SPEAKING
FREELY The way forward in
southern Thailand By S P Harish
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The southern
provinces of Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani in
southern Thailand have witnessed a series of
high-profile incidents of violence in the last
month. The alleged killing of a Muslim religious
teacher by security forces led the residents of
Lahan in the Sungei Padi district to blockade
access to the village. The subsequent exodus of
131 people from southern Thailand to
neighboring
Malaysia has led to tensions between the two
countries.
Furthermore, the gruesome
murders of two soldiers in Tanyong Limo village
and the ensuing cordon of the village by women and
children reflected the deep mistrust between the
authorities and the populace of the region. Even
as Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra visited
the southern provinces, two bombs went off in
Sungei Golok. Clearly, more than a year after the
Tak Bai incident in which 78 Muslim men suffocated
while in police custody, the violence in southern
Thailand continues in a downward spiral.
Many analysts advocate a velvet glove
approach to alleviate the insurgency. Particularly
after the conclusion of a peace agreement between
the government of Indonesia and the separatist
group, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka in Aceh, there have
been calls for Thailand to initiate a similar
peace process. There are two problems with
applying this Aceh-style strategy to southern
Thailand. Firstly, unlike Aceh, no one rebel group
can offer a reasonable guarantee to cease all acts
of violence in southern Thailand. Secondly, it
does not take into account the role that ordinary
citizens can play in resolving the insurgency.
Broadening the actors Tackling
the conflict in southern Thailand requires what
the peace scholar, Harold Saunders, calls a
"public peace process". The aim of the peace
process is not just to conclude a peace agreement
but to inoculate society against violence. It
endeavors to empower actors other than the state
in building peace. In doing so, it seeks to go
beyond the winning-hearts-and-minds rhetoric and
attempts to make citizens responsible for peace.
The current attempts in southern Thailand
to engage non-state actors primarily involve
recommendations made to Bangkok by the National
Reconciliation Commission and the local elites.
Unfortunately, these groups currently do not have
the autonomy to implement any of their proposals.
The central government in Bangkok still has the
power to adopt or reject these suggestions. The
recent extension of the emergency decree in the
south and the labelling of villages into colored
zones depending on their perceived support for the
insurgents have only widened the divide between
the authorities and the local population. In
contrast, a public peace process advocates a more
bottom-up approach where a sustained dialogue is
maintained between Bangkok and the southern
populace.
With a broader group of
participants, a better understanding of the nature
of the conflict in southern Thailand can be
obtained. Is the conflict ethnic or religious?
Could it be economic or a potent mix of all three
dimensions? If so, how should these different
aspects be prioritized in the government's search
for a solution? These seemingly abstract questions
are important for determining whether the current
response to the conflict is a right one. More
significantly, a larger consensus can help
determine more precisely the nature and
characteristics of the insurgency.
At the
risk of oversimplifying, a formal peace process
between a government and a rebel group usually
focuses on stemming the violence on the ground in
exchange for addressing the grievances of the
insurgents. Since a single rebel group in southern
Thailand is unlikely to assure the termination of
violence, the situation is ripe for a public peace
process.
Some plausible
approaches Among the strategies that could
be employed to deal with the current divide
between Bangkok and the people of the southern
provinces is education. The pondoks
(Islamic schools) are probably the most effective
medium to engage the southern population. Although
there may be a few radical ones, more efforts
could be made to ensure that pondoks are not
chastised. Sincere efforts by Bangkok to create an
environment where they can flourish will go a long
way in gaining the trust of the local populace.
The pondoks can then be steered toward
imparting both the Islamic education, which the
southerners want, as well as a curriculum that
will promote their Thainess.
In the past
two months, there have been a number of newspaper
reports about rebels surrendering to the
authorities. While this is a good sign, there can
be more information on the efforts made by the
authorities to reintegrate these rebels into
mainstream society and enlist them for
peace-building efforts in their respective
villages. This will showcase Bangkok's sincerity in
assuaging the conflict.
The public peace
process also calls for the involvement of the rest
of the Thai population into peace-building
endeavors. The historical mistreatment of the
southern population has largely been ignored by
the rest of the country. The people of the
southern provinces are usually referred to as
khaek, which means visitor or guest. One
possible way to get the Thai population involved
in the public peace process is for the government
to spearhead an initiative that discourages the
use of such derogatory terms. Steps can also be
taken to strengthen the culture of mutual
tolerance. In other words, the focus of a public
peace process is more on relationships and less on
the tangible demands of a specific rebel group.
Issue of legitimacy In the final
analysis, the legitimacy of a public peace process
is critical to its success. This legitimacy can be
built in two ways. First, people from all
cross-sections of society can be engaged to have a
stake in the process. The more inclusive the
public peace process, the higher its authority.
Second, consensus needs to be achieved through
persuasion rather than coercion. With a greater
number of voices debating possible policy options,
compromise will be harder but not necessarily
impossible. Arm-twisting tactics to realize an
agreement may work in the short-term but in the
long-term, it is detrimental to the legitimacy of
the public peace process.
Engaging
non-state actors as part of a public peace process
is not a one-off consultation exercise. The
sustainability of such a peace initiative is
crucial. Indeed, the process is not a linear road
and some measures may need to be revisited
regularly to ensure its relevance. If a formal
peace process with a rebel group is commenced in
future, the public peace process will only
reinforce it. The primary focus of the Thai
government now seems to be containing the
internationalization of the conflict. Instead,
more attempts could be made to stitch the divide
between the southern populace on the one hand and
the government as well as the rest of the country,
on the other.
S P Harish is an
associate research fellow with the Institute of
Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang
Technological University, Singapore.
(Copyright 2005 S P Harish)
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
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