The
US-led intervention in Iraq is going through a terrible
season. First, conflicts in Iraq have spiked, with more
allied casualties than at any time in the last year.
Second, a terrorist bomb in Madrid ushered in a new
government and a sharp U-turn for Spanish forces in
Iraq. Third, and still unfolding, are the revelations of
the ill-treatment meted out to Iraqi captives by US
forces. Will Asians endure?
How these issues
work out depends primarily on what Americans do. They
have led the way into Iraq, and Asians and others have
followed only after persuasion and pressure. The
Americans shape the conduct of affairs in Iraq almost
single-handedly. But while US leadership remains the
critical factor, there are growing concerns among
Asians.
Most who have supported US actions in
Iraq have done so in the face of growing popular opinion
against the United States, whether among US allies such
as South Korea and Japan, or in countries such as
Indonesia that have not supported US action.
No
Asian government has, however, opposed the United States
as strongly or consistently as Germany and France.
Popular opinion has not so far dictated foreign policy
for Asian governments. Most of them realistically
recognize that the US presence has been the single most
important factor for stability in the region since the
end of World War II.
Even if reluctant, Asian
governments have generally sought to engage the US since
September 11, 2001, and have either supported them or
limited the degree of their differences. This, however,
creates a democratic deficit between popular opinion and
government policy.
Grumbles have been growing
among Asians. There is a growing doubt that Americans
know what they are doing in Iraq, and know what next to
do. Beyond this, US policies toward the Middle East and
the Palestine-Israel issue are attracting more concern
and criticism. More, the horror stories of US conduct,
after all the talk of promoting democracy and freedom,
display a moral bankruptcy. Things could quite easily
tip the other way, and quickly.
Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld must either clean up or clear
out. This is the least that will help those who want to
help the United States.
During this year of
elections across Asia, another Madrid is possible. A
terrorist act carried out in the heat of elections could
help tilt results and policies regarding the US and
Iraq. Indeed, this is happening in South Korea. Popular
opinion within this US ally has turned sharply and the
new party in power is looking for a foreign policy that
is more independent of the US. In Japan, opposition to
its support for the US rose after the kidnapping of
three Japanese nationals, although this quieted with
their release.
Other Asian countries with
citizens in Iraq, whether as soldiers or civilians, will
have to run similar risks. Public attention over those
held, harmed, or killed will be inevitable, and there
are dangers that this may drive policy.
The US
under the administration of president Bill Clinton fell
into this error in Somalia when public images of
Americans killed led to its hasty withdrawal from that
war-torn country. The situation in Iraq must not suffer
the same "on-off" attention.
Longer-term
commitment is required. For even if the US paves the way
for the United Nations and then an Iraqi interim
government, US and international support will continue
to be necessary. The UN has, after all, little substance
without the will and resources of its member states. In
this regard, if indeed a handover is envisaged, the
effort must be to garner even more support, in Asia and
elsewhere.
With this in mind, a fine-tuning of
US policy in Asia is needed. Thus far, the US has
focused on political support, even if actual commitments
to assist were limited or even non-existent. The US has
also dealt with most Asian states on a bilateral basis,
focusing on internal conflicts within these states. This
must change, with efforts to gather a truly multilateral
commitment to help the UN and, when it is formed, an
Iraqi government.
For states to commit to this,
there must be a broader vision of order in the Middle
East and the world as a whole that they can accept. A
number of Asian states have experience in helping the UN
police and administer states in the complex tasks of
peace operations. This experience and the relative
neutrality of Asian states can be key elements in Iraq.
Two states in Southeast Asia that bear
particular attention are Thailand and Malaysia. In
Thailand, the troubles in the south need urgent
attention, whether by Thailand on its own, or with the
assistance of neighbors. This is important not just to
Thailand. The challenge will be to show there is no
irresolvable religious divide with the largely Muslim
south that requires heavy military action. It is to be
hoped that the situation is amenable to better politics
and peace-building. If so, the Thais should be
encouraged to take a substantial role in a UN operation
in Iraq.
One key Asian state would be Malaysia.
Its standing among the Islamic states, its experience in
the UN system, including its peace operations, and the
progressive Muslim example set by Prime Minister
Abdullah Badawi, would be important contributions to
attempts to seek longer-term solutions in Iraq.
Improvements in relations between Kuala Lumpur and
Washington, sour in recent years, should be sought.
It will not be enough for Asian governments who
are already in Iraq to endure only reluctantly just
because the United States tells them to do so. The
realism of needing to be on the right side of the US
administration can do only so much. If the present
difficulties there and against terrorism elsewhere are
to be resolved, it is vital for more Asians to be
convinced to take part in a deeper engagement.
Simon Tay is chairman of the Singapore
Institute of International Affairs and an associate
professor in the law faculty at the National University
of Singapore. He may be reached at
siia_chair@pacific.net.sg. This article was
originally published in the Straits Times (Singapore),
Comment & Analysis pages, on May 18, and is used by
permission of Pacific Forum CSIS.
