On September 19 the
Indonesian Navy fired on a Chinese fishing vessel
poaching in Indonesian waters - the most recent
event in a series of recurring violent outbreaks
that say a lot about the changing role of the
military in modern Indonesia.
The Fuyuan
123 was one of four Chinese-flagged fishing
vessels allegedly using illegal nets and poaching
valuable marine resources from the Arafura Sea,
off Papua province and within Indonesia's
exclusive economic zone. After a short chase, the
refusal of the Fuyuan 123 to stop and several
warning shots, the Indonesian Navy fired on the
vessel. The result was one dead sailor and two
wounded.
In the pursuing diplomatic row
between China and Indonesia, the illegality of the
Fuyuan 123 was never questioned. Its license to
fish in Indonesian waters
had expired a week before the incident. The focus
of China's anger was the Indonesian Navy. China
claimed Indonesian naval forces had used
"excessive force" in the pursuit of the fishing
boat - just as they have recently been doing from
one side of the archipelago to the other.
In March, Indonesian military forces went
on high alert over the disputed maritime border
with Malaysia. The navy was in the lead of what
could only be considered as the closest Indonesia
and Malaysia have come to conflict since the end
of Konfrontasi (Indonesia's 1963-66 effort to
disrupt the new state of Malaysia, which
Indonesian leaders regarded as a front for a
continued British colonial presence in Southeast
Asia).
The dispute, which saw the
deployment of warships, infantry reinforcements
and even four F-16 fighter jets, was over the
Sulawesi Sea maritime border, just off Indonesia's
East Kalimantan province and Malaysia's Sabah
state. At the heart of the dispute was of course
the resource-rich seabed beneath the disputed
border areas. But bubbling over the surface was
the Indonesian military asserting its sovereignty
in a display of nationalistic fervor.
Other recent incidents may have as much to
do with displays of naval strength as designs for
naval profiteering. Local officers' desire for a
little extra income is always an issue in such a
large and sometimes inadequately paid military. In
September 2004 an Indonesian naval vessel
approached and sought to board a tourist diving
vessel in East Timorese territory, off Atauro
Island. Whether it was a display of naval strength
against the fledgling and recently independent
East Timor, or just a little off-the-record
piracy, will never be known.
East Timor
played down the incident, citing the current
permeability of the East Timorese-Indonesia
border. Negotiations on setting the border have
been ongoing since 2000. The Indonesian Foreign
Ministry and its naval command in Jakarta denied
knowledge of the incident. The most obvious
conclusion is that even if boarded, the tourist
vessel could well have gotten off with an on the
spot "fine".
But the navy has also been at
the forefront of more obvious and blatantly
ostentatious demonstrations of Indonesian
sovereignty. In May 2002, six navy ships and more
than 120 troops accompanied Indonesian president
Megawati Sukarnoputri to East Timor's inaugural
independence ceremony. With foreign dignitaries
such as United States president Bill Clinton,
Australian Prime Minister John Howard and United
Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan maintaining a
security presence counted in the dozens, the
Indonesian entourage seemed excessive at best, and
an outright affront at worst.
Increasing professionalism or
restraining modernization? The Indonesian
military has an important choice to make. As the
military's role in Indonesia inevitably declines
with strengthened democracy, the military can
follow one of two paths - toward an increasingly
professional and respected military under civilian
control or toward a distrusted, feared and
ultimately despised military restraining
Indonesian modernization.
The former has
already demonstrated limited success. The military
has proven particularly restrained in its presence
in West Papua despite secessionist elements
ramping up efforts in the wake of East Timor and
Aceh rebellions. On October 10, the Papuan
People's Assembly will commence work. The
establishment of the assembly aims to empower
indigenous Papuans and deflate local support for
separatism while simultaneously avoiding the need
for overt military involvement. As Aceh and East
Timor have demonstrated, overt military
involvement only hardens local populations against
central control. There is also hope the
military will be attracted to the first path
through potential gains in training and resource
cooperation with external powers. The United
States is keenly watching the human rights
situation across the archipelago with the
intention of reestablishing military cooperation
with Indonesia. This has the potential to provide
a much-needed morale boost as well as a guiding
influence toward greater professionalism.
But the threat remains that as the role of
the military declines, reactionary elements will
seek to encourage conditions that support the
latter path.
As if predicting such moves,
in a speech to higher ranking officers on
September 8, during a visit to military
headquarters, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono emphasized the need for the Indonesian
military to remain professional and refrain from
political acts.
Morale in the Indonesian
military has been in steady decline since
democracy ended the long rule of the Suharto
family and its associated military backers.
Arguably, it took its harshest blow with the loss
of East Timor. But it is now facing another
crushing blow with the peace settlement in Aceh.
As the troop ships depart Banda Aceh, the most
prevalent expression on soldiers' faces is that of
shame. With this shame comes threat that the
Indonesian military will look to other areas to
distract it from the inevitable decline in morale
following the Aceh pullout. One such distraction
could be maritime Southeast Asia.
However,
this could prove highly dangerous. Maritime
Southeast Asia is a bubbling cauldron of potential
misunderstanding - a combination of resource
wealth, overlapping territorial claims and
preciously guarded post-colonial sovereignty. If
it were not the Indonesian Navy jealously
protecting its sovereignty over fishing rights, it
may as well have been Malaysia and Brunei, Taiwan
and the Philippines or China and just about
anyone. The fact is that the region could
potentially prove to be the greatest threat to
regional security. Unlike the Taiwan Straits where
the potential for conflict is widely appreciated
and problems are dealt with both carefully and
consistently, maritime Southeast Asia is hostage
to populist decisions and only intermittent
half-hearted attempts to defuse tensions.
How it responds to incidents in maritime
Southeast Asia, such as the Fuyuan 123 incident,
may prove to be the real indicator of which path
the Indonesian military will take.
Jeffrey Robertson is a political
affairs analyst focusing on Northeast Asia,
currently based in Seoul.
(Copyright
2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.
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