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Thaksin's power play with Thai
generals
By Fabio Scarpello
Thai politics have always been
characterized by a close association between the
country's military and its politicians. But under
the administration of business tycoon turned
politician, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra,
that relationship has changed. Where before the
generals held the reigns of power, the prime
minister is now calling the shots and has
integrated the military into his power base.
Analysts who were hoping for a de-politicization
of the armed forces fear long-term negative
consequences.
There seem to be no limits
to Thaksin's power. Re-elected in February by an
overwhelming majority to an unprecedented second
consecutive term in office, he sits comfortably at
the helm of the country with full control over the
parliament and cabinet, the latter filled with
members of his inner circle. But the prime
minister's influence extends much further,
encompassing big businesses, bureaucrats,
politicians, most of the media, the police and -
crucially - the armed forces.
At first
glance, the link between Thaksin and the military
is nothing new in Thailand, where politicians and
generals have always stood shoulder to shoulder.
Yet scraping the surface only slightly, it becomes
apparent that the current association is made from
a different mold. The difference is the shift in
the balance of power, which has slipped away from
the generals and now - for the first time - lies
firmly with the prime minister.
To say
that the army has dictated the political tempo in
Thailand is an understatement. Historical records
tell of 17 coups or attempted coups since 1932 and
of generals occupying the prime minister's seat
for all but eight years between 1938 and 1988.
Furthermore, whenever not in power, the military
had been the main force behind most of the
civilian leaders who preceded the current prime
minister.
The situation is different with
Thaksin, who despite training at a military cadet
school and serving as a policeman for a few years,
entered politics as a civilian and has been
legitimized by two democratic elections. Moreover,
Thaksin's ascent has coincided with probably the
weakest period of the army in modern Thai history.
The military began losing ground in the
political arena in the late 1980s, but the turning
point in the civilian-military relationship was
the violent civilian resistance of May 1992, which
brought an end to Thailand's last military regime.
The resulting pro-reform movement, culminating
with the drafting of the 1997 constitution,
cornered the generals' political aspirations and
threatened the army's status and its main
financial resources. As a consequence, the
military had no option but to lie low and
partially de-politicize. This trend was
interrupted, however, in 2001, when Thaksin was
first elected premier.
In this position,
Thaksin carved a new role in society for the
generals and secured the army's financial
resources, halting its decline. Both moves won him
favor among most high-ranking officers. The prime
minister also set out to transform the country's
three armed forces - the Royal Thai Army, the navy
and the air force - into another branch of his
power base. The approach he used to achieve such a
goal involved meddling with the military's
internal promotions.
Making over the
military
When Thaksin became prime
minister, the military lacked a clear role. With
the communist threat long gone and without any
immediate foreign threat, the military had
difficulties in claiming a special role in society
and was somehow squeezed out of the limelight by
the democratization movement that pressed for its
de-politicization. The new situation was in stark
contrast to the previous 50 years, during which
the military was wrapped up in an aura of
reverence and generals were offered senior
positions in government agencies.
Thaksin
filled the vacuum by using the army to flank the
police in dealing with civil issues. Under the
current administration, the army has been called
upon to deal with protests in rural areas and to
play a pivotal role in the "war on drugs" and the
"war on dark influences" begun in 2003. The army
is currently involved in the predominantly Muslim
provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat, where
civilian unrest has flared since January 2004.
In addition, Thaksin stepped in to ease
the chronic surplus of generals in the Thai army
by offering "high influential advisory
governmental positions" to more then 50 of them.
The prime minister has also restored the army's
influence over the country's foreign policy -
another area in which it had previously been
losing ground.
Likewise, Thaksin's rise to
power found the armed forces struggling to hold on
to their main sources of finance. The share of the
national budget allocated to the military had
shrunk gradually from 18%, allocated in the 1980s,
to about 11-12% in the mid-1990s and 9% in
1999-2000. Even more dangerous for the army was
the instruction laid down by the 1997 constitution
that called for Thailand's radio and television
frequencies to be placed under public management.
Such a change meant that the army was in line to
lose its main source of income, namely its control
over roughly 200 radio frequencies and television
Channel 5.
Since 2001, Thaksin has
increased the military budget, lifted the embargo
on military procurements that had been in place
since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and
approved the entire army's spending list for the
2005-13 period. With Thaksin in power, the army
has also managed to hold on to its radio
frequencies.
Hidden dangers in
controlling the military
Regenerating the
armed forces' status and securing its financial
resources were important means for Thaksin to
secure the generals' gratitude, but what turned
the military into another part of Thaksin's power
base was the relentless meddling with its internal
promotions.
In the past four years,
Thaksin has pushed some members of his own family
and no fewer then 35 of his former cadet-school
classmates, collectively know as "Class 10", up
the seniority ladder in the army and, to a lesser
extent, in the navy and the air force. In doing
so, he has shaped a powerful new clique that owes
a lot to him and little to ability and seniority.
The generals' gratitude translates into open
support for Thaksin.
Among the
beneficiaries of Thaksin's patronage, Chaisit
Shinawatra, one of Thaksin's cousins, deserves
special mention.
From August 2001 (the
first military reshuffle under Thaksin) to August
2003, Chaisit shot to the very top of the army's
hierarchy. In rapid succession he was promoted to
lieutenant-general (2001), full general (2002) and
then army commander (2003). His meteoric rise - as
noted at the time by several military experts -
would have been impossible without political
connections. Last August, Chaisit was pushed into
the highly ceremonial role of armed forces supreme
commander, after his failure to ease separatist
tensions in the troubled south and his involvement
in Channel 5's controversial plan to be listed on
the Thai stock exchange.
Some analysts
have argued that Thaksin is playing with fire with
his military meddling and say he not only risks
burning his fingers but might set the whole house
ablaze.
"The re-politicization of the
military is very dangerous for Thailand and for
Thaksin himself; he cannot handle it," said
Professor Ukrist Pathmanand, assistant director of
the Institute of Asian Studies at Bangkok's
Chulalongkorn University and co-author of the book
The Thaksinization of Thailand.
Part of what worries Professor Pathmanand
- and a few others - is that by allowing Class 10
to dominate the armed forces, Thaksin has opened
the door to the risk of another military coup. In
his book, Pathmanand noted that some of Thailand's
past military coups - Class 7 or "The Young Turks"
in 1977, attempts in 1981 and 1985 and Class 5 in
1991- were the direct consequence of a specific
military-class supremacy.
"It has happened
before and it could happen again," Pathmanand
said.
Other critics, including Suriyasai
Katasila, secretary general of the Campaign for
Popular Democracy, fear that by allowing his
friends to leapfrog the seniority ladder, Thaksin
has created a larger and more unhappy layer of
generals. Such a situation, they argue, could lead
to a takeover, especially if the socio-political
situation in the country were to change.
"Thaksin has interfered too much with the
promotion of his peers in the military," Suriyasai
said.
Although the logic behind both
analyses stands, it must be noticed that Thaksin's
current grip on power and the lessons of history
have made the eventuality of another "successful"
military coup in Thailand a slim possibility - as
noted by Abhisit Vejjajiva, deputy leader of the
Democrat Party, in an interview in late December.
"The military are aware that after 1992
their role in politics had to change. They are
careful not [to] be seen [to] interfere. A number
of high-rank military are very unhappy [because of
Thaksin's meddling with promotions], but they feel
they have to accept the role given to them by the
new democracy. The military would not get away
with another coup," Abhisit said.
Thaksin's way of dealing with the military
is nothing new in Thailand; he has simply changed
the rules and dictated the terms. The prime
minister could have carried on with the
de-politicization of the armed forces, which
started in 1988, but he decided instead to invert
the tendency and set out to integrate the generals
rather than confront them. His decision is
definitely a step back for Thailand's
democratization process, and in the long run may
turn out to be a dangerous move - as the analysts
have argued. But so far the approach has worked
very well for Thaksin, who has managed to appease
the generals while staying firmly on top.
Fabio Scarpello, ADNKronos
international Southeast Asia correspondent and a
freelance writer, can be reached via www.fabioscarpello.com.
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
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