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Southeast Asia

Indonesian courts scare off investors
By Bill Guerin

JAKARTA - "We would never see Indonesia again! I can't imagine any condition that would attract us back into that country," said Jim Bishop, vice president of New York-based Caithness Energy, in December 2000. Bishop was breathing a very audible sigh of relief after Cayman Islands-registered Karaha Bodas Co (KBC), 40.5 percent owned by Caithness Energy, won a US$261 million judgment, including $150 million in lost profits, from an ad hoc arbitral panel in Geneva against Indonesia's state-owned oil and gas company Pertamina.

The protracted legal wrangling between the two and Pertamina's attempts to challenge international rulings using Jakarta courts added to Indonesia's reputation for legal uncertainty. That reputation has not improved; in fact, investor sentiment has reached an all-time low in Indonesia. There is little faith in the local court system, which has failed to uphold international arbitration awards against local companies. The high country risk is made even worse by the increasing frequency of preposterous court decisions against foreign enterprises.

Despite this, the senior minister for the economy, Dorodjatun Kuntoro-Jakti, was to take to the podium in London on Thursday at a "highly exclusive summit" on a mission to persuade investors there to invest in Indonesia.

His mission comes only two days after the British Chamber of Commerce in Jakarta warned potential British investors to stay away, saying, "The law does not protect their investment here; it appears not to be impartial and fair."

A reported 31 percent slump in foreign direct investment for the first four months of this year serves to concentrate the mind, and sources in Jakarta said the minister planned to address the issue of Indonesia's legal system. Though conceding that there is a "large and deep-seated problem" after decades of neglect, he was expected to plead that legal reform is not an "overnight affair" and would need political will, funding and time.

Time appears to have run out long ago, and attempts like these to drum up investment will likely fall on stony ground.

Less than a decade ago, foreign investors and lenders gave scarcely a thought to the quality of Indonesia's legal system, preferring perhaps to turn a blind eye to the lack of a reliable and transparent commercial law system as they fought for pole positions in the country's fast-growing economy. The 1997 financial crisis changed all that. Since then, Indonesian commercial law has been the source of several disappointments for foreign investors and lenders.

Indonesia established the Commercial Court (Pengadilan Niaga) in 1998, along with the much-heralded bankruptcy law, both insisted on by the International Monetary Fund. The Commercial Court is tasked with handling bankruptcy and insolvency applications, though its jurisdiction can be extended to other commercial matters. Appeals from the Commercial Court go directly to the Supreme Court.

A case will not necessarily end once the Supreme Court renders its verdict. The next challenge is to enforce the verdict, and the case can be reopened by one of the parties to a dispute if they can furnish new evidence that has a bearing on the decision.

The new law was widely perceived as "creditor-oriented" and aimed mainly at helping foreign lenders to force local corporate creditors to the negotiating table. Instead, it has been used by well-connected local players to batter foreign investors or misused by the courts to force healthy companies to shut down.

In 2002, the Commercial Court declared solvent insurance company PT Asuransi Jiwa Manulife Indonesia, a unit of Canada's Manulife Financial Corp, bankrupt in a legal battle against its former local shareholder. The Supreme Court, however, overturned the verdict after protest from various parties, including the Canadian government.

Last month, the same court declared the local unit of Prudential, 94.5 percent owned by Prudential Assurance Co PLC, Britain's No 2 insurer, bankrupt for refusing to pay a contested debt. This was despite the Finance Ministry agreeing its assets were two and a half times the legal minimum.

"This case will indeed affect the investment climate," Kuntjoro-Jakti said at the end of last month when speaking to reporters about the Prudential farce.

As a Supreme Court review of the highly controversial bankruptcy order was awaited, a court in Medan, the provincial capital of Sumatra, last week annulled a purchase deal made by a majority-owned subsidiary of the British plantation group Rowe Evans. The company, Pangkatan Indonesia (PI), bought the Sennah plantation estate in March 2002 for Stg1.3 million ($2.3 million).

The Sumatran court ordered PI to return the shares and decreed that only the original investment should be repaid. The reasoning? Lawyers had argued that the company's British president, Matthew Adams, did not have a work permit when he signed off on the deal.

Under Adams' tenure PI paid off most of the acquired Stg575,000 of debt and boosted the plantation yields to almost double, said the company, which owns palm-oil, rubber and cocoa plantations in Malaysia and Indonesia. The verdict was "without any legal consideration" and would be fought "tooth and nail", Rowe Evans' executive chairman, Philip Fletcher, promised at a press conference. Hardly surprisingly, Rowe Evans is reconsidering a $30 million investment in Indonesia as a result of the ruling.

The saga of KBC, primarily owned by US companies Caithness Energy (40.5 percent) and Florida Power & Light (40.5 percent), helps illustrate just how tough a nut Indonesia is to crack. This March, Pertamina's new management finally agreed to pay the compensation, which was by then $294 million after taking interest into account. Fighting overt and rear-guard actions against a defiant Indonesian court eventually won the day for KBC, but it still hasn't collected a cent from Pertamina.

Pertamina's attempts to get the action moved back to the legal arena in Jakarta were an example of what has been termed "arbitral terrorism". This describes a scenario whereby countries obtain domestic court orders that aim to undermine arbitral proceedings or awards.

Though failing in the case of Pertamina, another round of terrorism in Indonesian courts may soon be needed to engage in battle with other foreign investors angry over broken contracts.

The biter may be bitten, as it were, if a planned multibillion-dollar lawsuit against the government over broken contracts in the mining sector succeeds. Twenty-two mining companies had appealed to the government to be allowed to resume their operations in protected forests after the implementation of Law No 41/1999 on forests banning open-pit mining in protected forests.

In March, 13 of the companies were allowed to resume operations (see Mining to resume in protected forests, March 17). The remaining nine will not be given licenses to resume their mining activities as no proven and economically viable reserves have been found in their areas. They are planning litigation at international arbitration courts on the grounds that their contracts with the government were made several years ago, before the law on protected forests came into effect.

There is also an ongoing arbitration case involving Mexican cement maker Cemex SA, which was not awarded a controlling stake in state-owned cement PT Semen Gresik as agreed in a 1998 privatization deal with the government. Cemex, the world's third-largest cement maker, could conclude its business operations in Indonesia if it fails to win arbitration proceedings filed against the Indonesian government with the World Bank's International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).

The debilitating downside of Indonesia's failure to address legal reform properly is the effect this has on attitudes of investors. Unlike capital flows to China and Thailand, which mostly represent long-term investments attracted by the upbeat economic prospects of both countries, major foreign companies continue to view Indonesia from the perspective of risk minimization.

Failure to attract needed investment and financing, and the thwarting of economic growth means huge missed opportunities for the country.

As Charles Humfrey, the British ambassador in Jakarta, put it when commenting on the Prudential case, "The solution is for the Indonesians themselves to come to. All we can do is underline the damage they are doing to themselves."

(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)


May 21, 2004



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(Apr 30, '04)

Indonesia's economy: Everything but money
(Oct 16, '03)


Indonesia gives up privatizing another asset
(Sep 16, '03)

 

         
         
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