Jihadi Islamists play a skillful PR
game By Gary LaMoshi
Greg
Barton, senior lecturer at the School of Social and
International Studies in Melbourne, Australia, and
author of Indonesia's Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and
the Soul of Islam, talked with Asia Times Online's
Gary LaMoshi about his book, the role of religion in
Indonesian politics and its impact on global terrorism.
Asia Times Online: Your book talks about
Indonesia's denial of the problem with radical Islam.
Doesn't that denial start with the contention that
extremists represent a small portion of the population
when Islamic parties receive a consistent 40% of the
vote? Why are moderate political and religious leaders
so muted in their criticisms of radical Islamists?
Greg Barton: Part of the reason
for the confused response is because it is difficult to
objectively gauge the extent of the problem. Jihadi
Islamists such as Abu Bakar Ba'asyir
[the alleged leader
of Jemaah Islamiyah] play a skillful PR game and present
themselves as being "the voice of the silent majority".
Nothing could be further from the truth, but
unfortunately many mainstream Muslims themselves are
taken in by this mendacity and fail to recognize that
not everyone who claims the respect accorded to learned
religious leaders is deserving of it.
The best objective
data about the extent of support for radical Islamism
comes from the parliamentary elections. In April
2004, Islamic parties achieved 38% of the vote, almost
the same as that achieved in both the 1999 polls and
in the previous free and fair election in 1955. But these
figures include non-sectarian Muslim-supported parties
and exclusively Islamist parties advocating the application
of Sharia, or Islamic law. Abdurrahman Wahid's
National Awakening Party (PKB) and Amien Rais' National
Mandate Party (PAN) belong to the former category
and attracted 17% of the vote this year, whereas
the Islamist parties - the United Development Party
(PPP), Reform Star Party (PBR), Crescent Moon and Star
Party (PBB) and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) -
together got 21%. But PPP and PBR, while formally
Islamist, are more the parties of social conservatives
than radicals, so perhaps the 12% of the vote they
achieved should be put to one side. This leaves radical
Islamist parties with about 10% of the vote.
For
many commentators, both in Indonesia and abroad, this
level of support for radical Islamism is too small to be
a great concern. On the other hand, these figures mean
that radical Islamism has as much support in Indonesia
as it does in Pakistan - so this level of support should
not be lightly dismissed. Moreover, a disproportionately
large number (almost half by some counts) of ministers
in President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's cabinet have
Islamist connections. With the objective data painting
such a complex picture, is it any wonder that it has
elicited such a confused response?
ATol:
What can the West do to strengthen the hand of moderates
in Indonesia, while avoiding backlash such as the
fallout from the trials of alleged Jemaah Islamiyah
leader Abu Bakar Ba'asyir
? What can Indonesian
moderate political and religious leaders do to
counteract the perception among Indonesians and the
world at large that radicals represent a far greater
portion of the population than you say they do?
Barton: This issue poses a difficult and
complex challenge. If Western nations are not careful
(that is to say, if they fail to rise above their
present garrulous clumsiness) they might do almost as
much harm as good in supporting moderate Islamic groups
in a way that undermines their local credibility. The
single most important element in strengthening moderate
understandings of Islam is education. But not just any
kind of education - giving scholarships to study in the
applied sciences (such as engineering) will not help.
The more that young Muslims develop a grounding in the
humanities and social sciences, the more they will
contribute to developing a tolerant, modern, socially
engaged understanding of Islam.
ATol:
Your book acknowledges connections between radical
Islamic violence and the Indonesian armed forces, links
that many other experts deny. Will resuming US military
aid to Indonesia be good or bad for the fight against
terrorism in Indonesia and around the world?
Barton: There is clear evidence (though,
it must be admitted, largely circumstantial) of elements
of the Indonesian military backing groups such as Laksar
Jihad. No such links are evident, however, for Jemaah
Islamiyah. Thoughtful engagement with the Indonesian
Police and, arguably, with carefully chosen sections of
the military is necessary and important, but discredited
units such as Kopassus [an elite commando unit
frequently used to quell political dissent under former
president Suharto] should be avoided at all costs.
ATol: What does it matter if Indonesia
becomes an Islamic state through democratic means, one
that recognizes the rights of non-Muslims to follow
their own rules? Is that kind of state possible,
according to your understanding of Islamic thought?
Barton: The current push for
application of Sharia is most unlikely to lead to Indonesia
becoming an Islamic state along the lines of Iran or
Saudi Arabia. But legislative and legal concessions to
radical Islamist lobbyists, such as those made by
successive governments in Pakistan and Malaysia are
likely to lead to the serious diminution of religious
and personal freedoms for Muslims first of all, and for
non-Muslim minorities as well.
ATol: Your
book barely recognizes that Islamist parties, especially
the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), represent the voice
of real reform in a system where other parties carry the
stain of Suharto's authoritarian rule. Do you doubt that
PKS and other Islamist parties are really committed to
political reform? What gives Islamists credibility on
anti-corruption pledges that other parties, even Islamic
parties, seem to lack? Do you think an end to corruption
in exchange for Sharia is a trade most Indonesians would
benefit from and/or accept?
Barton: The
exchange of Sharia for the end of corruption is indeed a
deal that many would welcome - and this explains the
appeal of PKS. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that
application of Sharia, in the narrow sense, is a panacea
for society's ills (consider for a moment the state of
affairs that prevails in Saudi Arabia). Sharia
understood in its broadest form, however, simply means
effective rule of law (ie not new laws but the effective
application of existing laws) and no one can argue with
this - but the long-term (and largely understated) aim
of PKS is much more radical.
ATol: Who's
afraid of Gus Dur [former president Abdurrahman Wahid]?
Why did the political establishment go out of its way to
bar him from the 2004 presidential race? Do they think
that despite his failure as president and less than
single-digit support in the polls, and this month, his
failure to regain the leadership of NU [Nahdlatul Ulama,
Indonesia's largest Muslim organization], he still
represents some kind of threat?
Barton:
The threat posed by Gus Dur in the presidential race was
that it was difficult to predict the effect that support
for him would have had on the other candidates. Perhaps
at first [Golkar chairman] Akbar Tanjung feared that he
(when he was on track to become a candidate before being
outbid by Wiranto) and Golkar would suffer some loss of
support. No doubt too, [incumbent president Megawati
Sukarnoputri's husband and would-be power broker] Taufiq
Kiemas was worried the some of the anti-military,
anti-Islamist support that Megawati was set to benefit
from would be drawn away by Gus Dur should he be allowed
to enter the race. For all of his eccentricity and
outspokenness, Gus Dur remains a national figure with
wide grassroots support, one of the very few such
figures in Indonesia, and as such, he remains a player.
Gary LaMoshi has worked as a broadcast
producer and print writer and editor in the US and Asia.
Longtime editor of investor rights advocate eRaider.com,
he's also a contributor to Slate and Salon.com.
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