Deviation in the democracy
roadmap By Phar Kim Beng
In
another sign that Myanmar's military junta is
eliminating internal differences, Prime Minister General
Khin Nyunt was replaced by a top member of the country's
ruling junta, Lieutenant General Soe Win, 56; described
as a trusted deputy to the country's top general, Than
Shwe.
Senior General Than Shwe, 71, currently
heads the ruling junta and controls the army. As the
country's highest-ranking leader and a military
hardliner, he is strongly opposed to allowing any
political role for opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.
Together with Vice Senior General Maung Aye, who
is widely considered the second-most powerful man in the
country and a career solider, both have exerted a grip
on Myanmar. And now that Soe Win has been installed as
prime minister, the first three positions in the junta
belong to the hardliners for the first time since 1988.
"Low-ranking officers have been removed before,
but never this high. This is new for this dog-eat-dog
business," Aung Zaw, editor of the Irrawaddy, a news
magazine published by Myanmar journalists in exile, told
Inter Press Service. "The timing is also surprising," he
added, since Yangon had let Khin Nyunt acquire a high
international profile by nominating him as the prime
minister last year.
Although Khin Nyunt was part
of the group that in 1988 crushed pro-democracy
demonstrations during widespread street clashes that
left more than 1,000 people dead, unlike the hardliners,
he was at least prepared to discuss the release from
house arrest of pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi.
All other hardliners were against such a move.
According to The Washington Post, "Khin Nyunt
was the principal figure on whom Southeast Asian
officials counted to build a policy of engagement with a
reclusive regime. Regional officials preferred that
approach to strong economic sanctions, such as those
imposed on Burma [Myanmar] by the United States."
Khin Nyunt's reputation as a relative moderate
was partly a result of his having negotiated ceasefire
agreements with 17 armed ethnic organizations, including
several major groups. Prior to his arrest, he was in the
process of opening negotiations with the Karen ethnic
minority.
Nevertheless, Khin Nyunt's removal
should not be seen as a surprise, especially in the
context of Myanmar's history of factionalism. The junta
that took power in 1988 (initially called the State Law
and Order Council, or Slorc), has seen its share of
power struggles. In November 1997, much of the top tier
of both Slorc and the cabinet were fired; some
individuals were placed under house arrest. Slorc was
renamed the State Peace and Development Council, or
SPDC.
The only members of Slorc still active in
the current government are Than Shwe and Maung Aye.
Khin Nyunt, however, was no defender of
political and civil liberties, either, during his years
as the head of Myanmar's military intelligence wing. He
was seen as part of the powerful troika that suppressed
a nation of nearly 50 million people.
But with
Khin Nyunt's removal, the so-called "roadmap" to restore
the democratization process in Myanmar is now
effectively dead. Just last month, Khin Nyunt played a
major role in reconvening the National Convention, which
had been stalled since 1996. The goal was to draft a new
constitution, the first step in the junta's seven-step
roadmap to reintroduce democracy, despite a boycott by
the main opposition party.
The opposition
National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Suu Kyi,
boycotted the convention after the military government
refused to release Suu Kyi and NLD vice chairman Tin Oo
from house arrest. The Shan Nationalities League for
Democracy, which is allied with the NLD, also joined the
boycott.
With Khin Nyunt gone, the first step is
therefore eliminated. This lends credence to the belief
that the junta's hardliners were never interested in
peace anyway.
"Khin Nyunt[s] attempt to convince
the international community that the SPDC is serious
about change has finally been unraveled with his
arrest," Win Naing, managing editor of New Vision, told
IPS. "He never had any power to decide change," added
Win Naing, whose monthly journal is published by Burmese
journalists in exile. "Than Shwe has remained in control
and he has proved this by crushing Khin Nyunt," he
stressed.
To be sure, the National Convention
has also run into its own difficulties: the 13 ethnic
groups that participated in the convention all sought to
have their own separate provinces and prime ministers,
something the junta clearly opposes. Instead, the junta
is seeking a tightly centralized polity, apparently to
prevent the breakup of Myanmar due to its ethnic
diversity.
Myanmar's 50 million people reflect the
country's ethnic diversity, which includes the Burmans,
the largest minority group, and seven others with
sizeable numbers - the Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni,
Mon, Rakhine and Shan.
The idea of achieving
equality among all these ethnic groups was a feature
recognized in the 1947 Panglong Accord, the document
that defined Myanmar's - then known as Burma's -
independence from British rule. However,
military-dominated regimes have failed to uphold the
accord in practice, resulting in decades-long armed
conflicts between Yangon and ethnic rebels.
Hints of Than Shwe going after Khin Nyunt to
consolidate the power of the junta's hardliners began to
emerge in late September following the firing of foreign
minister Win Aung, a moderate and ally of Khin Nyunt.
Myanmar watchers also saw cracks appearing within the
military regime over the growing international criticism
being leveled against it, ranging from UN secretary
general Kofi Annan, to the US government to the European
Union.
"The power struggle between the
intelligence wing and the army had been brewing for some
time," said Aung Zaw, the editor. " Now the hawks in the
army have come on top."
That raises the
question, will the 10 countries in the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) seek to remove Myanmar,
a threat raised by former Malaysian prime minister
Mahathir Mohammad in July 2003? Expulsion is not likely
as ASEAN's policy on Myanmar was first derived from the
policy of "constructive engagement" initiated in 1991 by
the Thai government of prime minister Anand Panyarachun.
This policy was later regionalized as an ASEAN policy.
For Thailand, the reasoning that led to the
formulation of the policy on constructive engagement was
based on both realities and aspirations, according to
its former deputy foreign minister, Sukhumband
Paribatra: "Myanmar and Thailand [have] been permanent
neighbors, sharing a 2,400 kilometer border. Most of
this border has not been demarcated and passes through
difficult mountainous and jungle terrain, inhabited by
common ethnic groups, which historically both
governments have not found it easy to rule."
The
border of the two countries is also porous, with more
than 70 passes, mostly in remote areas. Therefore events
in Myanmar often have repercussions on Thailand.
Aside from ASEAN, Japan remains one of the few
developed countries in direct talks with the junta in
Yangon. Its senior foreign policy officials have been
flying regularly to Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur, even
Hanoi, to fine-tune Tokyo's policy of engagement.
In 2001, the latest year for which figures were
available, Tokyo gave Myanmar US$78 million in aid.
Before 1988, the year of the pro-democracy crackdown,
Japan's grants to Myanmar made up 60% of all foreign aid
and grants to the country.
But even Japan's
influence on the hardliners, by way of economic largess,
is progressively waning, as Myanmar's bilateral trade
with China has already improved by 10 times in the past
decade to reach $500 million, a figure some believe to
be a low estimate.
With the removal
of Khin Nyunt, whom UN special envoy Tan Sri Razali
Ismail said was the key person he dealt with in Myanmar,
it is clear that an important interlocutor is now gone.
And for now, at least, hopes for bringing democracy to
the country may be as well.
Phar Kim
Beng is a regular contributor to Asia Times Online.
He is currently on a Sumitomo Foundation fellowship,
where he is studying the state of Japanese social
sciences. He was trained in international relations and
strategic studies, first at Cambridge University, later
the Fletcher School and Harvard University.
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