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Fearing Fernando, Filipinos turn back to
Arroyo By Marco Garrido
MANILA
- Slow but steady is winning the race. With just more
than one week before the presidential elections on May
10, and with the number of undecided voters wavering at
around 30 percent, Philippine President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo has taken the lead from movie star
Fernando Poe Jr.
The improvement in her standing
rests on many factors, which include the backing of a
party that is impeccably organized and superbly managed.
The electoral landscape has also shifted to Arroyo's
advantage, with the opposition remaining divided and
Poe's camp experiencing disarray, having failed to do
little extensive campaigning. Unlike Arroyo, Poe's
campaign is poorly managed; surrounded by the glitz and
glam more common to movie premiers than political
platforms. Moreover, Poe has emerged as a force to fear,
forcing many voters to swing toward Arroyo - seen
increasingly as perhaps the lesser of two evils.
When Poe officially announced his candidacy in
December, Arroyo lagged around a dozen percentage points
behind him in popularity. In fact, she was ranked third
on most presidential surveys, behind both Poe and her
former education secretary, Raul Roco. She has since
steadily crept her way up the rankings, displacing Roco
for second place, and, only as late as last month,
statistically tying Poe for first. Now she and her chief
opponent are showing different curves. While Poe's
campaign appears to have fizzled out, Arroyo's continues
to gain momentum. The latest surveys have given her a
three-point, a five-point and even a 10-point lead over
Poe. Pundits are heralding an Arroyo bandwagon. "And
while it is said that it ain't over until the fat lady
sings," writes Congressman Teddy Boy Locsin in the Today
newspaper, "we sense powerfully that the fat lady has
already signed a contract to sing at the victory party
of the small woman."
The sheer mathematics of
elections appears to be on Arroyo's side. What she lacks
in raw popularity she makes up for in organizational
strength. For one, her party machinery is formidable. So
extensive is its infrastructure that, in many cases, her
K-4 coalition is fielding an oversupply of candidates.
For the 211 seats being contested in the House of
Representatives, K-4 has 214 candidates, or a party
coverage of 101 percent. In contrast, Poe's coalition,
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP or Coalition of
United Filipinos), is fielding only 26 bets for 12
percent coverage. Arroyo's party also claims to control
60 of the country's 79 governors, as well as the
provincial governors of seven of the 10 most vote-rich
provinces.
Second, her campaign organization is
unparalleled. Arroyo's campaign strategist Ronald Puno
boasts contacts in each of the nation's 42,000
barangays (villages). "I have cell-phone numbers
in every town," he says. "I can call any town now and
find out what's happening there." And it is managed with
exceptional skill. For example, Arroyo would time her
release of campaign funds to provincial allies days
before the opposition was scheduled to visit. In her
speeches, she would consistently refer to a "down
payment" having been made - outwardly, a promise to
continue the reforms she has begun. But to political
allies, the "down payment" was code for future rewards
for continued loyalty.
Such apparent
organizational competence sells itself to campaign
donors, regardless of the candidate. The Arroyo campaign
acts as though it intends to win, and thus, is kept well
greased with the funds of donors anxious to ally
themselves with a winner.
But even if her
opponents could match her organization, which they
can't, Arroyo still lords a powerful advantage over
them: incumbency. And Arroyo is making full use of her
position to promote her candidacy. Government agencies
have taken out full-page ads loudly crediting her for
having expedited their services; she has distributed
health cards emblazoned with her picture, doubling as
campaign propaganda; and to curry favor with the
supporters of former president Joseph Estrada, she has
relaxed the conditions of his detention, allowing him to
stay at his rest house instead of inside a military
camp. Her critics have taken issue - they have filed a
disqualification suit against her with the Supreme Court
for alleged abuse of presidential powers - but in the
face of her ascendancy, their complaints seem more
querulous than substantive.
Ultimately, however,
her organization only partly accounts for her improved
standing. The electoral landscape also has shifted to
her advantage. Bloc-voting Christian sects El Shaddai
and Iglesia ni Cristo are poised to bless Arroyo with
millions of votes. Roco's sudden sick leave -
interpreted as a de facto withdrawal from the race - has
prompted defections from his camp to Arroyo's. But the
biggest factor explaining Arroyo's revival has been
Poe's decline.
The fear factor Poe's
vaunted electoral invincibility has proved to be both a
myth and a colossal miscalculation. After declaring his
candidacy, Poe seems to have forgotten he was running
for president. He posted such a wide lead over his
opponents that some pundits were already calling the
race. The Poe camp assumed that he would be carried into
Malacanang presidential palace by popularity alone and
neglected to callous their hands with hard campaigning.
Now, panicked and in disarray, his camp is paying for
its complacency.
For one, the opposition remains
divided. Ping Lacson corners a small but loyal
percentage of the opposition vote. These are voters
opposed to Arroyo but so afraid of Poe that they'd
rather cast their lots with an unwinnable candidate. The
Poe camp has shrugged off serious attempts at
reconciliation - at first because of complacency, now
because of pride (Lacson, on the other hand, has
remained obstinately delusional about his chances).
Minor hitches, such as scheduling conflicts and
unattended mobile phones, have been allowed to torpedo
talks. And now it appears that, out of sheer pride, the
opposition will remain a house divided against Arroyo's
juggernaut.
For another, Poe's campaign lacks
organization. Instead of building a proper party, the
campaign encouraged a cult of personality. "My party is
the people," Poe declared. Unfortunately, he overlooked
the necessity of having an organization to translate his
supporters' love into votes. The basic exigencies of
election day require organization: matters as simple as
transporting supporters to the precincts where they've
registered.
Moreover, the campaign is poorly
managed. It is run by a gaggle of courtiers, really -
family members and political puppet-masters - who grovel
at Poe's feet and growl at the media. They have run his
campaign as if they were promoting the latest
blockbuster: all glitz and glib. They treat Poe like a
movie star and cordon him off from those who expect a
presidential candidate.
The Poe campaign's
biggest liability, however, may be Poe himself. Despite
his handlers' best efforts to craft his image, the
campaign season has exposed Poe as unpresidential. He
refuses to engage in public debate. He says little -
even less of what he says can be understood through his
mumbling - and what is understood sounds trite or,
worse, suggests a terrifying incompetence. He has shown
streaks of belligerence, threatening to punch a
cameraman and humiliating a reporter on air by asking
her to take over his speech. These incidents have soured
the good faith of voters who approached him as an
alternative to Arroyo's relentless politicking. They
have eroded his following to the core that adores him
blindly.
These deficiencies have cost him
dearly. His campaign funds are drying up because
potential donors see him as a risky investment. Groups
that once backed him are defecting for the same reason.
The Muslims for Poe have renamed themselves the Muslims
for Ping. Blocs of the FPJPM - ostensibly the Filipinos
for Peace, Justice, and Progress Movement, but really
the FPJ (Poe's moniker) for President Movement - have
had to recontrive their acronym in shifting support to
Lacson. They settled for the decidedly less clever
Freedom and Justice for Ping Movement, the FJPM - which
one shouldn't confuse with the FPJM, the Freedom, Peace,
and Justice Movement, a distinct pro-Poe bloc that, as
it turns out, has also had to contend with defections.
"They're making us feel that they [the Poe camp] don't
need us at all," said Josefino Sanchez, an FPJM senior
organizer. Even some of the groups that stormed
Malacanang in 2001 in an effort to depose Arroyo and
reinstall Estrada have bucked Estrada's choice of Poe
and backed Arroyo.
A house of
sand Arroyo's lead seems to have sobered up the
Poe camp with a start. They have dismissed the latest
surveys as rigged (they used to brandish these surveys
like divine mandates when they showed Poe was in the
lead), mounted an offensive against Arroyo through
negative ads (they once claimed to shun them because it
was unmanly to attack a woman), and redoubled their
efforts to coax Lacson's withdrawal from the race. True,
Poe can still win, but his campaign's frantic activity
suggests the flailing of someone about to lose.
Arroyo, on the other hand, can still lose. The
surveys put the number of undecided and wavering voters
at about 30 percent. While they could, of course, swing
toward Poe at the last minute, it is more likely that
they won't. It has become clear that, while no one in
this race is really well liked, Poe is feared. The votes
accounting for Arroyo's lead are votes not so much for
her as against Poe. His candidacy has come to inspire
dread in uncommitted voters. So they have committed to
stopping him. This means that Arroyo's lead is built
upon a house of sand, which, once she wins, will
evaporate.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Co,
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