During a
maritime security conference in Singapore in May, a
Singaporean delegate called for maritime patrols by US
and Japanese naval vessels. This move echoed a comment
made in March by Admiral Thomas Fargo, commander of the
US Pacific Command, that the United States was
considering the deployment of special forces or marines
on speedboats to combat maritime terrorism in the
Malacca Straits, the narrow waterway bordering Malaysia,
Singapore and Indonesia through which a third of the
world's trade passes.
Both calls were
immediately opposed by Malaysia and Indonesia, who
rejected the proposal as an infringement of their
sovereignty. The diverse positions regarding maritime
patrols in the Straits stem from a combination of
historical factors and strategic interests. However, the
differences among the three in regard to a regional
security role for the US and Japan are more nuanced than
they appear, and neither Singapore's embrace nor
Malaysian and Indonesian rejections should be taken at
face value.
The declining role of
history All three countries were occupied by
Japan during World War II; that history set a bottom
line for Southeast Asian leaders. But strategic factors
have begun to push this concern aside for the three
nations. An invitation to Japan from Singapore, a
country with an ethnic-Chinese majority that suffered
more than ethnic Malays in Malaysia and Indonesia, is
proof that history matters less than strategic
interests.
Outside influences Since
its foundation, the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) has emphasized regional solidarity and
the exclusion of outside influences from the region.
While this was not practical at the time of the Cold War
and hot wars in Vietnam and Cambodia, when the
socialist/communist states of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia
and Myanmar joined ASEAN in the late 1990s the
organization had an opportunity to revisit these
objectives.
On maritime-security issues, the
desire to exclude outside influences is most closely
shared by Malaysia and Indonesia, the two countries that
view actions in the Straits as a sovereign issue.
Singapore's increasing cooperation with the United
States, such as preparation for port calls by US
aircraft carriers, is a divergence from the policies of
the other two countries. This stems from Singapore's
greater emphasis on Straits security as a national
strategic interest; the other two countries have broader
sets of security priorities. Fear of its bigger Muslim
neighbors, Indonesia and Malaysia, is often cited as a
reason for Singapore's flirtations with outside powers.
Though this may be true, Singapore also argues that
Indonesian and Malaysian maritime-security shortcomings
are the real concern and that the call for US and
Japanese help is intended to be a wake-up call.
The China factor Southeast Asian
countries also view China's rising naval power with
caution. For this reason, their attitude toward the US
presence in the region is ambiguous. Despite vocal
opposition to permanent basing by the US fleet, a less
visible presence, such as bilateral assistance from and
joint training with US forces that upgrade local
military capabilities, is welcomed by both Malaysia and
Indonesia. Malaysia has participated in joint naval
exercises with the United States. And Indonesia's lack
of participation is not the result of its reluctance,
but of US sanctions imposed after human-rights
violations were committed by the Indonesian military in
East Timor.
In Malaysia, the fear of the
People's Republic of China has been enhanced by a
history of PRC interferences during the 1960s when
Beijing aided local communist insurgencies. Historical
fear of Japan is matched, if not outweighed, by China's
more recent "history problem" with Malaysia.
Nevertheless, the three ASEAN countries are not
interested in antagonizing China over enhanced
cooperation with the US and Japan. China is recognized
as an important mediator that can be engaged and used to
deter other superpowers. China has been invited to major
regional anti-terrorism meetings along with the US and
Japan.
Expectations for Japan Despite
being divided about Japanese patrols, the three
Southeast Asian governments agree that Japan, whose oil
imports depend on security in the Malacca Straits, needs
to contribute to that security. Jakarta has requested
that Japan give foreign aid to allow Indonesia to
purchase more patrol boats. Japan's aid provisions,
which ban military aid, have prevented this. Similar
wishes are also coming from Malaysia, if only
informally. Related calls for assistance can be found in
the dual-use areas of civilian and military
technologies, such as satellite intelligence gathering,
maritime traffic monitoring and real-time information
sharing. Japan's contribution to the International
Maritime Bureau's Piracy Reporting Center in Kuala
Lumpur is acknowledged but considered insufficient.
Financial and technical aid from, and even joint
training with, Japan are welcome. They increase the
resources available to those governments in absolute
terms and also diversify the sources of assistance for
Southeast Asian countries, reducing their current
dependence on the United States.
International Law Recent US
pronouncements regarding the Regional Maritime Security
Initiative now emphasize enforcement of maritime
security by the littoral states of Singapore, Malaysia
and Indonesia. The controversial idea of deploying US
special forces or marines to patrol the Straits has been
scaled down.
International law allows
involuntary onboard inspections of foreign-flag vessels
in international waters only in special circumstances,
such as hostage taking and slave trading. In the Malacca
Straits, the littoral states recognize rights of passage
by foreign vessels through their territorial water but
tightly retain sovereign rights of law enforcement
against vessels suspected of more common crimes, such as
smuggling and sea robberies. Thus it was likely that the
US call that pushed the limits of international law
merely intended to provoke discussions on this urgent
matter.
The diverse responses of the three
Southeast Asian countries to the proposed naval patrols
in the Malacca Straits by the US and Japan reflect
differences in their strategic objectives. Those
differences may not be as sharp as they appear.
ASEAN solidarity against interventions by
external powers plays an important role in the three
countries' thinking. Their calculations are
predominantly shaped by realpolitik, and their
desire to create a more complex balance of power in the
region. Ironically, the best way for the ASEAN countries
to check unwanted interventions by any major external
power (the US, China, Japan, India and possibly South
Korea), would be to invite them all on a limited scale,
so that the external powers would balance among
themselves. Such a move might put ASEAN governments in
the driver's seat when it comes to multilateral security
cooperation in the Straits: outside powers would play
supporting roles and leave enforcement to the littoral
states themselves.
Yoichiro Sato is an
associate professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for
Security Studies (Honolulu, Hawaii). He can be reached
atsatoy@apcss.org. The
views expressed in this article are personal opinions
and do not reflect the official policy or position of
the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, the
Department of Defense, or the US government. This
article is used by permission ofPacific Forum
CSIS.
