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Hopes dashed for Yudhoyono's
first 100 days By Gary LaMoshi
DENPASAR, Bali - History will judge the
cataclysmic earthquake and tsunami that devastated
Aceh last month as the defining event of Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono's first 100 days as Indonesia's
president. That verdict reflects not just the
enormous proportions of this tragedy that likely
killed more than 200,000 Indonesians and uprooted
millions; it underscores the inability of
Indonesia's first directly elected president to
exploit his popular mandate to turn the political
tide.
To paraphrase US President George W
Bush after his re-election, Yudhoyono accumulated
political capital with his landslide win at the
polls, but he has shown little inclination to
spend it. Rather than earning interest, that
capital dwindles as Yudhoyono fails to face down
foes his victory supposedly vanquished.
At
first Yudhoyono pledged to attack a number of
Indonesia's most pressing problems in his first
100 days, including corruption, terrorism, and the
hangover from the 1997 economic tsunami: slow
growth, unemployment and low foreign investment.
That pledge was quickly scaled back to having
ministers formulate plans to address those
problems. The December 26 catastrophe overwhelmed
those plans and most other initiatives.
Business as usual Since the
tsunami, the government has rightly focused on
relief and reconstruction in Aceh province. That
focus excuses the president from delivering on
promises for his first three months in office. But
even before the tragedy, Yudhoyono's government
didn't produce the promised "shock treatment" for
the economy or other signature proposals, taking a
business-as-usual approach.
Despite the
symbolic importance of his democratic election,
Yudhoyono and his vice president, businessman
Jusuf Kalla, weren't destined to bring
revolutionary change. Both were ranking ministers
in the cabinet of president Megawati Sukarnoputri,
and Yudhoyono also served in the cabinet of
another former president, Abdurrahman Wahid. The
retired general's rise to the top circle of the
military came under disgraced former president
Suharto's authoritarian New Order.
Yudhoyono's cabinet choices in October
reflected his new team's establishment pedigree
and the customary political balancing - even
though Yudhoyono came to power in opposition to
the major parties and largely free of political
debts - rather than a clean break with the past.
Notably, he didn't reach outside the system to
distinguished academics or reformers that would
signal, and perhaps produce, significant change.
Yudhoyono has tried to change the
presidential tone, from the regal detachment of
his predecessor Megawati to a more engaged style.
The tsunami struck while Yudhoyono was spending
Christmas with victims of an earlier earthquake in
Papua. He has visited Aceh repeatedly since its
devastation. He has frequently pledged to crack
down on corruption, vowing he'll personally lead
the fight against the leading scourge of
Indonesia's economy and democracy. At a summit on
infrastructure development last week offering
US$22.5 billion in projects to private investors,
Yudhoyono promised representatives of 500
companies from around the globe "a new
partnership" with the government to ensure
adequate returns, fair administration and legal
certainty.
Words, not deeds But
the president's deeds haven't begun to live up to
his words. After his assurances on infrastructure
projects last week, this week Yudhoyono himself
reportedly vetoed a proposed settlement of the
government's long-running dispute with Mexican
cement multinational Cemex, one of the few foreign
investors brave enough to take a chance on
Indonesia in 1998 (see The tale of Indonesia's cement Taj
Mahal, May 27, 2004). The new government had
prioritized settling the four-year dispute over
Cemex's option to buy a controlling stake in Semen
Gresik during its first 100 days, one of the few
goals it is aimed to meet. Opposition to the
settlement comes from entrenched Semen Gresik
management and their local political backers who
hope to keep milking the state-owned company.
Instead of facing down these decidedly
minor-league foes, Yudhoyono chose to let the
dispute fester, leaving Indonesia vulnerable to a
potential $500 million judgment and sending a far
more costly signal to foreign capital.
On
corruption, there's been one high-profile arrest,
ironically of the governor of Aceh, and some
rumblings about new investigations. But there has
been no plan for meaningful progress to change the
culture of corruption. In addition to stricter law
enforcement, fighting corruption in Indonesia
requires legislation to criminalize common
practices that would be considered conflicts of
interest in other countries, such as officials and
their families doing business with the government.
It also requires overhauling the judicial system,
where prosecutors and judges too often respond to
the highest bidder.
There have been public
relations slip-ups, too. Yudhoyono first promised
then backed away from an independent investigation
of the murder of human-rights activist Munir Said
Thalib, a campaigner against military and police
abuses who died on a flight from Jakarta to
Amsterdam on national carrier Garuda in September
(see An Indonesian murder mystery,
November 16, 2004). The massive amount of arsenic
in Munir's stomach indicated he was poisoned on
board. The murder is a chilling reminder of the
New Order and its lingering power. As a
compromise, an independent body is overseeing the
police investigation that's in its fourth month
with no apparent progress.
The toll in
Aceh Declaring a March 26 deadline for
foreign troops on humanitarian missions to leave
Aceh became an international PR fiasco, painting
Indonesians as a bunch of xenophobic ingrates,
even after the deadline was softened to a target
(see A battle for the allegiance for
the living, January 14). If Yudhoyono wanted
to suggest that overseas forces leave by that
date, he could have couched it as a test for the
Indonesian army, Tentara Nasional Indonesia or
TNI, to be ready to assume the foreigners' duties.
That would have been better international
diplomacy, but more risky at home.
TNI
pride is still smarting from its lackluster
initial response to the disaster, which may have
reflected large-scale, undisclosed losses among
its forces. Openly challenging Indonesia's armed
forces to replace foreign troops within three
months might have offended TNI, already wounded by
the influx of foreigners it had previously barred
from Aceh while waging a sometimes dirty war
against separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) forces
in the province.
The military has tried to
reclaim face by claiming that GAM poses a threat
to aid workers and journalists to justify travel
restrictions as well as continuing military
operations against the rebels, even though GAM
declared a unilateral ceasefire. Yudhoyono, a
leading actor in the last serious Aceh peace
initiative in 2003, has backed new peace talks
with GAM to clarify the ceasefire and perhaps
discuss a wider settlement. If talks scheduled for
this weekend in Helsinki, Finland, succeed and
Yudhoyono can bring the military on board, that
could be a major success for the president.
Similarly, if relief and reconstruction of Aceh
are seen as free of corruption, as well as
political and military meddling, that will show
things have changed.
No fear of
Yudhoyono Unfortunately, there's no
evidence that Yudhoyono has the clout to impose
his will on key government institutions. Maybe
that's a result of his election without major
political party backing. Maybe it's a product of
reformasi diminishing the powers of the
presidency. Or maybe it's a function of
Yudhoyono's renowned caution. Despite her public
aloofness, former president Megawati was a
bare-knuckled political infighter with a troop of
feared hatchet men. Whatever the case, it's clear
that no one is afraid of Yudhoyono.
Insiders say that ministers regularly
announce policies without presidential approval,
confident Yudhoyono won't dare contradict them.
(The Aceh withdrawal deadline may have been an
example.) Even before Yudhoyono took office,
defeated political parties announced an opposition
coalition seeking to block his legislative
initiatives. That coalition dissolved in December
when Vice President Kalla unseated Akbar Tanjung
as chairman of Golkar, the largest party in the
legislature and the former ruling vehicle of
Suharto's New Order that still harbors many of its
acolytes.
Even this apparent triumph for
Yudhoyono may wind up as a defeat. Kalla's victory
brought political capital to him, but not
necessarily to the administration. It's yet to be
seen how Kalla will use his power over legislators
and the party, because the tsunami hit barely a
week after his Golkar win. But the vice
president's staff has been slapped twice this
month for overstepping its bounds and issuing
orders to the government on presidential matters.
Yudhoyono publicly criticized the Aceh relief
effort under Kalla's command.
Rivalries
within the cabinet are nothing new for Indonesia,
even at the highest levels - Megawati was a
hostile vice president under Wahid, whom she
eventually replaced. Voters may have hoped for
something different and better from Yudhoyono's
administration, but it's unlikely that they'll get
it.
Yudhoyono brings to mind John Goodman
or Gene Hackman, competent players capable of
outstanding performances. But these fine actors
are miscast as leading men. The good news for
Yudhoyono is that after 100 days, he has more than
1,800 left to repaint this picture.
Gary LaMoshi has worked as a
broadcast producer and print journalist in the US
and Asia. Longtime editor of investor rights
advocate eRaider.com, he's also a contributor to
Slate and Salon.com.
(Copyright 2005
Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us for information on sales, syndication and republishing.) |
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