SYDNEY -
Fears that reclusive Myanmar might become the next rogue
terrorism state have receded amid indications that it
has probably failed to gain access to advanced missile
or nuclear-weapons technologies and has been forced to
halt the development of chemical agents. Is a Myanmar
sans missiles still a menace, and without advanced arms
just how rogue a state can it be?
Diplomats say
it seems that the military junta has now been rebuffed
by potential suppliers North Korea and China after a
reduction in tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and is
also unlikely to make much headway with Russian arms
exporters.
Recent speeches by senior army
officers suggest that Yangon's ambitions to overhaul its
military hardware are as strong as ever but may have
been blunted by intense diplomatic pressure from the
United States and its allies. "We have no reason to
believe that anything has changed in the armed-forces
mindset: if anything, the tone of recent statements [by
the junta] has been more strident. But equally, there is
no evidence they have been able to make much headway,"
said one diplomat.
Studies by the US Defense
Intelligence Agency have concluded that Myanmar's
motives for acquiring a new generation of weapons are
probably defensive, given the junta's historic
xenophobia over the vulnerability of its borders.
The missiles story has been around since 1983,
when it emerged that Myanmar was establishing a
chemicals plant that would later be used to develop
offensive weapons for use against rebellious ethnic
minorities. Artillery shells and possibly balloons
containing chemical agents may have been used in 1993-95
attacks against Karen insurgents who were fighting
government forces close to the border with Thailand.
Suspicion of this came in 1993 when the US Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention reported an outbreak of
intestinal illness among Karen villagers that was viewed
as "suspicious" because balloons attached to
meteorologic radiosondes and parachutes had been
recovered nearby.
Chemical attacks against
ethnic insurgents Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) officials told US congressional hearings in 1988
and 1991 that Myanmar had a chemical-weapons program,
and a 1992 US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) survey
reported that Yangon had "chemical weapons and artillery
for delivering chemical agents".
However, the
junta was hampered by a lack of delivery systems that
could reach more remote regions and is believed to have
started looking in the early 1990s for surface-to-air
missiles capable of carrying chemicals.
Possible
suppliers would have been North Korea and China, which
are believed to have helped set up the chemicals
stockpile. Myanmar does not have close diplomatic ties
with South Korea, India, Pakistan, Taiwan and Vietnam,
the only other Asian states that reportedly maintain
stockpiles.
North Korea launched a
chemical-weapons program in the 1960s, and by 1995, it
had the largest chemical-weapons capability in Asia,
according to the DIA study, "Worldwide Chemical Warfare
Threat Current and Projected", which identified the main
agents as blister, blood and nerve toxins.
Anecdotal evidence from Karen villagers, aid
groups and human-rights organizations suggests that
Myanmar may have used a blister agent against the ethnic
minorities, which would constitute a breach of the
Geneva Conventions on treatment of civilians and
combatants. Though Yangon is not a signatory to the
conventions, it is sensitive to its international
reputation and to a loss of diplomatic standing.
In addition to the blister agent, three other
chemical agents that may possibly have been used,
including a mild incapacant and a phosphorus shell, are
not strictly prohibited.
No evidence against
Pyongyang, Beijing A 1996 US Defense Department
report found no evidence that Pyongyang had matched
these chemicals to its small missile arsenal, though
later studies have been less conclusive. Most were
developed for use in artillery, rocket launchers,
mortars and spray tanks.
China, the closest ally
of North Korea, has available both the technology and
delivery systems that Myanmar desires. The Defense
Department report described China's chemical warfare
capability as "mature" and said it must be assumed that
agents had been fitted to ballistic missiles.
However, Beijing has sent strong signals in the
past two or three years that it wants to limit the
proliferation of chemical agents and missiles and has
been under US diplomatic pressure specifically to keep
advanced weapons away from Myanmar's unstable regime.
Despite this scrutiny, the US State Department
told the House of Representatives International
Relations Committee on March 25 that there was "reason
to believe" North Korea had offered Myanmar Scud
surface-to-surface missiles.
But while assistant
secretary of state Matthew Daley confirmed that some
military hardware had been delivered, he said there were
no indications that the hardware had included missile
technology. The CIA also played down this likelihood in
its most recent public testimony.
A CIA report
to Congress in November on weapons proliferation did not
mention Myanmar, even though it did refer to concerns
over North Korea's growing exports of ballistic
missiles.
The search begins The search
for missiles began in earnest after the US agreed in
1991 to sell Thailand advanced medium-range air-to-air
missiles (AMRAAMs) for its fleet of F-16 fighter planes,
which in effect neutralized Myanmar's acquisition of
MiG-29 interceptors from Russia.
Relations
between the neighbors have been strained for generations
because of Yangon's offensive against ethnic minorities
and a subsequent flow of refugees into Thailand.
Myanmar's ties with India and Bangladesh also are tense,
for similar reasons.
One diplomat said
Thailand's armed forces, which are better equipped and
have technological superiority over Myanmar's, had
accused Myanmar of inadvertently poisoning scores of
Thai nationals living in border regions during the
1993-95 attacks.
Pressure from Thailand and
possibly India is believed to have forced Myanmar to
freeze its chemical-weapons program, though it probably
still maintains a stockpile of agents and has not yet
ratified the main global covenants against the use of
chemical agents in warfare.
Wider diplomatic
pressure also is believed to have prevented Myanmar from
realizing its long-standing goal of obtaining nuclear
technology that could be used to manufacture
weapons-grade material.
The State Department's
Daley told the House of Representatives hearing that
"the Burmese [Myanmar was formerly called Burma] remain
interested in acquiring a nuclear research reactor,
[but] we believe that news reports of construction
activities are not well founded".
In January
2002, Russia offered to build a 10-megawatt nuclear
research reactor, and recent media reports have
suggested that some equipment may have been delivered.
But Myanmar insists that Moscow has only helped in
training technicians, and that it will not be ready to
operate a reactor for another two decades.
Some
diplomatic analysts concur, citing Russian statements
that Moscow scrapped the deal last year when Myanmar
failed to meet a payment demand.
As a signatory
of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Myanmar
is banned from developing nuclear weapons but can
operate a reactor for peaceful purposes under safeguards
laid down by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA).
Despite diplomatic pressure, there is
wariness over North Korea's potential as a fallback
supplier if Russia plays hardball, especially if China
elects to put commercial interests ahead of strategic
concerns and act as a broker through Pyongyang.
"I think there is an acceptance that China is
now committed to putting a stopper on North Korea's
nuclear ambitions out of an awareness of the potentially
destabilizing impact on North Asia and the [Korean]
peninsula in particular," said a diplomat.
But,
he added, "the Chinese do not look at the East in the
same terms. We are not looking at an imminent problem,
as it is obvious the Burmese have a limited
technological capacity for running nuclear power
stations; but it is difficult to feel wholly confident
when North Korea is in the picture."
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2004 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved.
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