clear sign
that US strategic interest remains high.
Australia, too, remains committed to East Timor,
although its very wary of offending Indonesia by
retaining too robust a presence along the border.
Australia's army battalion is due to withdraw next year,
but there are already calls from communities along the
border for a military company to remain in each district
after that, as a consequence of smuggling and potential
militia activity. The East Timorese Border Patrol Unit
is now formally in place, but it does have a limited
capability.
On a balance of probabilities, East
Timor is likely to bump along after next May, certainly
with many problems but also with some strengths. If the
major political groups can continue to respect the rule
of law, then the future of East Timor should be more
rather than less positive, compared with the situation
under Indonesian rule. However, abandoning the rule of
law, or failing to have it properly applied, will almost
certainly spell disaster for the fledgling state.
If East Timorese need any motivation to remain
on the path of tolerance and respect for the law, they
need only to recall their own history. The cost in human
life up to 1999 was staggering by any standard -
respected Harvard genocide expert Ben Kiernan estimates
150,000 of 650,000 died between 1975 and the mid- 1980s
- and the destruction and death of 1999 have left their
own scars. As with Indonesia itself, the price of going
back to the bad old days is too high to contemplate.
Dr Damien Kingsbury is head of
philosophical, political and international studies at
Deakin University, Melbourne. He recently visited East
Timor.
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have their
say. Please click here if you are
interested in contributing.
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