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COMMENT
Indonesia's open door
ushers in political Islam
By
Eric Teo Chu Cheow
(Used by permission of
Pacific Forum CSIS)
It
has been two months since the tsunami disaster in
Aceh claimed tens of thousands of lives, with the
death toll continuing to rise. Many observers
believe that this unfortunate incident has
"opened" Aceh and perhaps even Indonesia as a
whole to the West. Indeed, Aceh has been
intermittently "closed" to international scrutiny
and an international presence for the past 30
years as Acehnese secessionists battled Jakarta
for an independent state.
Undoubtedly, the
tsunami has physically opened Aceh to Western
humanitarian relief, with the support of the
Indonesian armed forces (TNI) that instead of
battling Free Aceh Movement (GAM) secessionists
are aiding Acehnese in tsunami disaster
management. These two novelties could change the
political situation in Aceh considerably as
Jakarta seeks to win the hearts and minds of the
Acehnese from the separatists and as peace talks
between Jakarta and GAM continue after a
"constructive" second round in Helsinki, Finland.
At the same time, however, the TNI has
tried to restrict the movement of relief workers
outside the provincial capital Banda Aceh and the
Jakarta government has called for foreign troops
to leave the province, a move that clearly
dampened Western enthusiasm about Indonesia's
reconciliation with the West, especially the
United States and Australia. Despite this setback,
the TNI is being progressively rehabilitated in
the eyes of the US administration, Congress, and
public opinion. But the TNI may also have
strengthened its political influence within
Indonesia, thanks to growing concerns about
Western interference and rising nationalism in
Indonesia.
What perhaps has been less
noticeable is the rise of political Islam since
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's October
inauguration, which could be linked to domestic,
regional and international events; this rise is
concurrent with the stirring of Indonesian
nationalism. So although Aceh may have been
physically opened, there are doubts that the
province and Indonesia as a whole have been
psychologically opened to the West as well.
After Yudhoyono's election, two radical
Muslim parties, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)
and Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB), seem to have
gained a political foothold in Indonesia. Both PKS
and PBB supported Yudhoyono's candidacy against
the established secular political parties, Golkar
and incumbent Megawati Sukarnoputri's Indonesian
Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). Today, the
presidents of the PKS and PBB occupy the
presidencies of the MPR (Consultative Assembly)
and the State Secretariat respectively. As an
indication of their political strength, these two
parties opposed and delayed the appointment of two
liberal-minded female ministers, who were deemed
too close to the International Monetary Fund or
too much in favor of liberalization. Although the
election of Vice President Jusuf Kalla as chairman
of Golkar may have lifted some "Islamist" pressure
from Yudhoyono, the PKS has distinguished itself
as the best-organized and most admired
humanitarian relief organization in Aceh, rivaling
both the TNI and Western aid agencies there.
Concerns have been expressed that the PKS
and PBB could press for the introduction of
Islamic Sharia laws in Indonesia; their growing
influence in the president's immediate entourage
could encourage radical Muslims and their
activities in pesentrens (religious
schools) across the archipelago. They may also
embolden potential Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) radicals
who support embattled cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir,
the alleged spiritual leader of the JI currently
on trial for treason, as well as the Bali bombers,
who have been sentenced but are appealing the
trial decisions.
Political Islam in
Indonesia may also be fanned by developments in
southern Thailand. The violence there took on a
political dimension when Thai Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra accused his country's Muslim
neighbors of fomenting unrest in Thailand's three
southern Malay-Muslim provinces. Thaksin accused
Malaysia of holding training camps for Thai
Muslims in the Malaysian jungle, despite strong
denials from Malaysia, and blamed Indonesian
extremists for supporting the separatist
insurgency in Thailand. But by pointing the finger
at Jakarta, Thaksin might encourage Indonesian
Muslim radicals to aid their brethren in southern
Thailand against Buddhist Bangkok, just as they
morally support Filipino Muslims against Catholic
Manila. Current Muslim problems in Southeast Asia
could thus further radicalize Indonesian Muslims
and encourage political Islam, especially after
Thaksin's impressive election victory. His Thai
Rak Thai party claimed 75% of the seats in
parliament, but lost soundly in the south, where
voters overwhelming threw their support behind the
opposition Democrats, maintaining the country's
political divide.
Beyond the 10 member
countries of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), Indonesians have been incensed by
Australian moves - real or purported - ranging
from media discussions in Canberra to acquire and
deploy missiles that could be put in range of
Indonesia, to the decision to create a
1,000-nautical-mile maritime surveillance zone,
both of which are thought to encroach on
Indonesian sovereignty. This fear has been
heightened thanks to Canberra's close support for
and collaboration with the US in its fight against
international terror; Prime Minister John Howard
is commonly perceived in Jakarta as President
George W Bush's "deputy sheriff" in the region.
Many have also never forgotten or forgiven
Australia for having helped "liberate" East Timor,
which is viewed as a profound humiliation for
Indonesia. It is hoped therefore that Canberra
would tread carefully in its approach to Aceh's
relief operations, even though it has pledged a
generous US$760 million in humanitarian relief,
the majority of it going to Indonesia.
The
rise of political Islam also has clear links to
broader Muslim issues, as moderate Indonesian
Muslims have become increasingly critical of
Washington's policies in Iraq and the
Israeli-Palestinian quagmire. Yudhoyono's first
overseas trip was to attend Palestinian leader
Yasser Arafat's funeral in Cairo, a clear
indication of Indonesia's Islamic priorities and
convictions. On the other hand, Jakarta's
rapprochement with Washington is moving forward
discreetly and relations with the US are cool,
even though the US supports Yudhoyono, especially
in the fight against terrorism in Southeast Asia.
Yudhoyono cannot move fast, primarily
because of the domestic Muslim lobby.
Washington-Jakarta rapprochement could thus be
held hostage to the rise of political Islam. Aceh
may be a small opening that allows the TNI and the
US military to cooperate and work together, and
perhaps even permit rapprochement and the
resumption of US military training to the TNI, but
bilateral ties have not realized their full
potential.
The rise of political Islam in
Indonesia is a fundamental aspect of Yudhoyono's
Indonesia. The tsunami relief operations may have
opened Aceh, and even Indonesia, but the rise of
both political Islam and Indonesian nationalism
appears to have consolidated in tandem. Australia,
the US and other Western governments must be aware
of this parallel phenomenon and should not be
lulled by the illusion of a seemingly pro-West
Indonesia in the making. President Yudhoyono must
continue to balance between a pro-Western business
outlook and Indonesia's inherent Islamic and
nationalistic inclinations.
Eric Teo
Chu Cheow, a business consultant and
strategist based in Singapore, is council
secretary of the Singapore Institute for
International Affairs (SIIA). He can be reached
at sldeet@mbox3.singnet.com.sg.
(Used by permission of Pacific Forum CSIS) |
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