The first East Asian summit of regional
leaders in Kuala Lumpur on Wednesday is a historic
event whose future impact is likely to be as
significant as the first Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit held in Bali in
February 1976.
The first Bali summit led
to the emergence of a cohesive ASEAN 5 (Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand)
in the aftermath of the emergence of communist
regimes in Indo-China.
Today, the presence
in Kuala Lumpur of a rising China and
resurgent India and the
absence of the United States, which has played the
role of an Asia-Pacific hegemon since the end of
the World War II, suggest we are on the cusp of a
new era.
The inaugural East Asian summit
(EAS) comes on the heals of ASEAN's 11th summit on
Monday, also in Kuala Lumpur. It occurs as East
Asia demonstrates a new vitality following its
recovery from the trauma of the Asian financial
meltdown and subsequent economic crisis in 1997-98
while the US is distracted by its commitment in
Iraq.
EAS
inclusiveness Wednesday's meeting is
significant because it goes beyond narrow
geographical definitions or ethnic/racial identity
in attempting to lay the groundwork for a new
regional institution.
The EAS summit is
preceded by the annual ASEAN gathering, separate
meetings of the ASEAN leaders with their
counterparts from China, Japan and South Korea,
and the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) meeting involving
the leaders of the 10 ASEAN countries, China,
Japan and South Korea.
The inclusion of
India, Australia and New Zealand and the presence
of Vladimir Putin of Russia demonstrate an
outward-looking, inclusive approach to
participation in the emerging East Asian
regionalism.
This broader inclusive
identity is likely to subsume the earlier focus on
an East Asia comprising the ASEAN 10 plus China,
Japan and South Korea. Its emergence is somewhat
accidental. In Vientiane, Laos last year, Prime
Minister Abdullah Badawi of Malaysia offered to
host an East Asian Summit involving the ASEAN Ten
Plus Three.
Premier Wen Jiabao of China
offered to host the second summit. The center of
gravity would move away from Southeast to
Northeast Asia, an unwelcome development from an
ASEAN perspective. This led to a desire to include
other states that had substantial interactions
with the region.
The participation of
India, Australia and New Zealand was seen as
ensuring that ASEAN remained at the center of any
emerging East Asian community. India was also
perceived as a balance to China. Indonesia, for
example, sought to avoid aligning with China while
retaining friendly ties to other powers such as
the US, a classic "hedging" strategy.
Growing Sino-Japanese
antagonism Growing antagonism between China
and Japan will make Southeast Asians wary of being
enmeshed in a new regional cold war.
China
continues to remind the region of Japanese
expansionism during World War II by pointing to
the lack of Japanese remorse, as evidenced by
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's annual visits
to Yasukuni shrine - which includes the remains of
Class A war criminals - as well Japan's
downplaying of atrocities during the war.
Chinese criticism has evoked a strong
reaction in Japan. Most worrying is the
ultra-nationalistic response of young Japanese and
Chinese. We are reminded of these trends by the
heightened rhetoric between Chinese and Japanese
decision-makers at closed door international and
regional conferences, even as substantive economic
links between China and Japan increase rapidly.
While ASEAN members have had four decades
of institutional experience in regional
reconciliation, Northeast Asians have focused on
bilateral ties and multilateral forums with a
specific agenda, such as the six party talks on
North Korea's nuclear program.
The EAS
provides an opportunity for informal
confidence-building and discussions on broad
strategic issues that concern the region. But this
will take time to develop. China's decision not to
proceed with a separate summit of China, Japan and
South Korea in Kuala Lumpur suggests that the
ASEAN approach of using such opportunities to
maintain informal contact even in the midst of
bilateral differences has not yet percolated to
Northeast Asians.
Nevertheless, the issue
of Japanese lack of atonement for World War II is
one that resonates around the region, especially
in South Korea, and could lead to Japan's
isolation.
The US: Regaining the
initiative For the US, the EAS represents a
diplomatic challenge. Although the US is a leading
trading partner of all EAS participants and has
security relationships with significant players,
including Japan, the US is not able to participate
in the summit, as it is unwilling to accede to the
1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation "to promote
perpetual peace, everlasting amity and cooperation
among their [ASEAN] peoples which would contribute
to their strength, solidarity and closer
relationship".
Given current White House
priorities, it is also unlikely that the US
president could be persuaded to make an annual
trans-Pacific visit barely a month after the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders'
meeting.
The US alliance system, APEC and
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) , are therefore
currently the key institutions for the management
of US relations with the region. But a
reassessment of US participation in the EAS is
warranted as the EAS will form part of a network
of regional institutions.
The American
concern with the marginalization of Taiwan has led
the US to downplay the significance of China's
initiative to organize a meeting in 2004 of APEC
foreign ministers in Santiago, Chile. However,
given East Asia's emerging cooperative security
architecture, it would be in the American interest
to support a larger political and security role
for APEC.
Such a revitalized APEC need not
be competitive with the EAS or APT but would be
complementary. The overlapping membership of these
institutions includes a core that brings together
key hubs in the Asia-Pacific.
While there
already are APEC directors responsible for
non-traditional security issues such as
counter-terrorism and infectious diseases, APEC
should consider appointing program directors to
handle trade-related political, social and
security issues such as supply chain security,
maritime security, energy and the environment. A
broader agenda for APEC would be fitting as APEC
is the only Asia-Pacific institution that meets at
the heads of government level.
US analysts
such as John Mearsheimer of the University of
Chicago fret about the risk of confrontation with
a rising China and the desirability of developing
relationships with states on the periphery of
China that could balance China such as Japan,
India and Vietnam. I would argue that it is
probably more important today to develop
trans-Pacific institutions, which could enmesh
China in a web of cooperative relationships in the
region. In this context, the decision to engage
North Korea through the six party talks is
positive as US leverage on North Korea is much
lower than that of traditional allies such as
China and Russia.
Similarly, greater
attention should be given to the ARF process. US
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's decision to
skip this year's ARF meeting was a mistake.
Although the risks of conflict are greater in East
Asia, US policy remains more focused on Europe.
ASEAN: Bandwagon or
balancing? During the Cold War, ASEAN was
clearly identified with the West although
nominally non-aligned. Today, as sophisticated
Chinese diplomacy leads to the establishment of
multiple regional organizations, ASEAN is
developing closer linkages with China. These
relationships are perceived as a balance against
US unilateralism. Some of the newer members of
ASEAN such as Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia have
benefited from Chinese largesse and are supportive
of Chinese concerns within ASEAN. Older members
such as Malaysia and Thailand are beginning to
bandwagon with China.
For ASEAN states
that prefer a regional balance of power, a
regional security architecture that is
outward-looking and promotes the observance of
international norms and codes of conduct is
preferable to one dominated by a single power. An
active US presence enables this vision of the
region's future to be sustained. In future years,
the US should therefore participate in the EAS as
it is likely to emerge as the key institution for
East Asian community-building.
Barry
Desker is currently the Director of the
Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies,
Singapore. His past portfolios include being chief
executive officer of the Singapore Trade
Development Board, Singapore's deputy permanent
representative to the United Nations in New York,
and Singapore's ambassador to Indonesia.
(This article is based on a paper
delivered at a conference on the "Regional
Security Architecture in Asia" held in Washington,
DC on December 14.)
