SPEAKING FREELY So much for the Spratly Islands
accord By Ronald A
Rodriguez
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have their
say. Please click hereif you
are interested in contributing.
Recent
events confirm that maritime territorial disputes in the
South China Sea remain an issue for East Asian
governments. Ownership of the resource-rich Spratly
Islands is still disputed, in whole or in parts, among
Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and
Vietnam.
In the first quarter of 2004 alone,
claimants took turns building up anxiety, raising
concerns about the sustainability of the status quo and
the ability of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties
in the South China Sea to ensure the claimants'
self-restraint. Under the declaration, signed in 2002 by
the 10 member states of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China, the claimants agreed to
avoid actions that could raise tension in the South
China Sea.
Two years after it was signed,
however, the parties are almost back to where they
started. Most, if not all, do not seem ready to allow
regional concerns to supersede their national interests.
For some critics, the declaration has been reduced to a
"flimsy piece of paper".
The first sign of
conflict came in February with the Philippines'
announcement of the Balikatan exercises with the United
States in the South China Sea. The Philippine action
appeared to be driven by Manila's growing uneasiness
over an increasing number of visits by Chinese research
vessels and warships in the Spratly Islands and the
sudden appearance of new Chinese markers on the
unoccupied reefs late last year. The mounting tension
did not dissipate until Philippine President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo assured the region that the military
exercises did not have anything to do with the maritime
territorial disputes.
Then it was Taiwan's turn.
On March 23, a Taiwanese speedboat carrying eight
individuals landed on the Ban Than Reef and swiftly
constructed a makeshift "bird-watching stand". Vietnam
strongly condemned Taiwan's move and demanded an end to
the construction activities. Le Dung, spokesperson of
Vietnam's Foreign Ministry, branded Taiwan's handiwork
"an act of land grabbing expansion that seriously
violated Vietnam's territorial sovereignty" and warned
against the possible consequences of Taiwan's
"adventurism".
Taiwan's action did not go
unanswered. Two days after the Ban Than Reef incident,
Vietnam reaffirmed its sovereignty over the Truong Sa
(Spratly) and the Hoang Sa (Paracel) atolls by
announcing it would hold an inaugural tourist boat trip
to the contested islands.
Then China decided to
conduct a PLA Navy drill in the South China Sea on April
12, sending signals to the other claimants to back off.
This did not stop Vietnam. Unfazed, Hanoi gave
its white navy ship HQ988 the go-ahead to sail for the
atolls with about 60 tourists and 40 officials on April
19. Many saw the controversial eight-day round trip as
just the beginning of Vietnamese tourism activities in
the area, following the Malaysian lead a few years ago.
What happened to the 2002
declaration? This maneuvering for advantage in
the South China Sea reveals the frailty of the
aforementioned declaration. In November 2002, the region
celebrated in Phnom Penh the signing of the landmark
declaration to avoid raising tension in the South China
Sea. The non-binding nature of the declaration, however,
did concern some of the signatories.
There are
two views on the value of the declaration. Mark
Valencia, an ocean policies expert at the Honolulu-based
East-West Center, typifies the skeptic's view. He
anticipated the declaration was doomed and considers it
a flawed attempt to reduce the heat over territory in
the South China Sea. This view sees the declaration to
be a self-deceiving exercise that satisfied ASEAN's
thirst for political accomplishment, but did not offer
profound changes in the security situation. Valencia
emphasizes that such a loose agreement will not prevent
claimants from positioning themselves strategically in
the lingering dispute.
The other view grants
some merit to the declaration. Aileen Baviera of the
University of the Philippines' Asian Center, for
instance, cautions against a rush to judgment and
outright dismissal of the declaration, arguing the
claimants' constant reference to the declaration
suggests parties continue to find value and purpose in
its spirit. In this sense, the declaration has value as
a referent, and modifies the behavior of the parties to
the South China Sea dispute. The Philippines' and
China's efforts to downplay their navy drills as part of
regular security routines and unrelated to the maritime
territorial disputes indicate a turnaround in their past
self-assured positions.
Quo
vadis? However, the recent moves by Taiwan and
Vietnam cannot be downplayed. It is time to reassess the
declaration and see how similar incidents can be
avoided.
For one, the parties should start
molding a set of guidelines that will diminish the gray
areas in the declaration. The declaration should define
the 10 points the parties have agreed on and seek
strategies to activate them as soon as possible. The
mounting criticisms of the declaration should create
momentum for greater interest in a more binding
agreement.
In addition, the parties should build
on the prospects for regional cooperation emerging from
China's decision to sign the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation (TAC) with ASEAN on October 8, 2003. While
committing ASEAN and China to a non-aggression pact, the
TAC also increases the possibility of a more binding
agreement on the South China Sea in the future.
Optimists and skeptics share the view that
dialogue is a basic need in the South China Sea. But any
fresh initiative should emphasize the need for progress
in cooperative endeavors rather than dwell on
infractions. The parties can begin with the six proposed
areas of cooperation on the declaration, which include
marine environmental protection, marine scientific
research, safety of navigation and communication at sea,
search and rescue operation and combating transnational
crime.
Regardless, Taiwan will continue to be a
problem. To date, China has refused to allow Taiwan to
become a signatory to any legal accord in the South
China Sea. Yet any failure to consider Taiwan's
interests will allow it to play spoiler. A peaceful
resolution to the disputes requires effective management
of the Taiwan problem.
In hindsight, probably
the lack of sustained dialogue weakened the foundations
of the declaration. The parties overlooked the fact that
continuous interaction is an equally important element
of the signed declaration. While an informal working
group still convenes, the gradual retreat of catalysts
such as Canada and Indonesia, as well as key individuals
like Ambassador Hasjim Djalal, an Indonesian special
adviser to the minister of of maritime affairs and
fisheries, has impeded negotiations. The parties may not
readily agree, but it appears the South China Sea needs
another intermediary. Takers anyone?
Ronald A Rodriguez is head of the
Northeast Asia Program and Officer in Charge of the
Security and Strategic Studies Program of the Center for
International Relations and Strategic Studies (CIRSS),
Foreign Service Institute of the Philippines. He is
currently a Vasey Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS, a US
think-tank based in Honolulu, Hawaii.
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online
feature that allows guest writers to have their say.
Please click hereif you
are interested in contributing.
