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SPEAKING FREELY
Malaysia's new premier:
Altered stakes
By Manjit Bhatia
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online
feature that allows guest writers to have their say.
Please click here if you
are interested in contributing.
Malaysia's fifth prime minister,
Abdullah Badawi, cannot afford to be seen as a
card-carrying Mahathir loyalist. His predecessor, Mahathir
Mohamad, left Malaysia with a legacy of risks that Abdullah
must reduce and not intensify by continuing with
his ex-boss's policies. Yet from all indications,
Abdullah is going to do just that - embedding his
premiership in Mahathir's legacy. This is both wrong and foolish.
There's been much nonsense by media commentators
and analysts about loyalty to Mahathir finally paying
off for his toadies. Curiously, Mahathir had bypassed
chief crawler Najib Razak, the defense minister, and son
of Malaysia's second premier Abdul Razak. Najib's
supporters are desperately jockeying to install him as
Abdullah's No 2. Although Najib has partisan UMNO
(United Malay National Organization) support, Mahathir
distrusted him enough to overlook him.
Abdullah
is seeking to come into his own. But throughout his time
as Mahathir's deputy, he barely made a whimper about the
man he replaced, Anwar Ibrahim, and his ongoing
victimization by Mahathir, his craven thugs in cabinet,
the politically skewed judiciary and the highly
dishonest, incompetent and politicized police. Two
things would be bothering Abdullah: upcoming national
and party elections, which he must win to gain true
legitimacy in his own right; and factional brawling so
intense that it could topple him sooner rather than
later.
Without clear-cut UMNO factional support,
Abdullah looks dead certain to abide by Mahathir's
rules. Even now Abdullah's factional support within UMNO
remains unclear. He'll have to wait until the next
general elections and secure sizeable legitimacy in his
own right from Malay voters - including winning back
those massively lost in the 1999 poll to the Islamic
party PAS (Parti Islam SeMalaysia) - and from non-Malay
voters, before he even thinks of purging UMNO of
Mahathir loyalists and deadwood from cabinet and
government. And there are enough of them.
But
this Abdullah must do if more innovative, progressive,
equitable and transparent policies are to emerge for
navigating Malaysia through the morass of complexities
of the 21st century political economy at the local,
national and international levels. For example, Abdullah
must dismantle the National Economic Action Council
(NEAC), which on the one hand is no longer relevant, and
which, on the other hand, as K S Jomo has said,
resembles the 1969 National Operations Council, which
was run by Najib's father, Abdul Razak.
The NEAC
had become Mahathir's "kitchen cabinet". The policy
elite resides here, running roughshod over the "formal"
but mostly incompetent cabinet. The latter's members
lack the honesty and commitment to establish the
foundations for an open, democratic government and for
good economic governance in Malaysia. They're more
inclined toward racial chauvinism to protect their own
interests and of vested interests within their parties
for a share of the spoils of state power.
So
talk of imminent policy changes on the heels of
leadership change is singularly naive, the kind of tripe
unthinkingly flaunted by Western observers, especially
journalists, with local journalists none the wiser (or
educated and honest enough) to correct such imbalances.
Notwithstanding the overt materialist symbols, Malaysian
society has fundamentally retained remnants of a
feudalistic social order, which determines the nature of
the Malaysian state and its power. It shares broad
similarities with Japan's Liberal Democratic Party
state. Both Malaysia and Japan are in essence one-party
states, like Singapore and Zimbabwe.
In this
order the structures and institutions of patron-client
relations are entrenched, with all the accouterments of
factionalism, machine politics, corruption, cronyism,
nepotism, patrimonialism, populism, fictive kinship and
brokerage. Here, notorious forms of political
clientelism far outweigh visages of modern politics of a
modern Malaysian nation. Within this order the state is
more authoritarian, not less, the regime is more
illiberal, and not one given to cultivating liberalism
or democratization, other than espousing democratic
tendencies.
Even where patronage politics do
change they do not transcend the feudal order; they
merely enlarge feudal politics from within without
cracking its container. Powerful competing interests
that cut across class and race in Malaysia will struggle
to maintain this order in which state largesse is
distributed among them. But they also control the
largesse through their political access to and influence
within the Malaysian state. Their vast accrual of
financial wealth has been through the state, which
protects them from direct foreign competition. Which
explains why there have been few if any real reforms -
certainly none worth crowing about - in Malaysia since
the Asian crisis.
Abdullah speaks of protecting
democracy in Malaysia, but that's impossible: democracy
hasn't existed since the race riots in 1969.
Authoritarianism has brutally circumscribed democracy,
if not murdered it. The Economist magazine recently
wrote that, after Myanmar, Malaysia is Southeast Asia's
most repressive country. It's not wrong. But under
Abdullah authoritarianism will be further entrenched,
even though Abdullah won't be able to concentrate
executive power in his hands as Mahathir had, and
precisely because of this.
After Mahathir's
exit, UMNO is readying itself for deeply splintering
factional battle again. That's why he has repeatedly
called for political bickering within UMNO to stop.
Malay hegemonic power within UMNO will be decentralized,
but Abdullah won't be able to control warring factions.
Abdullah, who's basically an honest man, has been taking
his time in choosing his deputy. He'll want someone he
can trust - someone who won't turn on him at the UMNO
elections, and undermine his authority and "legitimacy"
until that time.
UMNO's factions are struggling
for influence over policy development and management.
Abdullah is an Islamic scholar; he doesn't understand
economics, and he's not a consummate political animal,
either. It's hard to see democracy flowering again in
Malaysia under Abdullah, since UMNO is scarcely
democratic to begin with. Nor are any of the political
parties in Barisan Nasional, the ruling national
coalition.
UMNO's rival factions will ensure
that democracy doesn't seed in Malaysia, knowing it'll
work against their interests. Under Mahathir money
politics grew stronger still. Under Abdullah it'll be
amplified, as will corruption. Judicial independence in
Malaysia will continue to be bastardized to protect the
powerful and corrupt Malaysian elite. Abdullah's major
hobbyhorse - to rid Malaysia of corruption - is just
political hype; unlike Mahathir, Abdullah hasn't and
most probably will not be able to take UMNO by the
scruff of its neck. More, Abdullah has no real policies
of his own. That'll make his legitimacy, even if he wins
national elections, still questionable, particularly in
foreign economic markets, on which Malaysia overly
depends for its prosperity.
Unless Abdullah
quickly wins powerful UMNO factional support for his
leadership, he's likely to be toppled by an internal
party coup before too long. The longer he takes in
choosing his deputy, the more the knives will be
sharpened against him. So, too, Abdullah's choice for
his No 2. Which is why Mahathir's retirement from
politics is far from final. Interestingly, Mahathir
hasn't resigned from his parliamentary seat. The threat
of anarchy within UMNO shouldn't be lightly dismissed.
For that reason Mahathir loyalists and his capitalist
cronies will bring Mahathir back until a "more suitable"
successor can be found.
And that's another
problem: there are no competent leaders in UMNO.
Strikingly, in multiracial Malaysia, only Malay Muslims
can be premier and deputy premier. In fact all the key
ministries - prime minister, deputy prime minister,
home, defense, finance, education and law - are "owned"
by UMNO Malay Muslims and are non-negotiable in
multiracial Malaysia. Whereas Indonesian since Suharto
has taken some small steps toward political
liberalization, Malaysia has in fact regressed.
Ordinary, amateurish, inept and shady politicians, most
without credible educational background, skills and
intellectual ability, constitute the Malaysian cabinet.
But Abdullah is reluctant to reshuffle the cabinet, much
less replace it with better-educated and able new blood.
These are the key risks Malaysia faces going
forward. If Abdullah is serious about executing his
office with "integrity, trustworthiness, efficiency and
fairness", he must demolish the relics of feudal rule
that Mahathir had created in state institutions and
structures. Otherwise Malaysian "society" won't move
forward as one people (bangsa Malaysia) but
remain deeply divided, inequitable and suspicious of
each other. This is Mahathir's legacy, much as Margaret
Thatcher had left for Britain and Ronald Reagan for the
United States in the 1980s.
Clearly Abdullah is
in trouble already. One of Mahathir's last shenanigans
before retiring was ordering the Malaysian Electoral
Commission, a tool of the regime's, to create some 20
new constituencies. The bulk of these will favor UMNO in
a shamelessly elaborate scheme of gerrymandering. Real
fear runs deep through the veins of UMNO (and the ruling
coalition), specifically of the erosion of its
legitimacy principally among traditional Malay Muslim
voters, and of being whipped, again, by PAS, with the
pro-Anwar Barisan Alternative Party also picking up
votes if not seats. Such a prospect will add another
problem for Malaysia: like Hong Kong and other
authoritarian and neo-authoritarian societies, rule of
law will give more ground to rule by law.
The
problems facing Abdullah can either weaken or strengthen
him politically. If Abdullah doesn't take power
definitively, and soon, it'll be no surprise if the
Malay-hegemonic feudal state comes under serious siege
by powerful factions of the rentier-parasitic
capitalist classes. They'll seek to extract more rent
from the state while jostling to wield greater political
influence over state policy. There'll be more
corruption, not less; more abuse of political power, not
less. Moreover, the politics of state patronage will
also see the dominant classes also extract greater state
protection of their interests against pressures for
reforms from inside and outside Malaysia. It's an
ominous form of a state-organized protection racket
since, under Mahathir, the state has both organized and
monopolized the means for violence. Whether Abdullah can
muster the same state apparatus as Mahathir had is
doubtful.
Abdullah hasn't the personality cult
or commitment for producing genuine democratic change.
That much is already clear. And here's the irony: as
deputy Abdullah seemed strong; as prime minister he
looks to have become suddenly weaker. It'll seriously
jeopardize his leadership and he will very possibly be
unseated as UMNO president. For politically expedient
reasons he'll have to be an autocrat, like Mahathir. His
image is patriarchal but his demeanor will be
patrimonialist.
Still, the bottom line for
Abdullah is that without strong factional UMNO backing
he won't resile from Mahathir's legacy of waste and
abuse. If he does make a move too soon on changing
course from Mahathir's, he'll probably feel a million
deadly cuts from the knives being sharpened by Mahathir
loyalists ahead of the next UMNO poll. Abdullah will
take the safe route, if only to protect his weak flanks.
But then a golden opportunity for real change in
Malaysia has already been squandered - worse, even
before it could begin.
Manjit Bhatia
is an academic and writer in Australia. He specializes
in international economics and politics, with a focus on
the Asia-Pacific region.
Speaking Freely
is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest
writers to have their say. Please click here if you
are interested in contributing.
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