SPEAKING
FREELY Bali
in the shadow of terror By
Yeo Wei Meng
Speaking Freely is an Asia
Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click hereif you
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Shortly
before midnight on October 12, 2002, a devastating
terror attack was launched at the beachside town of Kuta
on the island of Bali, Indonesia. Two bombs exploded in
quick succession in Paddy's Irish Pub and outside the
Sari Club. The blast and subsequent fires left more than
202 people dead and several hundred injured, most of
them young vacationers from Australia and other Western
countries.
It has been exactly two years since
the Bali bombings, an event that introduced the world to
al-Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the pioneer
vanguard of Islamic militants in Southeast Asia. The
question now is, what has become of JI and what are its
prospects?
With the arrest of many senior JI
operatives, it might appear that the group's capacity
and capability to mount large-scale coordinated
operations aimed at destroying multiple domestic and
foreign targets within the region have been dented.
However, this is clearly not the case. The JI network in
Southeast Asia remains intact and retains the capacity
and capability to mount another operation of Bali's
scale, as was made clear by last month's attack on the
Australian Embassy in Jakarta.
JI network
resilient and robust There are many reasons for
believing that the JI threat in this region will
continue to exist. Even with the arrest of senior JI
operatives such as Hambali in Thailand, the JI network
has proved to be resilient and robust. One regional
intelligence agency has estimated that there are about
400 JI members in Indonesia alone, of whom only 80 have
been arrested.
Moreover, JI's cell structure has
become more streamlined, without the different layers of
communication that once characterized the outfit and
made it more vulnerable to intelligence infiltration.
There is now no longer a regional shura (an
assembly that meets for mutual consultation). Nor are
there the mantiqis, districts or territories,
made up of several branches, or wakalahs, that
once composed the JI organization. The whole outfit has
been reconfigured, making it harder for intelligence
agencies to keep track. Now JI is a loosely defined
network of independent cells playing the most
predominant roles under the leadership of several key
individuals in the JI central command.
There are
also indications that JI is breaking into smaller
independent splinter groups. Last December, Malaysian
marine police detained a small boat off the coast of
Sabah and detained the crew. Under interrogation last
month, one of them, an Indonesian named Ahmad Said
Maulana, said he was involved in a plot to drive an
explosives-laden vehicle into the national police
headquarters in Jakarta, officials say. The attack was
planned for early July, to coincide with Indonesia's
national Police Day celebrations. Ahmad, now in custody
in Malaysia, told his interrogators he was a member of a
previously unknown radical group called Republik
Persatuan Islam Indonesia a splinter group of JI.
Apart from Republik Persatuan Islam Indonesia, regional
security agencies also are observing the activities of
another JI offshoot, Batalion Abu Bakar.
Senior JI members still active A
number of senior members in the JI central command are
also still active in the region, among them Dr Azahari
Husin and Abu Hanifiah, the leaders of JI's Malaysian
cell. Yasin Syawal, who is JI founder Abdullah Sungkar's
son-in-law and the current head of Laskar Jundullah, the
militant wing of the Indonesian Mujahideen Council
(MMI), is also still at large. Another important
individual on the run is Zulkarnaen, believed to be the
head of Laskar Khos, an Arabic phrase meaning "special
force", whose members are prepared to die in their
attacks.
It is also likely that one of the two
Singapore JI members who were not apprehended by
Indonesian authorities will replace Mas Selamat Kastari,
the alleged head of the Singapore branch of JI who was
arrested in February 2003, as the chief of JI's
Singapore operations. Other senior members who have been
on the run include Zulkifli Marzuki, JI's chief
financier; Noordin Din bin Mohammed, aka Top, a top
explosives expert; and Zulkifli bin Hir, the current
leader of Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), who is
suspected to be hiding in Mindanao.
In addition,
while the arrest of Hambali in September 2003 in
Thailand has hurt JI's capability, the al-Qaeda-JI nexus
will remain, as many senior JI operatives formed links
with higher-ranking al-Qaeda agents while serving in
Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. For example,
both Yasin Syawal and Zulkarnaen were the first batch of
Indonesians who were trained in a camp led by Abdul
Rasul Sayyaf, the Afghan mujahideen commander, a close
aide to Osama bin Laden. As such, the capture of Hambali
will provide an opportunity for other individuals from
the central command of JI to take control of al-Qaeda
operations in Southeast Asia while also maintaining
close contacts with senior al-Qaeda operatives.
Laskar Khos and suicide bombing Laskar
Khos also adds a new dimension to JI's military
capabilities. Known as the elite "special forces" in the
network, the unit emerged as early as 2000 in Poso, on
the island of Sulawesi. Though it is difficult to
ascertain how many people there are in the group, given
that it is even more shadowy than JI, the members are
drawn from individual terrorist cells. Under the
stewardship of Zulkarnaen, Laskar Khos's objective is to
carry out assassination and bombing operations.
In addition, JI remains a threat in that the
group has added suicide bombing to its attack
capabilities. Both the 2002 Bali bombings and the JW
Marriott Hotel blast in August 2003 involved suicide
bombers. So did the 2002 McDonald's blast in Makassar,
South Sulawesi, committed by Laskar Jundullah, a JI
associate group. Unfortunately, because of the
"effectiveness" of suicide bombing, it is likely there
will be more attacks of this nature.
While
regional security agencies are working tirelessly to
combat terrorism, JI is working to rebuild its own
capabilities to launch another attack. Like al-Qaeda, JI
places great emphasis on training, and currently is
refocusing its efforts on mounting large-scale
operations in the region. JI is rebuilding its
capabilities on the fringes of the archipelago,
especially in East Kalimantan, the Riau islands and
conventional strongholds such as Sulawesi and Maluku,
where several of its members have bloodied their hands
in sectarian and religious conflicts in recent years.
Some JI members have even reportedly regrouped and have
been lying low in Bangladesh and Pakistan preparing for
another attack in Southeast Asia.
No plans to
stop funds Security agencies have yet to come out
with a coherent plan to stop funds being channeled to
terrorist groups such as JI. Though countries in the
region have clamped down on illegal money laundering
activities, it must be noted that funds used in the
financing of terrorism do not necessarily derive from
criminal activity, which is a requisite element of most
existing money laundering offences. Currently in
Indonesia, it is estimated that 15-20% of Islamic
charity funds are diverted to various politically
motivated groups, and even some terrorist groups. For
example, Laskar Jundullah has receive funding from
Kompak, the largest Islamic charity organization in
Indonesia, as well as from the Al Haramain foundation,
an international charity based in Saudi Arabia.
Therefore, successful participation in this fight by the
financial sector requires global cooperation between
governments and financial institutions. The latter can
assist governments and their agencies in the fight
against terrorism through prevention, detection and
information sharing. They can also prevent terrorist
groups from accessing their financial services; assist
governments in their efforts to detect suspected
terrorist financing; and promptly respond to
governmental enquiries.
Another related point is
that some countries have yet to confront the issue of
terrorism head-on. Though JI cells were successfully
thwarted and neutralized in Singapore, Malaysia and the
Philippines, Indonesia continues to be the proverbial
stick in the mud. The Indonesian government has been far
too cautious in confronting the JI problem. Even after
Bali, Jakarta has only gone after JI members directly
connected to the Kuta Beach bomb blast, not JI as an
organization and not its political wing, the MMI. For
example, any individual in Indonesia who is known to be
a JI operative cannot be arrested unless he commits or
attempts to commit an unlawful act. As a result, JI will
be able to operate inside Indonesia and continue to use
Indonesia as a launching pad for attacks on its
neighbors.
Last but not least, the international
environment has become more favorable for Islamic
militants. The worsening of the Israel-Palestine issue
and the ability of al-Qaeda to survive and retaliate in
Middle East, East Africa and Southeast Asia have
unleashed a torrent of support. The US occupation in
Iraq will only compound the problem and swell the flow
of recruits and other forms of support to Islamic
militants and radical Islamic political groups pursuing
an aggressive agenda based on terror in the near future.
Conclusion Despite regional security
agencies' success in disrupting the JI network in
Southeast Asia, JI remains a threat and will continue to
be a scourge in the region for the foreseeable future.
So long as the factors discussed above exist, the JI
network will remain intact. JI operatives are indeed
currently moving across borders, establishing lines of
communication among themselves, and maintaining their
operational capability.
The "war on terrorism"
in Southeast Asia will be long and arduous. Governments
in this region must work together if they are to have
any chance of eliminating the JI threat. The JI specter
is still with us and it is essential to exorcise it
before more innocent lives are lost.
Yeo
Wei Meng, a former research analyst for the
Political Violence and Terrorism Program at the
Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, is currently
working toward a master's degree at the Edmund Walsh
School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in
Washington, DC.
Speaking Freely is an
Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to
have their say. Please click hereif you
are interested in contributing.
