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The threats looming
over Jakarta
By Erich Marquardt
With 210 million people, Indonesia is the
world's fourth-most populous state and possesses
Southeast Asia's strongest military. Consisting of
more than 17,000 islands, spanning from the east
of Malaysia to the western portion of the island
of New Guinea, Indonesia controls critical sea
lanes and airways, making it a strategic regional
state in Southeast Asia. Ruled by authoritarian
military leaders since its independence from the
Netherlands in 1949, Indonesia was a strong ally
of the West during the Cold War and an adversary
to communism. Throughout this period, the military
was the dominant political force in the country
and kept a tight reign on political power,
imprisoning and killing political dissidents to
eliminate threats to its rule.
After the end of successive
military dictatorships, first by General Sukarno
from 1945-1967 and then by General Suharto from
1967-1998, the government of Bacharuddin Jusuf
Habibie agreed to economic liberalization policies
in addition to lifting controls on labor unions,
political parties and the media. Indonesia's first
nationwide elections after the successive military
dictatorships of Sukarno and Suharto took place in
June 1999. Since these elections, Indonesia has
seen peaceful transfers of political power.
As Jakarta
continues to struggle with political stability, it
faces a number of threats to its interests. It has
strived to retain its territorial integrity,
fighting off separatist rebels in Aceh and Papua
provinces; it has suffered from Islamist violence,
best displayed during the October 2002 terror
attack on a Bali nightclub that killed 202 people;
the present civilian government of President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has tried to limit the
power of Indonesia's most dominant faction, the
military; and it must prepare to adapt to the
changing security arrangements in East Asia due to
the rising status of China as a regional power.
How the present government in Jakarta handles
these significant threats to its interests will
determine the future shape of Indonesia's internal
and external security disposition.
Threats of separatism
In
Indonesia's Aceh province, located on the
northernmost part of the island of Sumatra,
separatist rebels of the Free Aceh Movement, known
by its Indonesian name, Gerakin Aceh Merdeka
(GAM), have been fighting the Indonesian
government for 30 years. No stranger to
separatism, Jakarta fought a recent losing battle
against separatists on the eastern portion of the
island of Timor.
The conflict in East
Timor culminated in January 1999, when the Habibie
administration agreed with a UN process to allow
East Timorese to vote on independence.
Approximately 98% of registered voters took part
in the election, and 78.5% of those voters called
for independence from Indonesia. The Indonesian
Defense Forces, or TNI, in an attempt to influence
the election, and in retaliation to the final
result, responded roughly, causing much violence
and destruction. Indeed, the attacks against East
Timorese were so harsh that they critically
affected Indonesia's relations with other states,
resulting in the US Congress severing all military
ties with its once strong Cold War ally. While
Indonesia was forced to relinquish sovereignty in
East Timor, it does not plan on surrendering
sovereignty elsewhere in its island chain, such as
in the provinces of Aceh and Papua.
More
independent than other parts of Indonesia, and
more Islamic in character, Aceh never fully
submitted to Dutch rule. After Jakarta took
control of the province as part of its
independence from the Netherlands, separatist
tension remained, heightened by the fact that Aceh
is abundant in natural resources, such as timber
and natural gas; these resources have been used by
the central government in Jakarta, creating
animosity among the more separatist elements of
the population in Aceh who feel that their
resources are being exploited.
GAM is
calling for an independent Islamic state and uses
military force to agitate against the centralized
rule of Jakarta. In addition to targeting
Indonesian troops, the organization has attacked
international economic interests in the region,
such as Exxon Mobil's natural gas facilities in
Aceh. The movement is believed to have received
funding and equipment from Iran and Libya;
however, most of its arms are thought to come from
sources in the region.
In response to
GAM's insurgency, the Indonesian military
frequently uses brutal tactics to destroy the
organization's resolve. Human-rights groups accuse
the military of using tactics of abduction, rape,
torture and mass killings against GAM members and
alleged supporters. As stated by the New
York-based organization Human Rights Watch,
"Substantial evidence from several reliable
sources, including Indonesia's own National
Commission on Human Rights, establishes that
Indonesian security forces have engaged in
extra-judicial executions, forced disappearances,
torture, beatings, arbitrary arrests and
detentions, and drastic limits on freedom of
movement in Aceh."
Nevertheless, TNI
actions in Aceh have managed to push the rebels
out of major cities and into the more rural areas
of the province. While it appears that GAM has
been weakened, it still exists as an organization
and continues to launch scattered attacks on
Indonesian interests.
Indeed, GAM just
completed negotiations with the Indonesian
government in Helsinki, Finland, mediated by
former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari. As
recently stated by Ahtisaari, "Issues discussed
included special autonomy or, as proposed by GAM,
self-government; amnesty and other measures to
facilitate an agreement; security arrangements;
monitoring of the implementation of the
commitments; and a timetable."
At the end
of the talks, both sides came to a common
agreement over some of the key issues involving
the conflict. GAM publicly stated that it would
drop its quest for independence in exchange for
Aceh's greater autonomy from Jakarta. GAM and
Jakarta have agreed to a third round of
discussions, planned for the middle of April.
On the western portion of the island of
New Guinea, the TNI has engaged separatist rebels
of the Free Papua Movement, known as the
Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM). This is a
political organization with a military wing that
fights for independence and autonomy for the
indigenous people of West Papua. Not a major
threat to Jakarta, OPM has engaged in military
struggles with the TNI, which reacts with a heavy
hand, seen through the actions by the Kopassus,
the Indonesian special forces unit. Human Rights
Watch argues that "disproportionate reprisals
against civilians and suspected separatists
[occur]. Arbitrary detention, torture,
disappearances, and arson are widespread in this
region of Indonesia."
Successive
governments in Jakarta, and especially the highly
nationalistic TNI, have as a major policy goal the
preservation of Indonesia's current territorial
integrity. After the loss of East Timor in 1999,
Jakarta has worked to prevent the fragmentation of
its territory, an often difficult task due to the
spread-out nature of the country's islands. Both
the United States and China, two states with
influence in the region, have supported Indonesia
in these efforts, since a fragmented Indonesia
would create risk for the stability of the
straits. Ralph Boyce, the US ambassador to
Indonesia, explained this risk, telling the US
Congress in July 2001, "instability in the world's
fourth-most populous nation, would threaten not
only Indonesia's immediate neighbors, but also our
own strategic and regional objectives".
Islamist violence
Indonesia's
large Muslim population makes it vulnerable to
advances by Islamist organizations to recruit and
train militants to launch attacks against the
United States and Western interests. There are
active militant Islamic organizations operating in
the region, and attacks against Indonesian and
Western interests have already transpired.
On October 12, 2002, Indonesia suffered
from a terror attack on a nightclub in the resort
city of Bali. The bomb blasts killed 202 people,
many of them Westerners flocking to Indonesia's
beautiful tourist destinations. The attacks were
launched by the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah.
On August 5, 2003, the group attacked the JW
Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, killing a dozen people.
Finally, on September 9, 2004, nine people were
killed when a car bomb detonated outside the
Australian Embassy in Jakarta, injuring almost 200
people - Indonesian authorities attributed this
attack to Jemaah Islamiyah as well, although it is
not clear if the organization claimed
responsibility.
As these attacks
demonstrate, militants have been able to launch
successful, high-profile attacks on Western
interests within Indonesia. The United States is
concerned that Islamist organizations could
increase their ranks and strength in Indonesia and
launch even more debilitating attacks. Because
Indonesia controls some of the world's most
trafficked and vital sea lanes, it could provide a
lucrative opportunity for Islamist organizations
to cripple the global economy. As clearly defined
by the US State Department, "Indonesia remains a
linchpin of regional security due to its strategic
location astride a number of key international
maritime straits."
For instance, the
Malacca Strait is a key sea lane for the transport
of goods, as it links together the Indian and
Pacific Oceans. Twenty-five percent of world trade
passes through the strait. Some 80% of Japan's oil
is brought through the strait, and as China
increases its energy consumption and purchases of
oil from the Middle East, it too sees the majority
of its energy traffic pass through this critical
sea lane.
Furthermore, due to the dynamics
of the strait - shallow reefs and narrow channels
- sea traffic is slow, meaning that any major
attack would be extremely damaging. After all, the
strait is already a major target of pirates; the
International Maritime Bureau ranks the strait as
the second-hardest hit piracy hotspot on the
globe. Some potential attack scenarios include the
hijacking of an oil tanker and using it in
conjunction with explosives to create an enormous
bomb that could be used to attack coastal regions.
The environmental disaster alone from the
explosion of an oil tanker would be tremendous.
Attacked in a narrow part of the channel, the oil
spillage could be enough to block the route for
other ships, having a significant effect on the
global economic market.
For this reason,
the United States, and its allies in the region,
has worked with Indonesian security forces to
analyze these scenarios and devise
counter-terrorism techniques to combat their
realization. China, too, has given assistance to
Jakarta, offering to send military equipment at
reduced rates for use by the TNI.
The
Indonesian military
The Indonesian military
is the strongest power faction in Indonesia. The
country was ruled by military leaders until 1998,
and while a civilian government now rules in
Jakarta, that government is handicapped by the
entrenched power of the military. In the words of
Juwono Sudarsono, the civilian minister of
defense, the military "retains the real levers of
power". To highlight how independent of the
central government the military is, it is
estimated that almost one-third of the TNI budget
comes from the Indonesian government, with the
rest of the budget coming from unaccountable
sources. Dana R Dillon from the Washington-based
Heritage Foundation claims that these profits
emanate from "illegal logging, poaching, drug
smuggling, and protection rackets".
The
rule by generals fostered an atmosphere where
members of the military were exempt from many of
the norms and laws affecting civilian society.
Furthermore, under the concept of
dwifungsi, dual function, the military was
able to assert itself in social and political
affairs. Dwifungsi reserved political posts
within the government for military officers. This
created a condition where officers served in all
levels of the government, even in parliament,
causing the entire government to be under the
oversight of the military.
The system of
dwifungsi is no longer active, and a number
of reforms have been pushed through to try to
limit its past effects. For instance, military
officers must now resign from the armed forces
before filling a position in the civilian
government. The police, too, have been separated
from the military. Nevertheless, the atmosphere
prevails today, seen through the many human-rights
offenses committed by the TNI, and shown by
military leaders who are still unwilling to give
up their entrenched positions of power to a
civilian government.
Up until the early
1990s, the TNI and the US military enjoyed good
relations. According to the US Defense Security
Cooperation Agency, from 1950 to 1993 the United
States trained more than 8,000 Indonesian officers
in US military schools, in addition to providing
Indonesia with hundreds of millions of dollars in
military assistance grants, loans and credit used
to purchase US military supplies.
Throughout this period, however, minor
civilian oversight of the military caused TNI to
become grossly corrupt and violent. In November
1991, the Indonesian military shot at peaceful
protesters in East Timor, leading to the deaths of
hundreds of people. The following year, in 1992,
the US Congress ended its security assistance to
Jakarta. In 1995, the ban was relaxed, only to be
re-established following the reaction by the TNI
to the 1999 decision by East Timor to separate
from Indonesia.
Then, in 2002, another
incident occurred involving the TNI: an ambush
resulting in the deaths of two American teachers
in Papua province on New Guinea. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) complained over the
little support it received from Jakarta in
investigating the murders, which led Congress to
further restrict the International Military
Education and Training (IMET) and Extended IMET
programs. It is thought that the Indonesian
military had a role in the murders. Most recently,
however, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
has certified that the TNI is assisting in the FBI
probe on the murders, which could lead to a full
resumption of US military assistance to Indonesia
(See US back in step with
Indonesia, March 2).
Jakarta
claims that it is working to comply with the
United States on these matters. Nevertheless, US
Senator Patrick Leahy said in a speech on the
floor of the US Senate in early February,
"Although senior Indonesian military officers have
repeatedly vowed to support reform, they have done
next to nothing to hold their members accountable
for these heinous crimes. Instead, the Indonesian
military has consistently obstructed justice."
It is for this reason that Yudhoyono's
civilian government is seeking closer ties with
the Unites States and the re-establishment of the
IMET programs, funded by the US State Department.
Yudhoyono seeks to establish civilian control over
the entrenched power of the military, one of the
IMET programs aims in providing officer training
courses to member countries, presently consisting
of Malaysia, Thailand, Pakistan and India.
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency of
the US Department of Defense describes the IMET
program as one that "exposes students to the US
professional military establishment and the
American way of life, including amongst other
things, US regard for democratic values, respect
for individual and human rights and belief in the
rule of law". The department further explains that
the purpose of IMET is to "further the goal of
regional stability through effective, mutually
beneficial military-to-military relations which
culminate in increased understanding and defense
cooperation between the United States and foreign
countries; and to increase the ability of foreign
national military and civilian personnel to absorb
and maintain basic democratic values and protect
internationally recognized human rights".
Because IMET pushes civilian control of
the military, it is in the interests of the
civilian government of Yudhoyono to increase
relations with the United States and to get its
military involved in this program; this explains
why Juwono is pushing for a "re-engagement" with
Washington. For the entrenched military leaders,
however, increasing ties with the United States
could lead to the erosion of their power to
civilian rule, which would be a new development
for Indonesia. US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul
Wolfowitz understands this assessment, noting
during a January 2005 visit to Indonesia, "Cutting
off contact with Indonesian officers only makes
the problem [of corruption] worse."
The
military's long nationalistic history of taking
actions necessary for the preservation of
Indonesia's territorial integrity and security as
a state makes it skeptical of improved relations
with the United States. It reasons that excessive
force is necessary to retain control over
Indonesia's many islands, where uprisings are
common and separatist groups are trying to follow
the example of East Timor. Indonesian military
leaders worry that if it were to increase
relations with the US, it will lose the ability to
take the necessary measures to preserve
Indonesia's national interests.
The
changing security environment
The civilian
government in Jakarta is striving to re-establish
good relations with Washington. In addition to its
desire to firmly control the Indonesian military
establishment, Jakarta also recognizes that the
security environment in Southeast Asia is changing
as China increases its regional power. Indonesia's
modern history with China has been rocky because
Jakarta cooperated with Washington to resist the
spread of communism. Relations with China were not
officially resumed until 1990, although economic
relations between the two countries were
reestablished in 1985. Presently, the two
countries are continuing to improve relations, and
trade between them has increased greatly.
For instance, a free-trade area is being
planned that will encompass the states that make
up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and China, creating a market of 1.7
billion people. Indonesia, as the largest economy
in ASEAN, will have a huge role in trade relations
with China. China is already Indonesia's
fourth-largest export market and one of China's
primary resource suppliers, especially in oil and
gas.
However, there are potential
conflicting interests between the two states.
China will seek a more influential role in
Southeast Asia, especially considering so many of
its resources and trade will emanate from the
region. This will induce China to seek greater
control of the region - to protect its own
interests and to receive the benefits that come
with being a regional powerhouse. Indonesia, on
the other hand, is large and independent enough to
desire complete autonomy from China. Furthermore,
because the United States is seeking to continue
its influence in the region, Jakarta will likely
attempt to balance between China and the United
States, obtaining the best concessions from each.
As an example of this, if the George W
Bush administration is able to re-establish ties
with Jakarta, it will result in more US weaponry
being sold to Indonesia, which would be used to
patrol the country's critical sea lanes. China,
too, has offered fighter jets and other weaponry
to Indonesia, much for the same reason but also to
improve relations with a country that was formerly
its antagonist.
As an example of this
balancing technique, after the Chinese offer of
weaponry, Juwono said that the Chinese "emphasized
there would be no conditionality" and that Jakarta
considered the offer "attractive". Juwono said his
response to Beijing was that Indonesia's decision
"depends on the strategic partnership. If it's a
junior partnership for Indonesia, no way."
Indonesia is able to maintain this balance because
the Chinese understand that Jakarta can always
turn to the United States for equipment if Jakarta
considers Beijing's conditions on the weapons
purchases to be too demanding. And the United
States knows that if it attempts to overly
influence Indonesia's political decisions, Jakarta
could seek more support from Beijing.
Conclusion
As Southeast Asia's
largest and most powerful state, Indonesia is a
keystone country that is courted by both China and
the United States. Both countries seek to gain
influence in Jakarta, especially since the country
patrols the Malacca Strait - a critical passageway
for global trade. Indonesia can attempt to balance
the two powers off each other, gaining economic
and military benefits from both while preserving
its autonomy.
Yet, Indonesia faces a
series of internal problems that it must deal
with. It faces separatists in two of its
provinces, and has already lost to a separatist
movement in East Timor. It has suffered from
multiple terrorist attacks within its borders and
must be vigilant in preventing such an attack from
affecting trade through the Malacca Strait. Its
nationalistic military is loathe to submit to
civilian rule and still retains the "real levers
of power".
Yet, if Jakarta is able to
control the many threats to its interests, and
maintain good relations with both the United
States and China, it has a promising future. The
plan to create a free-trade area encompassing
China and the ASEAN states will help to unite East
Asia's economic ideals, improving the region's
development and making it more independent from
the West.
Published with permission of
the Power and Interest News
Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into
various conflicts, regions and points of interest
around the globe. All comments should be directed
to content@pinr.com |
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