SPEAKING FREELY Lessons from the 'war on
terror' By Dr Khoo How San
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Recent
successes in capturing al-Qaeda operatives in a number
of "front-line" states reaffirm that behind-the-scenes
intelligence work is ever so vital. Meanwhile, as the
third anniversary of September 11, 2001, approaches, the
conduct of the "more visible" global "war on terror"
requires a re-evaluation.
After September 11, a
war with a clear objective was waged by states - a
United States-led coalition against al-Qaeda (a
non-state threat) and its state sponsor, Taliban-ruled
Afghanistan. Today, it is the shadowy contest that seems
likely to decide the outcome.
Arguably, the
military failure to rout al-Qaeda - when its center of
gravity was still located within a state haven
(Afghanistan) and when it had structure and form - and
the opaque consequences of the Iraqi campaign created
what will now have to be a long-drawn military and
non-military contest.
This contest needs to be
waged more by a matrix of states, and less a US-led "war
on terror", against what has now morphed into a truly
transnational jihadi threat from al-Qaeda and its
affiliates.
For sure, Iraq must not become a
"failed state", which means the coalition to help it
rebuild itself must stay the course.
But the
enemy has learned a key lesson: that states are
vulnerable to transnational threats. The enemy has also
learned that it, too, is vulnerable if it depends on
static headquarters and bases, ergo, state havens.
Indeed, al-Qaeda and its affiliates such as
Jemaah Islamiyah have learned to "franchise" their
deadly business, while dispersing lower-echelon leaders.
Their mission statement is to reach out to disaffected
Muslims everywhere with the message that the current
state system, a Western imposition (and one that
allegedly favors Zionist Israel), has to be overthrown
by violent means. A global jihad is the only way to
achieve this. And there is no immediate time frame.
Connected by the Internet, sleeper cells, false
passports and couriers, for example, adherents may hide
and bide their time, striking as opportunity permits, so
to speak.
What should "our" side - states that
wish to survive and get on with life in the current
states system, with its warts and all - have learned by
now?
The momentum for global cooperation against
the enemy cannot slacken, of course. But the enemy is a
global jihadi terrorist network, not a state. Rules of
engagement don't count. The labels "war on terrorism"
and "war on terror" have not proved to be rallying
calls. More precisely, these labels have come to be
associated with a US-driven campaign.
On the
plus side, the recognition by states of a globally
networked "non-traditional security" threat has driven
intelligence cooperation and sharing that would not have
been otherwise so forthcoming, especially between
nations still suspicious of each other in the
"traditional security" sense.
Importantly, too,
there is recognition of the need to cooperate in efforts
to cut off one lifeline of the global jihadi network -
funds, whether raised illegally through criminal
activities or legally through such conduits as charity
organizations. The record to cut off another key
lifeline - the supply of suicide jihadis - has been less
impressive.
On the minus side, it is becoming
evident that the invasion of Iraq has diverted effort
and resources from the US-led hunt for the remaining
al-Qaeda leaders and, worse, created an even more
elusive, rejuvenated enemy network.
What should
be the template ahead, three years after September 11?
First, a way must be found to offer hope for a
resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli issue. The
majority of moderate and modernist Muslims despise
al-Qaeda for the terrorist network it is but are
sympathetic to the Palestinians for their nationalistic
cause even if their violent methods of seeking redress
are unacceptable. But the jihadis' propaganda has
widespread appeal, and unless the Palestinian issue has
hope for an equitable solution, moderate Muslims can
only fight the jihadis with their hands tied.
Second, everyone from senior officials to the
man in the street must realize that the global jihadi
threat driven by the al-Qaeda-led network is a real and
present danger to all who do not want to see a world
dominated by the ideological demagogues who are the
network's shadowy leaders. True, such a notion seems
laughable now, but the jihadis are in it for the long
haul.
Finally, global cooperation and allied
unity are ever vital, but it is time to acknowledge that
states are guided by their own experiences and
circumstances. The common denominator is their own fight
against the jihadi networks. In Southeast Asia's case,
it starts with convincing its Muslim populations that
the threat to their way of life from the Jemaah
Islamiyah network, reliably accepted to have links to
al-Qaeda, is real, and in formulating counter-terrorism
strategies appropriate to each country.
Khoo How San has a PhD in strategic
studies and is an associate fellow with the Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore) and a part-time
lecturer at the National University of Singapore. This
article is a personal comment.
Speaking
Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest
writers to have their say. Please click hereif you
are interested in contributing.
