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When all else fails, try engaging Myanmar
junta By Jim Lobe
WASHINGTON -
The seven-year-long stalemate between the Myanmar
military regime and the country's democratic opposition
plus Western supporters needs to be reassessed and a
pragmatic new approach undertaken, however distasteful -
conditional engagement with the junta, according to an
international conflict-resolution group.
What is
needed is flexibility, nimble and creative diplomatic
moves, carrots and sticks to encourage the government to
reform - and agreement to gradually withdraw sanctions
as the government makes visible progress on political
and constitutional reform. The sine qua non for
all of this is the immediate release of Aung San Suu Kyi
and genuine dialogue with her pro-democracy movement.
In a report released on Monday, the
Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG)
concludes that neither seven years of United States and
other Western sanctions against the government, nor the
more supportive policies, such as the Bangkok Process,
pursued by Myanmar's Southeast Asian neighbors, have
brought about any major change in the country's domestic
political situation.
The report, "Myanmar:
Sanctions, Engagement or Another Way Forward?", calls
instead for a new approach that might begin a process of
reform in Myanmar, provided certain preconditions are
met. These include the regime's unconditional release
from custody of 1990 Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu
Kyi and the launch of a "serious dialogue" between her
National League for Democracy (NLD) and the government -
both within and beyond the impending National Convention
that is due to begin on May 17.
"If Suu Kyi is
given complete personal and political freedom, and the
international community can unite around a concerted
approach - maintaining pressure by setting benchmarks
for change, but also offering some forms of support
without further conditions - there is a better chance of
political and constitutional movement, painfully slow
though it may be, than there has been for a decade,"
said Robert Templer, ICG's Asia program director.
Myanmar has ranked high on the global human
rights agenda since the NLD won a landslide victory in
the 1990 elections - the first free national elections
in Myanmar since the military first took power in 1962.
The military junta, known at that time as the
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), refused
to recognize the election results, however, and cracked
down hard against the National League for Democracy.
Many of the party's top national and regional leaders
were rounded up and thrown in prison, while Suu Kyi
spent much of the 1990s under house arrest at her home
in Yangon. When it took power, the junta renamed Rangoon
Yangon and Burma Myanmar.
With the help of the
United Nations and pressure from Western powers, the
SLORC, which renamed itself the State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC) several years ago, granted
conditional freedom to Suu Kyi, with whom it attempted
to engage in dialogue on several occasions.
At
the same time, the administration of US president Bill
Clinton took a series of steps throughout the 1990s to
increase pressure on the regime, including imposing a
ban in 1997 on new investment by US businesses in
Myanmar.
Members of the European Union also took
steps to isolate and pressure the government into a more
forthcoming position vis-a-vis Suu Kyi and the NLD, but
these measures were largely stymied by Chinese support
for the regime, as well as a policy of "engagement" by
Myanmar's neighbors, particularly Thailand, Singapore,
Malaysia and, more recently, India.
Hopes for
reform received a stunning setback last May 30 when Suu
Kyi, who had been trying to rally popular support to her
cause during a national tour, was again taken into
custody after her motorcade was attacked by a mob of
government supporters in the north of the country.
Scores of other NLD officials also were taken into
custody.
International outrage over the attack
further isolated the regime from the West, prompting a
shake up in the government. An inveterate hardliner,
Senior General Than Shwe, relinquished the premiership
to the head of military intelligence, Lieutenant General
Khin Nyunt, who, while no democrat, is believed to be
more sensitive than other members of the ruling junta to
international opinion, and the importance it accords to
re-establishing a dialogue with Suu Kyi.
At this
time, with evidence of shifts in its political approach,
the military junta - the State Peace and Development
Council (formerly the SLORC) and Prime Minister Khin
Nyunt announced a seven-step "roadmap" for
constitutional and political reform that includes the
convening of a national convention next month to draft a
new constitution.
In its analysis, however, the
International Crisis Group (IGC) stresses that the
military regime, including Khin Nyunt, has made similar
moves in the past, that it remains very much in control
of all the levers of power and that it has shown no more
enthusiasm for a rapid transition to a democratic system
than in the past. The national convention, for instance,
was last convened in 1993 but only lasted until 1996
when the NLD walked out under protest. Events this May
could well repeat themselves "with the same actors, the
same script and, quite possibly, the same ending",
according to the ICG.
"About the only basis for
any optimism is that Khin Nyunt is sensitive to demands
that Aung San Suu Kyi be released and given a role in
the transition, appears to be seeking some form of
accommodation with other political forces in the
country, and also appears to be conscious of the need to
make significant progress before Myanmar assumes the
ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations]
presidency in 2006," said the ICG. It concluded that the
new roadmap "provides at least a chance to begin a
process of longer-term political and economic change".
In the context of stalemate between Western
countries' pressures for comprehensive democratic reform
and Myanmar's neighbors, who prefer regional stability
and economic progress, Myanmar's other pressing problems
suggest that a new approach could command a broader
international concensus. These problems include
iron-fisted military control, a deteriorating economic,
humanitarian and human rights situation, alarming
increases in drug trafficking, illegal migration, and
rates of HIV-AIDS infection, said the IGC.
The
report cites three elements in a policy that might be
able to bridge the gap between Western and regional
positions and interests in ways that both maintain
external pressure for reform and build the capacity and
political will for change within Myanmar itself.
On the international front, both the West and
Myanmar's Asian neighbors should recognize that the
installation of an NLD-led government will not take
place in any foreseeable future and that constitutional
reform will necessarily be a gradual process.
These also should be prepared to offer carrots as
well as sticks to encourage the government to reform.
"There should be some flexibility on sanctions and
agreement on their gradual withdrawal as the government
makes visible progress on political and constitutional
reform," the ICG said. "And there should be
benchmark-based incentives for the resumption of
international lending and other economic development
support measures."
The international community should be willing to
extend aid without preconditions to support measures,
such as conflict prevention and resolution, that would
ease the country's internal tensions - including the
persistence of ethnic conflict - and provide
humanitarian assistance to people most in need.
Such a pragmatic, three-pronged,
carrot-and-stick strategy would take effect only after
Suu Kyi is given unconditional freedom and dialogue
between the government and the opposition resume under
the National Convention framework and in other forums,
according to the ICG. The group also called for UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan to propose to the Security
Council a plan for international engagement in the
process.
The report also noted that Myanmar's
Southeast Asian neighbors will themselves be under
greater pressure over the next 18 months to push for
reform because of Myanmar's scheduled assumption of the
chairmanship of ASEAN in 2006. Under the current
circumstances, such a high-profile position for Myanmar
could result in a "public relations disaster" for
ASEAN.
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