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SPEAKING
FREELY Big Brother Beijing blocks Yangon
reform By Kanbawza
Win
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online
feature that allows guest writers to have their say.
Please click here if you are interested in
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The Myanmar regime
has shown how to use Thailand's prime minister, Thaksin
Shinawatra, to promote its own interests, when, without
any regard for Thailand or its Association of Southeast
Asian Nation (ASEAN) partners, which have graciously
accepted the obnoxious Myanmar military junta into their
fold, even at the cost of disrupting the Asia Europe
Ministerial Meeting (ASEM), it vetoed the Bangkok
Process by refusing to attend.
It seems to
suggest that either the Myanmar generals, who have a
track record of broken promises, were uncomfortable
answering questions posed by the 17 nations scheduled to
participate in the Bangkok talks regarding the openness
of the constitutional process due on May 17, or they
simply have no intention of introducing a new process
and are unwilling to undertake democratic change.
During the 60th session of the United Nations
Human Rights Commission in Geneva recently, 53 nations
unanimously deplored the systematic violation of human
rights and the suppression of political freedom in
Myanmar. They also demanded the freedom of pro-democracy
opposition leader and Nobel Peace laureate Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi, lovingly known as Daw Suu.
But still
Myanmar stood its ground. So what is its rationale?
Its Pauk Paw, meaning dear Chinese
brother. Adhering to the rhetorical principle of
"non-interference in the internal affairs of neighboring
countries", China has quietly shored up the military
junta, and it is not at all unlikely that Beijing has
been behind the recent measures adopted by the regime.
In other words, it is possible that the generals have
been inspired by the Chinese ahead of any foreign
intervention that might lead to the installation of a
pro-American regime that could possibly be hostile to
China.
It should be noted that by exploiting the
junta's isolation, Beijing was able to maintain diverse
links with Yangon and to consolidate its military
influence in the Indian Ocean. It has established
invulnerable naval bases, equipped with sophisticated
monitoring and espionage systems, on Myanmar soil
opposite India's east coast. During the past few years,
China also has helped to cushion the sanctions imposed
on Myanmar by its neighbors and those in the West, and
China has been the only gateway open for the junta to
prolong its rule and to deal with the country's economic
problems. The scenario is somewhat similar to Pakistan's
role in Afghanistan, when it reminds us that if the
international community had met Islamabad's interference
with a firm position from the beginning, the Afghans
would have been spared six rough years of the worst kind
of human-rights abuses at the hands of the Taliban.
Myanmar senior generals have regularly been
visiting Beijing to sign bilateral deals, particularly
in the field of military cooperation. It has been
reported that since 1992, US$3 billion worth of
Chinese-made arms and security equipment has been pumped
into Myanmar, to tighten China's grip on the country's
generals. The Chinese arms sales have enabled the
Myanmar military to expand to a point where it could
occupy territories far beyond its previous reach. The
supply of such a large army, however, with military
expenditures eating up about 60 percent of the national
budget, was beyond the capacity of Myanmar's weak and
shrinking economy. This required the military to live
off the land - and in effect, the people - resulting in
further oppression, human-rights violations and refugee
flows. From this scenario, it can be said that China is
indirectly responsible for encouraging the egregious
human-rights violations that the military regime in
Myanmar is committing.
China aid: More than
meets the eye Beijing has provided Yangon with
loans and grants to ease its financial and economic
crises, and Myanmar Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt is
scheduled to visit China in July. The most recent
Chinese aid was a loan of $200 million, which does not
include the $72 million (600 million yuan) donated by
China for the extension of the Lashio-Muse railway or
the $20 million deal for the right to extract teak from
Kachin state in northern Myanmar.
What is
particularly conspicuous is that Htun Myint Hlaing, the
son of Asia World Co owner and opium king Lo Hse Han, is
involved with the Chinese counterpart CIFG (China
International Forest Group). Moreover, Htun Myint Hlaing
- also known as Steven Law - often goes to Singapore via
China as he holds two passports. The situation smells
fishy, and it could mean that China is helping the junta
in laundering narco-dollars via a Hong Kong bank that
can change yuan into dollars as one of its endeavors to
cushion the sanctions. Given the above, the Chinese role
in obstructing attempts by Thailand to bring Myanmar out
of its dark abyss with the Bangkok Process must be
worthy of consideration.
China has brazenly
defied the United States' latest attempts to isolate the
Myanmar military leadership, as Beijing moves to reclaim
the reform initiative with its own unique blend of
coercion and economic leverage. China has already
denounced the sanctions and given a clear indication
that it will not support efforts by the Western alliance
to isolate the junta, economically or otherwise.
Obviously, China wants to have people in Yangon who it
can deal with, and who aren't going to destabilize their
neighborhood and attract lots of unwanted attention from
Western Europe and the US. The bottom line is they
(Beijing) will probably support a diplomatic solution
that will be favorable to them and send Vice Premier
Madame Wu Yi to say a few words on the people's
participation before sending her to the US.
Beijing's pragmatic policy toward Daw
Suu Beijing's policy toward detained opposition
leader Daw Suu, who is seen as the most likely leader of
a democratic Myanmar, has been based on a strong dose of
pragmatism. Wary of social instability, China is
believed to have exerted a certain pressure on the junta
and has sought a more moderate response to political
activism. However, it might be a different matter if Daw
Suu were to establish a democratic government with an
assertive foreign policy, which would probably be more
sympathetic to the US and its allies. The Chinese
leadership will also be acutely aware of the personal
bond that exists between Daw Suu and Beijing's longtime
rival India, which gave her family a sanctuary after the
junta's predecessors forced her into exile in the early
1960s.
Daw Suu's National League for Democracy
(NLD) has lashed out at the junta's interdependency with
the Chinese military establishment. The NLD also was
unhappy with the Chinese infiltration into the Andaman
Sea, construed as a violation of Myanmar's sovereignty,
and could be expected to move swiftly to curtail
Beijing's sphere of influence if ever Daw Suu formed a
government. This hypothesis further compels Beijing to
support the regime.
On the one hand, China is
slowly polishing up its diplomatic image - it wants to
be construed as a big country undertaking regional
responsibility, as seen in its dealings with North
Korea. China's policy of good neighborliness and
friendship has been continuing with its economic
leverage throughout Asia, so much so that an article in
the Washington Post on November 15 said, "China is
building up a brand-new reputation among its neighbors."
The end line was to prove that it is not a big bully or
a threat to any other country. How far this is true in
the context of Myanmar is anyone's guess.
Traveling to the Chinese border and talking to
the Myanmar dissidents and the local people, it has
slowly dawned on me that in the "Depayin Massacre" last
May 30, when the junta implemented a premeditated
genocide to finish off Daw Suu and the NLD once and for
all, China had prior knowledge, if not tacit approval. A
Myanmar dissident commented: "We can clearly recollect
that starting from round about May 25, when Daw Suu was
traversing the countryside, the various branches of
Chinese intelligence men often ask us what is new.
Usually these kinds of question [were] asked once in a
while, but during that period they asked us almost at an
interval of three to four hours daily. Of course we were
bewildered by this behavior. It is only now that we can
conjecture why such irrational behavior."
Even
after the Depayin Massacre, when all the countries,
including Myanmar's fellow ASEAN members, showed their
disapproval, China was the only country in the world
that kept its mouth shut and carried on business as
usual. What is more, it lavished the regime with more
economic and military aid. To demonstrate its solidarity
it shored up the border forces. China's reinforcement is
a result of its fear that the regime in Yangon might
collapse suddenly because of domestic and international
pressure. As Daw Suu has been put under house arrest for
the third time, opposition voices are mounting,
including those of ASEAN, which is always reluctant to
interfere in the internal affairs of a member state.
A buildup on the border Under these
circumstances, if the regime can hold on to its rule,
its ability to control the border could deteriorate
dramatically, leading to fighting among warlords in the
region. For that and other reasons, China has seen the
need to strengthen its own defense of the border. The
Chinese argument is that, as with the situation on the
Sino-North Korean border, the changes on the
China-Myanmar border were clearly replacements, not
reinforcements. But the existing border police were not
removed; in fact, to make things more complicated and
mysterious, some of them were transformed into a
"mobility brigade". For local residents, this is one of
the signs of prewar preparations. The military buildup
of People's Liberation Army (PLA) 13th Army (nicknamed
the Chuan Army, as it hails from Sichuan province) was
most conspicuous in Jinghong, the capital of
Xishuangbanna autonomous prefecture. Since that time,
the field army stationed in Yunnan has been the 14th
Army. To all intent, the Chuan Army has broken the
convention and marched into the "taboo" region, a
possible indication of Beijing's desire to reinforce the
border and show support to the regime in Yangon.
It is also not surprising to see the massive
Chinese population in the city of Mandalay in central
Myanmar as well as in the rest of the country, for China
has reciprocated by giving up a small part of their
sovereignty in Yunnan province, especially in Kunming,
Mangshi and Ruili, where Myanmar security personnel roam
at will, singling out Myanmar dissidents such as Sein
Aye of the All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF),
arrested in Ruili and sentenced to 19 years in prison. U
Win Ko, an elected member of parliament from Sagaing and
a cabinet member of the National Coalition Government of
the Union of Burma (NCGUB), a parallel government to the
junta, was shot and killed in Kunming; the case was
hushed up by the Chinese.
It is high time that
the US and the West vigorously followed up with their
agenda to dislodge Myanmar's vehemently hated regime and
curb the big crafty bully China, which has become the
fourth-largest economy in the world and whose products
have become the largest component of America's trade
deficit.
From virtually zero in the 1980s,
America's trade deficit with China jumped to $103
billion last year. Thus, the US should consider revoking
China's most-favored-nation status - that would surely
hurt Chinese businesses - and apply pressure on the
World Bank to look more carefully at its China projects.
With all the unmet needs in the free countries of the
world, there is no reason why China should be the
largest customer of the World Bank, whose operations are
funded largely by US taxpayers. China has often violated
international norms, as in its sale of missiles and
nuclear technology to threatening regimes in countries
that include Syria, Iran and Iraq - and should be
condemned.
China has evidently helped to
maintain the status quo in Myanmar while the
pro-democracy groups and the people are paying a high
price. Nothing seems to have changed the Chinese
attitude toward Myanmar, and the sad fact is that
freedom for the people of Myanmar is probably not in the
cards. While the Berlin Wall crumbled with the Cold War,
apartheid was overthrown and East Timor, against all
odds, gained its independence, the winds of change have
bypassed Myanmar, because the big Pauk Paw is blocking
its way. With the Olympics coming to Beijing in 2008,
the international community should ask the people
sitting on the Dragon Throne, what about your little
brother, Myanmar?
It is high time for the
international community, especially ASEAN, to decipher
whether Beijing is a benign brother or a hypocritical
giant. With a track record of three border wars (with
India in 1962, the Soviet Union in 1969 and Vietnam in
1979) and the problem of the Nanhai Sea (Spratly
Islands) still unsolved, India and the ASEAN countries
should clearly rethink their policy toward Myanmar,
there is to be peace in Southeast Asia.
Professor Kanbawza Win, dean of AEIOU,
is formerly the secretary for foreign affairs of prime
minister of Burma, professor at the University of
Winnipeg and senior research fellow of the European
Institute of Asian Studies. He filed this article from
Kunming, China.
Speaking Freely is an
Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to
have their say. Please
click here
if you are interested in
contributing.
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