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Aftershocks in Southeast
Asia
By Eric Teo Chu Cheow
SINGAPORE - Southeast Asians have been
watching the Sino-Japanese feud with deep interest
and concern. Singapore issued a statement last
month criticizing Japan's history textbooks for
approving "this strange interpretation of the
Pacific War in Asia"; it also warned that "this is
not in the interest of the entire region".
Indonesia's Foreign Ministry spokesman said (after
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's public
apologies to Asian nations in Jakarta on April 22)
that Japan must face up to and settle its past.
Southeast Asian nations are aware that the feud
between Asia's giants has important implications
for them and the future of East Asia in at least
four areas.
First, historical irritations
run through the whole of Asia, and the bitter
memories of World War II have resurfaced in China
and South Korea against Japan. Japan's attempts to
create a sphere of Asian co-prosperity under the
Dai Nippon in the 1940s, from Korea to Indonesia,
appear to be haunting Japan and Asia again,
following attempts by Tokyo to secure a permanent
seat in the United Nations Security Council. The
recent textbook crisis is reviving bad memories
among older Southeast Asians, too.
Japanese occupation was harsh in the
Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, as
well as in Myanmar (then Burma), Vietnam, Cambodia
and Laos - virtually all the countries of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Although Southeast Asian countries have officially
moved on, the recent protests and riots in China
and South Korea bring back painful memories for a
generation that lived through three-plus years of
Japanese occupation in Southeast Asia. Although
officially unsaid, many Southeast Asians still
hope for an official and outright apology from
Tokyo - even after all its financial and
technological assistance, trade and investments.
Only then will this ugly historical chapter be put
to rest once and for all.
Second,
Southeast Asians also hope that efforts will be
made to minimize the current tension in Northeast
Asia, so as not to allow "accidents" to happen
that could cause governments to lose control of
these explosive situations. Any instability in
Northeast Asia could affect Southeast Asia
adversely, especially in terms of the regional
trade and investment climate. Economic growth in
ASEAN countries is slowing down due to high oil
prices, depressed consumption and rising inflation
and interest rates. Southeast Asian hopes and the
need for regional stability have increased
substantially over the past two years.
Third, Asian nations fear the spillover
effects that these feuds could have on the budding
East Asian Community, which is to be launched at
an East Asian summit this coming December in Kuala
Lumpur. Southeast Asians are concerned that the
dream of building East Asia to counter-balance a
unified Europe (of 25 countries) and the potential
free-trade area of the Americas is cooling off,
even though the recent ASEAN foreign ministers'
retreat in Cebu, the Philippines, underscored
ASEAN's hopes of building a region-wide Asian
free-trade area, comprising ASEAN, China, Japan,
South Korea, and eventually India, Australia and
New Zealand.
The growing divide between
China and South Korea on the one hand and Japan on
the other is an unsettling development, although
the recent China-India summit in New Delhi augurs
well for a new Asian entente and the future
community. Japan's future in this group may seem
less obvious as a result of its disputes with its
neighbors. Yet an East Asia without its premier
economy makes no sense.
Fourth, Southeast
Asia wonders if there is the possibility of a
strategic schism in Northeast Asia. The common
cause shared by Beijing, Seoul and Pyongyang in
opposing Japan's bid for permanent membership in
the UN Security Council could bring them closer
together at a time when Tokyo is moving closer to
Washington. This shift in alignment and alliance
could pit China and the two Koreas against the
Washington-Tokyo axis in the Asia-Pacific, which
could split East Asia right down the middle in
strategic, security and political terms,
reminiscent of the Cold War. This shift could
provoke a dramatic revision of the existing
regional alliances in Northeast Asia and affect
East Asian regionalism.
We may be "going
back in history". The Korean kingdom was once the
premier tributary state of China for almost 400
years, stretching from the late Ming to the end of
the Qing dynasties. Korea, under the Chosun
dynasty, paid tribute to the Chinese emperor once
a year, more frequently than any of the other
tributary states of Annam, Siam, Sulu, Burma or
the Lao and Ryukyu kingdoms. Chosun literature
always portrayed China in favorable terms; Beijing
was widely recognized as the intellectual,
architectural and civilizational (and
inspirational) model for Korea.
Ironically, Japan "forced" Korea out of
this Chinese tributary system. When the Qing
emperor lost the first Sino-Japanese war in 1895,
China was forced to cede Korea and Taiwan, and
Japan then annexed the Korean peninsula 15 years
later in 1910 and occupied it "harshly" (according
to Korean collective memory) for 35 years, until
the end of World War II.
Memories of
Japan's violent occupation in South Korea are
compared to the more benevolent "tributary
memories" of China. This contributes further to a
growing "commonality" between the Chinese and the
North and South Koreans vis-a-vis the
Japanese.
These disputes come as Seoul is
softening its approach to Pyongyang, and as Tokyo
stiffens its own position against North Korea.
South Korea appears to be approximating China's
position as Tokyo moves closer to that of the US.
Seoul also appears to be moving toward a more
"neutral" position in regard to a US-China
conflict.
These feuds between Japan and
its neighbors may thus drive China and South Korea
still closer together, just as Seoul's relations
with Washington (and Tokyo) grow more troubled. It
could be that a fundamental shift in Northeast
Asia's alliances is in the making. Increasing
defense cooperation between Seoul and Beijing is
an indication of this shift, just as the six-party
talks may crystallize around Seoul's progressive
"alignment" with Beijing, in opposition to the
"Washington-Tokyo axis". Moreover, Seoul has
announced that it has rejected the latest version
of Op-Plan 5029, which reportedly calls for US and
South Korean armed forces (presumably under US
command) to be prepared to respond militarily if
and should the Pyongyang regime collapse.
Pyongyang's recent tough line could be
attributed to shifting triangular relations
between Beijing, Tokyo and Seoul. It could also be
upping its ante, a result of unhappiness with
increasingly cozy US-Japan relations, as well as
to take advantage of the rift between Washington
and Tokyo on one side and Beijing and Seoul (and
Moscow) on the other.
East Asia has sought
constructive community-building and regionalism to
stabilize the region and its economies; a
strategic schism would not benefit East Asia.
A key element of this future is East
Asia's relationship with Washington, and the US
commitment to the region. The East Asia summit was
supposed to act as a regional confidence-builder
and stabilize East Asia; any strategic schism will
be detrimental to East Asian regionalism and the
aspirations of the East Asian community and its
peoples. Southeast Asians have thus been watching
with growing concern the feuds in Northeast Asia,
and hoping for calm and rationality.
Dr Eric Teo Chu Cheow, a
business consultant and strategist, is council
secretary of the Singapore Institute for
International Affairs. He can be reached at
sldeet@singnet.com.sg
(Used by permission
of Pacific Forum CSIS) |
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