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Philippine crisis in
search of a forum
By Marco
Garrido
MANILA - Deposed Philippine
president Joseph Estrada calls it "karma", and
indeed he must delight in the twist of fate: his
successor - or more accurately, replacement - and
an agent in his ouster, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, harriedly staving off her own
precipitate ousting.
Karma or not,
Arroyo's tenure since she took over from Estrada
in 2001 has been haunted by the divisiveness of
her ascendance, her extra-constitutional
installation as president on the shoulders of a
popular uprising. Recent calls for her ouster are
not new, but simply the latest, most serious
eruption of the protracted political crisis that
has marked her presidency.
June
6: Amid allegations that Arroyo's family
profited from illegal gambling (a numbers game
known locally as jueteng), the presidential
palace disclosed the interception of an audio tape
purportedly containing a series of 15 telephone
conversations between Arroyo and commissioner of
elections, Virgilio Garcillano. In the tape,
Arroyo, or a voice resembling hers, importunes
Garcillano ("Garci") to ensure her victory in the
May 2004 presidential election by a margin of at
least a million votes. (In fact, Arroyo wins the
election by such a margin.) The palace
decried the tape as false and even produced
another tape, the original so it claimed, with
similar dialogue, but with Arroyo speaking to
someone named "Gary".
June
28: After nearly three weeks of public
consternation over the veracity of the tape, its
controversial content having leaked so widely by
this time that Arroyo's greeting to the elections
commissioner, "Hello Garci?", had become a popular
cellphone ringtone, the president appeared on
television to admit that she had, in fact,
committed the indiscretion of talking to an
election official during the runup to elections.
However, she did not admit that hers was the voice
on the tape; nor did she admit to cheating, only
that her call had been "a lapse in judgment". The
ambiguity and apparent evasiveness of her apology
heightened clamor for her removal. Anti-Arroyo
forces, composed mainly of the partisan opposition
and the radical left, intensified an offensive
seemingly designed to instigate another "people
power"-style uprising.
June 29:
Susan Roces, widow of the late Fernando
Poe Jr, Arroyo's biggest rival in the presidential
race, accused her of stealing the presidency "not
once but twice" (from Estrada and then her
husband). Roces declared her readiness to preside
over a caretaker government should Arroyo resign
or be removed. Street demonstrations swelled to
several thousands in number, but fell short of
people-power magnitude. Moreover, the backbone of
the first and second people-power demonstrations,
the middle class, failed to turn out in
overwhelming numbers. (Corazon Aquino was swept
into power in the first people-power revolution in
1986, with the second seeing Arroyo take the
helm.)
July 8: Eight members
of Arroyo's cabinet, as well as two senior
officials, resigned. Segments of civil society in
business and academia followed suit. The next day,
Aquino added her voice to calls for Arroyo's
resignation. One might call this the third wave of
opposition. There were those who opposed Arroyo
even before the scandal broke (viscerally or
intellectually) and those who opposed her once the
scandal broke (morally), and now, most damagingly,
impressed by the growing opposition against her,
those who opposed her because she had become too
embattled to be effective (politically). Arroyo's
situation looked dire. Pundits proclaimed the
president checkmated.
But reports of her
imminent downfall were greatly exaggerated. She
survived this phase less by virtue of those who
stand by her side than by virtue of those who have
chosen to stand on the sidelines.
Former
president Fidel Ramos' support has been helpful,
although he gave it contingent to the adoption of
a plan for transition to a more parliamentary
system of government in place of presidential
rule. Vows of support from various sectors,
threats of secession from certain provincial
governors should Arroyo be removed - such gestures
have been of some consolation to the
administration. But demonstrations of restraint
are what have mattered.
July
11: The Catholic Bishops Conference of the
Philippines refrained from calling for Arroyo's
resignation. The bishops' restraint resonated with
a cautious middle class and seems to have stemmed
a tide of hysterical opposition and refocused the
public on more sober options: not forced removal
but impeachment, not forced resignation but a
phased withdrawal.
The opposition dislikes
these options. They see the impeachment process as
a trap, not only because they believe they lack
the political clout to secure a complaint, but
also because they believe they lack the evidence
to guarantee a conviction. The tape, after all, is
the product of an illegal wiretap (one, it is
believed, the administration had originally
commissioned to keep tabs on the opposition) and
thus would be inadmissible in a court of law. As
for transition to a parliamentary system, or the
Ramos plan, such an option would likely keep
Arroyo in power, at least for the duration of the
transition, and the opposition out of power.
The problem is, Arroyo's resignation or
removal requires force, and the erstwhile agent of
force, the people, for the large part appear
unwilling to stage another popular coup. There
just isn't a moral consensus about whether or not
Arroyo should go. Certainly, most people believe
she cheated, but then they also believe that both
sides probably cheated (and indeed, the tapes also
feature opposition senatorial candidates talking
to Garcillano). Some even believe that Arroyo had
to cheat to avert what was perceived as the
potential disaster of a Poe presidency.
Moreover, people are tired of being
manipulated - again. People smell the opportunism
lacing the pious calls for Arroyo's ouster. They
see shadowy machinations behind the moral
rhetoric. They see Senate president Franklin
Drilon pledging his support to Arroyo one week,
plotting against her the next; and the president's
cabinet serenading her with "If We Hold On
Together", then letting go all at once - jumping
ship to widen its breach, as well as, of course,
to secure their seats on the next ship of state.
They also don't like their alternatives.
Noli de Castro, Arroyo's constitutional successor,
is considered a political lightweight. While
elected vice president because of his popularity
as a broadcaster, de Castro appears an unpopular
choice for president because of his inexperience.
Moreover, his election, as Arroyo's running mate,
is also being contested. There is Susan Roces, who
has only her late husband to recommend her for the
office. The left wants a revolutionary council;
the right a military junta. No doubt such unsavory
alternatives give those contemplating another
people-power uprising pause.
Most people
don't know whether to take to the streets and most
people are tired of taking to the streets. But
that still leaves the question of the president
possibly having lied and cheated. This question
must be put in its proper forum: in Congress, or
in the courts, and not on the streets.
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