|
|
|
|
COMMENTARY
US ties and
challenges to peace in Aceh
By
Abigail Abrash Walton and Bama Athreya
Aceh, so long isolated from international
view by the Indonesian government and military, is
now - tragically - at the center of world
attention. Members of the US Congress and their
staff, United Nations officials, journalists, and
humanitarian aid workers have arrived on the scene
after years of blocked access. These shifts offer
the administration of US President George W Bush
and other actors an unprecedented opportunity for
peace-building and enhancement of human security
and stability in a region dominated by violent
conflict for decades.
This report analyzes
three key factors in responding effectively to the
challenges of emergency aid and reconstruction
efforts as well as long-term sustainable
development and conflict resolution: 1) the role
of the Indonesian military (TNI) in aid delivery
and in ending the ongoing conflict; 2) the
differences between Aceh's indigenous insurgents
(Free Aceh Movement or GAM) and newly arriving
extremist Islamic militias; and 3) the role of
ExxonMobil in the province.
Shortsighted US opportunism in the face
of disaster?
In the aftermath of the
massive earthquake and tsunami that devastated
much of Aceh, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
is pushing yet again the Bush administration's
frustrated desire to strengthen ties with the
Indonesian military over the well-grounded
objections of the US Congress, as cemented in US
law. In his trademark Orwellian rhetoric, the
secretary argues that such a move is essential to
winning the "global war on terror". This myopic
logic ignores the numerous reports documenting the
Indonesian military as a de facto terrorist entity
with a long track record of undermining human
security in Aceh and other parts of Indonesia as
well as near-daily news reports about the TNI's
control-happy undermining of emergency relief
efforts.
Indeed, the US State Department's
2003 Indonesia country report notes,
"Security-force members murdered, tortured, raped,
beat, and arbitrarily detained civilians ...
Human-rights abuses were most apparent in Aceh ...
however, no security-force members have been
prosecuted for unlawful killings in Aceh ...
Retired and active-duty military officers who were
known to have committed serious human-rights
violations occupy or have been promoted to senior
positions in both the government and the TNI."
The TNI is also a massively corrupt
institution, relying on its private business
interests for an estimated two-thirds of its
annual budget. The TNI's businesses include
illegal logging, drug production and trafficking,
and prostitution, as well as "security" payments,
viewed by many as extortion, from Indonesian and
US businesses. ExxonMobil reportedly pays the
military about US$6 million per year for
"security" at its Aceh natural-gas operations;
Louisiana-based Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold
Inc paid the Indonesian military and police at its
West Papua mines $10.7 million during a recent
two-year period. These relationships with the TNI
have cost US multinationals and their shareholders
both in terms of reputation and financial
liabilities resulting from associated TNI
human-rights abuses.
New legislation
requires the TNI to abandon its economic
activities within the next five years - a crucial
yet challenging undertaking that will require
consistent backing by the international community
to Indonesia's civilian reformers, not the
business-as-usual stance proffered by
normalization of military relations.
When
will policymakers grasp the common-sense wisdom
"With friends like these, who needs enemies?"
Attempting to build working relationships with
human-rights abusers with agendas and interests of
their own is a long-failed policy that costs lives
rather than saves them. US support and assistance
- financial and political - are best channeled to
civilian-led emergency aid, good governance, and
development programs.
The political
landscape and the threat to aid
delivery
Because of its territorial command
structure, which gives it bases of operation from
the village level up, the TNI would in theory be
the best-placed Indonesian institution to provide
disaster relief. However, the TNI cannot play an
effective leadership role in disaster relief and
reconstruction for numerous reasons. Its brutal
reputation, gained during years of unfettered
human-rights atrocities against Aceh's civilians,
has hindered the TNI's effectiveness by casting
grave and well-founded suspicion on the military
playing any sort of unsupervised or managerial aid
role.
By severely restricting the
movements of aid workers and unilaterally setting
an arbitrary March 26 deadline for the departure
of US and other foreign troops assisting with
disaster relief, the TNI has further lost
credibility as an institution capable of meeting
the needs and challenges confronting disaster
survivors. Instead, the TNI's overriding mission
of destroying the estimated few thousand GAM
fighters in the region - and the TNI's interest in
sustaining the conflict so as to continue to
profit from the region's war economy - constitute
a conflict of interest that irreparably undermines
aid work.
In recent days, the
international press has reported that foreign aid
workers to Indonesia will be restricted to two
areas: Banda Aceh and Meulaboh. The Indonesian
military has claimed that it cannot guarantee the
safety of foreigners in any other part of the
province, alleging GAM might at any time attack
foreigners in other parts of the province. The
alleged GAM threat is a red herring, meant to
prevent foreign aid workers, journalists, and
other observers from witnessing the TNI's ongoing
military offensive in Aceh's inner regions even
since the disaster of December 26 or from hearing
the stories of survivors of pre-disaster
human-rights abuses.
GAM has issued
statements declaring a unilateral ceasefire
(though fighters in the field say they will return
fire if the TNI strikes first) and also declaring
its intent not to fire on civilian aid workers of
any nationality. Adding to the credibility of
these statements is the simple fact that GAM
members believe that a foreign presence throughout
Aceh ultimately benefits their cause. While GAM
has indeed engaged in violence against Indonesian
forces and, on occasion, civilians in the past,
the group has no record of aggression against
foreigners.
It is important for
international audiences to understand that
anti-foreign, violent Islamic elements do exist in
Indonesia, but these forces are not GAM. There are
a number of other extremist Islamic groups that
operate in Indonesia, although historically these
groups have had no presence in Aceh. However,
within the past several weeks, the Indonesian
government and military have facilitated the
movement of these extremist groups into Aceh. It
is crucial for the international donor community
to recognize the past role of the Indonesian
military in aiding and abetting such groups, and
the present interest the military may have in
maintaining such groups' presence in Aceh as a
proxy base for its military operations against
GAM.
In fact, the TNI has a documented
record of using proxy militia groups to engage in
violence in East Timor and elsewhere. A 2002 study
for the US Naval Postgraduate School notes that
the Indonesian army has become "a major
facilitator of terrorism" due to "radical Muslim
militias they ... organized, trained, and
financed". The study adds that the military gave
one terrorist group an estimated $9.3 million
"embezzled from its defense budget". According to
a Congressional Research Service report first
released in 2002 and updated in 2004, "Radical
groups such as Laskar Jihad and the Islamic
Defenders Front ... received assistance from
elements within the Indonesian military in
organizing [and] securing arms and transport to
locales throughout the Indonesian archipelago."
The Islamic Defenders Front - known for
its violent attacks on Jakarta nightclubs - as
well as Laskar Mujahidin, the security wing of the
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), have
established a presence in Aceh reportedly to
support Islamic law and tradition in the region
during aid relief efforts there. MMI once was
headed by Jemaah Islamiah (JI) leader Abu Bakar
Ba'asyir, who is currently on trial for his
alleged role in the 2002 bombing of a Bali
nightclub in which 202 people were killed and a
2003 blast that killed 12 people at the JW
Marriott hotel in Jakarta. JI reportedly also is
responsible for a 2004 bombing at the Australian
Embassy in Jakarta.
In maintaining a
coherent position in promoting peace in the
region, governments and other institutions
providing disaster aid should not shy away from
protesting the entrance into Aceh of outfits with
a documented history of violence.
Corporate good citizenship: ExxonMobil
in Aceh
Multinational corporations based
in Indonesia, including ExxonMobil, Newmont and
Unocal, have given generously to assist relief
efforts in the region. However, in view of the
unparalleled and, in many ways, destabilizing role
that ExxonMobil has played in Aceh over the years,
it is incumbent on the corporation to do more.
ExxonMobil currently faces a
multimillion-dollar lawsuit, filed by the
Washington, DC-based International Labor Rights
Fund (ILRF) on behalf of Acehnese villagers who
were tortured and murdered by the TNI on
ExxonMobil's premises. Concerned about its
investments, the city of New York has filed a
shareholder resolution with the US Securities and
Exchange Commission calling on ExxonMobil
management to report on the details of the
company's financial relationship with the TNI.
What did ExxonMobil do? The Arun gas field
in North Sumatra is one of the world's largest
sources of liquefied natural gas (LNG), and Exxon
Mobil Corp (originally Mobil Oil Corp) has had a
contract with the government of Indonesia since
1969 to process LNG from this site.
There
have been credible reports that ExxonMobil Corp,
along with its predecessor companies, hired TNI
military units to provide "security" for the
company's Arun project. The result has been
TNI-perpetrated torture, murder, rape, and other
acts of terror against the local population. In
some cases, the TNI used ExxonMobil equipment or
facilities to conduct the torture and to dispose
of those killed. For example, one of the
plaintiffs in the ILRF case was "disappeared" for
a period of three months, during which time he was
repeatedly beaten and tortured with electric
shocks. He was then taken to an open pit where he
was shown a large pile of human heads. He was told
that he would be killed and his head would be
added to the pile. He was eventually released, but
soldiers burned down his home thereafter. Another
plaintiff, who was several months pregnant, was
raped and beaten by a soldier who forced his way
into her home. These examples are typical of the
stories of dozens of innocent civilians living
around the ExxonMobil area of operations.
The ExxonMobil facilities were not
significantly damaged by the tsunami, thanks to
concrete barriers that had been erected long ago
to protect the site. The company's gas-extraction
operations are ongoing, and ExxonMobil personnel
reportedly are continuing to work in the area
without problems. However, despite the
announcement of a $5 million donation to relief
efforts, the company has been silent regarding its
own role in facilitating relief operations in the
Lhoksumawe area. The Indonesian military has
denied access to Lhoksumawe to foreign relief
workers, supposedly on the grounds that the TNI
cannot protect foreigners' safety in that area,
but no such restrictions have been placed on
ExxonMobil employees. ExxonMobil owns its own
airstrip at the site, but it is unclear whether
the company has offered to make it available to
facilitate aid delivery by humanitarian workers or
whether ExxonMobil intends to provide meaningful
assistance to reconstruction efforts.
The
company owes far more to the people of Aceh than a
mere $5 million donation. ExxonMobil reportedly
has extracted some $40 billion from its Arun gas
operations during the past decade alone, including
earnings of an estimated $2 billion annually in
recent years. ExxonMobil's role as a major player
not only in Aceh, but also in terms of Indonesia's
national economy and the other US-based
multinationals operating there, makes the company
a stakeholder with unmatched clout. (ExxonMobil
executive Robert Haines serves as chairperson of
the US-ASEAN Business Council's Indonesia subgroup
and led a high-level delegation to Jakarta early
last month to meet with Indonesian President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and other top-ranking
government officials.) The company should use its
resources and influence to advocate that foreign
aid workers be given access to the area,
facilitate their transport and delivery of aid
and, on a broader scale, encourage the Indonesian
government to move toward a ceasefire and
resumption of peace talks with GAM as an
absolutely vital condition to aid delivery and
long-term security throughout the province.
Conclusion and
recommendations
To ensure that the response
to the tsunami contributes to both short-term
relief and long-term peace and security for the
people of Aceh, the Bush administration must
support Indonesian efforts at strengthening the
country's civilian democratic governance and
military reform. Above all else, this means
ensuring that in the immediate and near term, the
TNI plays a limited, non-managerial role in relief
efforts. For example, Indonesian military
personnel could usefully employ the TNI's
logistical infrastructure to provide transport of
aid under the direction of local civilian
government and Indonesian and international
humanitarian organizations.
The Bush
administration should support efforts by the UN as
well as international and local humanitarian
organizations to provide long-term reconstruction
assistance in Aceh. For recovery and
reconstruction to be effective, fighting in the
region must end. The task of building peace in
Aceh is complex but, at a minimum, the US and
other members of the international community must
prioritize a ceasefire between the TNI and GAM,
insist on demilitarization of the province, and
once again vigorously support peace talks. Indeed,
Germany has explicitly linked its massive aid
pledge to President Yudhoyono's stated commitment
to pursue a peaceful solution to the conflict in
Aceh.
As the largest debtor among the
countries hit by the tsunami, Indonesia puts
roughly 25% of its annual revenues toward debt
repayment to the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the World Bank and wealthy countries such
as the United States and Japan. The Bush
administration should support an immediate,
interest-free debt moratorium and the convening of
an International Debt Conference. A moratorium
will enable the Indonesian government to undertake
emergency aid and reconstruction planning; a
conference is needed to develop an effective and
comprehensive approach to Indonesia's massive $132
billion external debt burden, much of it accrued
during the corrupt, 32-year regime of ousted
military dictator Suharto. Coordinated by an
independent institution such as the UN Development
Program, and based on independent research, the
conference would assess the sustainability of
current debt repayments with respect to immediate
disaster relief as well as the country's overall
poverty reduction and development goals. These
measures should enable the Indonesian government
to meet the new challenges of effective emergency
aid and reconstruction without having to enter
into more debt slavery or by escalating
exploitation of Indonesia's unique and sensitive
natural environment.
To combat terrorism
effectively, the US arguably needs the friendship
of Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim
nation. Aceh's natural disaster offers an
unprecedented opportunity for enhanced long-term
human security. The way to achieve these goals is
not by building ties with the very elements that
engage in destructive violence there. It is by
demonstrating that the United States is ready to
contribute materially to peace-building,
sustainable development and democratic reform.
Abigail Abrash Walton is on the
faculty at Antioch New England Graduate School and
has monitored conditions in Indonesia since 1993.
Bama Athreya is deputy director of the
International Labor Rights Fund. Both are regular
contributors to Foreign Policy In Focus.
(Posted with permission from Foreign Policy In Focus.) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
 |
|
|
|
|
|
All material on this
website is copyright and may not be republished in any form without written
permission.
© Copyright 1999 - 2005 Asia Times
Online Ltd.
|
|
Head
Office: Rm 202, Hau Fook Mansion, No. 8 Hau Fook St., Kowloon, Hong
Kong
Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
|
Asian Sex Gazette Southeast Asian Sex News
|
|
|
