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SPEAKING
FREELY
Vietnam pushes on 30 years after
war
By Lawrence E Grinter
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click here if you are
interested in contributing.
Vietnam's climb from the rubble of the
Second Indochina War, which the communist
leadership launched in 1961, was slow and painful.
The totalitarian policies grafted on to South
Vietnam by Hanoi's hardliners after "liberation"
in 1975 resulted in nearly 400,000 southerners
being sent to "re-education camps"; more than
500,000 southerners escaping (many taking their
chances on the high seas) or bribing their way out
of the territory; and some 2 million people being
forcibly resettled into "economic zones" in the
southern countryside. The number of executions of
southerners has never been officially admitted by
Hanoi. Add to this the huge refugee packing into
South Vietnam's cities induced by US bombing and
artillery practices, and severe misery
characterized the first few years of Vietnam's
"unification".
Le Duan's, Trong Chinh's
and other communist hardliners' insistence on
Stalinist economics for the conquered south, which
included the expropriation of southern land,
factories and wealth, and the substitution of
class credentials for competence, naturally
worsened the whole country's situation. Per capita
incomes fell drastically, economic growth ended,
and the country's gross domestic product (GDP)
bottomed out.
Vietnam's long journey
toward economic recovery did not begin until 1986,
with the Politburo's acknowledgement of its failed
economic policies and managerial ineptitude. That
year the Communist Party announced its doi
moi (renovation) campaign - the same year
Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev began his
policy of perestroika (restructuring) in
the Soviet Union. Even then, it was not until 1989
when Vietnam's economic reforms finally took
effect - the same year the army pulled out of
prostrated Cambodia, ruled by the former Khmer
Rouge and Vietnamese client dictator Hun Sen,
ending a 10-year Vietnamese military occupation
that had further wrecked the economy.
Today, 30 years after Hanoi's victory over
Saigon, Vietnam displays an economic vibrancy
never known before under Indochinese communism.
Still governed by the Vietnamese Communist Party,
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has a population
of 83 million (more than half under the age of
25), a GDP estimated at about US$45 billion (using
exchange-rate formulas and ignoring a large hidden
economy), and a countrywide per capita income of
about $500 annually. A new middle class has
emerged in Vietnam's largest cities, where
disposable incomes could be six to eight times the
rural average. The south continues to be ahead of
the north in per capita income, foreign investment
and entrepreneurship. The former southern capital
of Saigon (officially renamed Ho Chi Minh City in
1975) provides nearly one-third of the entire
country's tax receipts and a conspicuously
wealthy, if still small, nouveau riche
shows off its acquisitions fueled by
government corruption, tax dodging and a
speculative real-estate boom.
For the
immediate future, Vietnamese authorities are
pushing to get the country into the World Trade
Organization (WTO) by December 2005, 10 years
after Vietnam's first application. But significant
obstacles remain, including the country's tariff
and non-tariff barriers as well as the lack of
banking transparency and poor legal and financial
institutions. Vietnamese bureaucrats are pressing
to come up with the regulations and legal
arrangements to satisfy the WTO, but admittance
this year is not a sure thing. Not long ago the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) suspended
disbursements to the country because of problems
in Vietnamese state banks.
Vietnam's
current economy, what the authorities call a
"socialist market" system, shows promise and
pitfalls. On the positive side is a 2004 GDP that
grew at 7.5% and exports, helped by crude-oil
prices, that grew at 30%. Given the slow growth of
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the heavily
debt-ridden conglomerates ranging from profitable
to completely insolvent and constituting nearly
40% of GDP, Vietnam's private sector could be
growing at 20-25%. But Vietnam's trade deficit is
also climbing and could now be 15% of GDP. And of
course, government corruption, a seemingly
irreconcilable problem in Vietnam, could amount to
5% of GDP. Nevertheless, the country has blossomed
into a robust trading nation with imports and
exports almost equaling the size of the country's
GDP itself. Vietnam is now the world's largest
pepper exporter, and the second-largest coffee and
seafood exporter.
Politically, Vietnam is
still ruled by a triumvirate of Communist Party
members, bureaucrats and the armed forces,
although Communist Party General Secretary Nong
Duc Manh, like President Hu Jintao in China, was
not one of the original revolutionary cadres.
(Interestingly, Manh, an economic reformer, makes
no attempt to dispel rumors that he might be Ho
Chi Minh's illegitimate son.) One encouraging
development is the rise of civic and professional
associations in both south and north Vietnam,
associations that fill gaps between the Communist
Party and the objects of its constant attention:
the people. These associations focus on issues
such as social welfare, street children, AIDS,
community affairs, women's rights, etc. Hanoi, of
course, was slower to accept these interest groups
than was Ho Chi Minh City. But today the
countrywide trend is encouraging, and it shows a
growing tolerance toward the spread of civic and
interest groups that the party, always zealous,
nevertheless seeks to control.
No active
alternative to the Vietnamese Communist Party is
permitted in Vietnam. Citizens cannot change their
form of government, there is an oppressive
intrusion by the security organs into people's
lives, and the prisons, of course, are dire, with
only meager medical care. Vietnam's courts are
controlled by the party and, so far, no non-party
candidates have been allowed to compete for
elections at any level (a contrast to China, where
independent candidates have won at the village
level). Vietnam's National Assembly has a voice on
numerous issues, and at times the
government-controlled media can show fortitude on
such issues as corruption, but basically these two
elements, like most others in Vietnam, exist to
legitimize the power and policies of the regime.
The Communist Party of Vietnam exerts more
penetration and control of Vietnamese society than
the Chinese Communist Party does in China. That
control is shown in party attitudes toward public
demonstrations, the media, religious associations,
and education, where the party also controls
university openings.
Vietnam's armed
forces remain the largest in Southeast Asia (with
about 435,000 troops), a way of employing young
men - although the numbers are down from the
nearly 1 million troops Vietnam claimed when it
finally quit Cambodia in 1989, having lost some
50,000 in action during the difficult occupation
to rid Cambodia of Pol Pot. Army doctrine reflects
a developing country with insecure borders run by
communist authorities. Thus the missions of the
"People's War", "Protection of the Fatherland",
and "Development".
Senior Vietnamese
military officers speak of "hostile outside
forces" cooperating with "reactionary elements
inside our country". They are slowly modernizing
the armed forces, given the old Soviet equipment
they are saddled with, which includes antiquated
jet fighters and tanks, and an inadequate navy,
given 2,400 kilometers of coastline and episodes
of smuggling and piracy. The Russians left Cam
Ranh Bay years ago, unwilling to cough up the
reported $300 million the Vietnamese wanted for
rent. Nevertheless, a deal seems to be in the
offing regarding the purchase of more surplus
Russian Su-22s.
Another striking aspect of
the Vietnamese military is how deeply embedded it
is in business operations - hotels, restaurants,
construction, mining and evidently gambling. Some
of the construction projects are focused on
Vietnam's borders and highland areas where
security is problematic. I encountered estimates
that claimed 40% of the armed forces' budget is
earned through commercial enterprises run by
officers. Vietnamese generals I talked to
acknowledge the risks of this; they know how
massive corruption has infected the Indonesian,
Thai and Chinese armed forces. But Vietnamese
commanders, whom I assume profit personally from
these business enterprises, seem content at this
point - and not worried in public - about the loss
of professionalism that accompanies Asia's
"business soldiers". That is all the more striking
since communist Vietnam's armies once defeated the
French, Saigon's US-assisted forces, and the
Chinese.
In diplomacy, Hanoi seeks
"diversity" and multilateralism in its foreign
affairs. Relations between Hanoi and Washington
continue in a formative stage. This year marks the
10th anniversary of the normalization of
diplomatic relations between the two nations, and
is also the fourth anniversary of the US-Vietnam
Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA). There are nearly
1.5 million Vietnamese-Americans (called Viet
Kieu by Hanoi) and another 2 million US
veterans of the Vietnam War. Former South
Vietnamese prime minister Nguyen Cao Ky visited
Vietnam on a 2004 goodwill trip, and US-Vietnamese
cooperation continues on POW (prisoner of war) and
MIA (missing in action) issues. Nearly 2,500
Vietnamese are studying in the US and about 100
non-governmental organizations have offices in
Vietnam.
But 2005 is also the 30th
anniversary of Saigon's fall, the 60th anniversary
of Ho Chi Minh's declaration of independence from
the French, and the 75th anniversary of the
founding of the Indochinese Communist Party; so
US-Vietnam relations, despite pragmatism and
shared experiences on both sides, have a definite
sensitivity to them. Nevertheless, US-Vietnam
trade, spurred by the BTA, grew nearly 10% in 2004
to reach $6.5 billion (with a nearly $4 billion US
deficit). The United States now purchases more
than 20% of Vietnam's exports. Both sides see the
BTA providing valuable experience for the
Vietnamese as they push for WTO admission,
although US organized labor argues that Vietnam is
dumping low-cost goods on the US market.
Other aspects of the relationship show the
United States pressing the Vietnamese on the
protection of minority rights (especially the
Montagnards and political dissidents), freedom of
religion, and the pirating of copyrighted
merchandise. I witnessed an interesting
give-and-take in Ho Chi Minh City last month as a
senior American diplomat and his Vietnamese
counterpart addressed US concerns over Vietnam's
human rights. The Vietnamese official responded:
"We are moving toward a more universal
interpretation of human rights. But each nation
has its own norms and values. In Vietnam this
can't happen overnight. And we can't risk
disturbances. Our top priority remains political
and social stability. So we cannot accept other
political parties or individuals' right to bear
arms. We can't do that."
US-Vietnam
military-to-military relations are not close;
however, there have been two US Navy ship visits
to Vietnam and a third one is expected this year.
So far Washington provides no economic or training
assistance to Vietnam's armed forces, although
Vietnamese officials have broached the idea of
sending officers to US military schools.
Vietnam's other foreign relations show a
general conservatism. China is, of course,
Vietnam's most important external relationship,
and a country with 17 times Vietnam's population.
The two Communist parties have cordial relations,
particularly since a long-negotiated border
arrangement was finalized in December 1999 and a
Tonkin Gulf demarcation was signed in December
2000. Two-way trade between them is almost $6
billion and one sees cheap, low-quality Chinese
goods selling on the streets of Hanoi. Direct air,
land and sea routes now exist, and China is an
official assistance donor to Vietnam. Cambodia, a
Vietnamese client for much of its history, is
relatively stable under strongman Hun Sen (who
takes vacations in, and subsidies from, Vietnam).
But Cambodia is also a source of crime, drugs and
trafficking that affect Vietnam. Smuggling and
trafficking also occur across the Laotian border.
Vietnam's multilateral engagement
crystallized with its admission to the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1995, which
gave Hanoi the regional legitimation it needed and
the diplomatic cover it was seeking against the
enlarging Chinese presence in the South China Sea.
Today, Vietnam belongs to numerous international
organizations and seeks WTO admission. Having
relations with 170-plus countries, Vietnam has
conspicuously composed relations with the bigger
powers, balancing between them while avoiding too
close an alignment with any single one.
Given America's historic encounter with
Vietnam, encouragement of Vietnam's push toward
global engagement is a sensible policy.
Lawrence E Grinter is professor
of Asian Studies at the Air War College, USA.
These views are his own and not necessarily those
of any US government agency.
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact us for information
on sales, syndication and republishing.)
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click here if you are
interested in contributing. |
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