BANGKOK - Myanmar's generals have always
marched to the beat of their own drummer. Facing
the new possibility of United Nations Security
Council sanctions for its abysmal human rights
record, the reclusive regime is marching out on a
new diplomatic offensive aimed first at deflecting
Western pressure. If it works, it could also tip
Southeast Asia's prevailing strategic balance.
As part of this new strategy, the
secretive regime is seeking to re-establish ties
with its former allies in Moscow and strengthen
its already strong bonds with Beijing while
downgrading its relations with the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which
has
recently joined the Western-led chorus for
political compromise and change. The junta is
apparently preparing to withdraw altogether from
ASEAN, the regional grouping it joined in 1997 in
a bid to hedge its reliance on Beijing and achieve
integration with the regional economy.
General Maung Aye, Myanmar's second
most-powerful military leader, recently returned
from an extended trip to Moscow, the first by a
top Myanmar leader in more than 40 years. His
agenda included strong lobbying of his Russian
counterparts to veto any US efforts to bring
Myanmar's political troubles to the floor of the
UN's Security Council, according to diplomatic
sources in Moscow. The two sides also agreed to
strengthen military, economic and technical
cooperation, including Myanmar's promise to
purchase military hardware from Russian
stockpiles.
"Myanmar is intent on becoming
part of a new Sino-Russian strategic alliance,
aimed at blocking Washington's domination of the
international stage," said a senior Asian diplomat
on the condition of anonymity. Myanmar's new
gambit, if successful, promises to further
intensify US-China competition in the region and
as arms deals are brokered could act to
recalibrate the region's strategic calculus.
Myanmar's intractable political imbroglio, where
more than 1,100 political prisoners languish in
prison and the main opposition leader, Aung San
Suu Kyi, is under house arrest, was last year
discussed at the UN for the first time in harsh
terms as a crisis situation. The US and Western
European countries, which have consistently heaped
criticism on the regime's abysmal human rights
record, lobbied hard to put the issue on the
global body's agenda.
The UN's early
attempts to broker secret negotiations between the
junta and opposition broke down in 2003. Since,
the junta repeatedly has refused UN special envoy
Rizali Ismail's frequent requests to visit the
country, and he stepped down from his position
earlier this year. Although last year's critical
UN Security Council meeting was held behind closed
doors, the UN team in Yangon reportedly painted an
alarming picture of instability, rampant
repression, economic distress and a looming
humanitarian disaster that has the potential to
threaten regional security.
The US, which
has recently included Myanmar on its global list
of pariah states, is pushing for the UN to take
much stronger action against the hard-line regime,
including possible economic and political
sanctions. US criticism has obviously unnerved the
ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC),
as the junta is called, and was an important
factor in its abrupt decision last year to move
the nation's capital from coastal Yangon to inland
Pyinmana, to fortify itself against a possible US
invasion, diplomats say.
That's why
Myanmar's generals are reaching out to China and
Russia. During a visit to China earlier this year,
General Soe Win, Myanmar's prime minister,
similarly sought Beijing's veto at the UN Security
Council. China, which has extensive economic and
strategic interests in Myanmar, reportedly
promised to oppose any US-led bid to raise the
matter at the UN Security Council. Privately,
however, senior Beijing officials voiced their
reservations concerning the SPDC's lack of
progress toward political and economic reform.
Beijing has over the years provided a series of
low-interest loans to shore up Myanmar's
collapsing economy.
One of Beijing's major
strategic concerns surrounds Myanmar's restive
ethnic minority groups along their common border.
Beijing has supplied arms and urged Yangon to
exert greater control over the ethic guerrilla
groups, which have signed tenuous ceasefire
agreements but retained their weapons. During the
China visit, Myanmar's prime minister reportedly
asked Beijing on its behalf to seek Moscow's
support, paving the diplomatic way for Maung Aye's
recent visit.
Friends in need As the US and Western Europe campaign against
Myanmar's military leaders, Beijing and Moscow's
contrarian embrace of the SPDC is a reflection of
the broader strategic competition for global
influence. "It's no accident that China has almost
unreservedly backed anyone who becomes the target
of US criticism and pressure - like Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe," according to
an Asian diplomat. "Beijing is operating under the
old adage: your enemies' foes must be your
friend," he added.
After beating a retreat
from the region in the early 1990s, Moscow is now
trying to piggyback onto Beijing's recent
successful commercial diplomacy in the region.
Beijing has actively and successfully wooed many
regional countries - including Thailand, Cambodia,
Laos and Myanmar - by granting easy access to its
booming economy. Beijing is also sometimes playing
the role of benevolent patron: last week China
announced it would provide more aid to Cambodia
with fewer strings attached than Western donors.
"Moscow also has a growing interest in
developing stronger economic and strategic ties
with these countries, as well as Asia as a whole,"
said a Western diplomat based in Moscow. "Working
with China gives … Moscow greater influence in
these countries," he added. Behind Beijing's
friendly diplomacy are its growing strategic
concerns about the vulnerability of its energy
supplies. Many of the countries that the US has
campaigned against also have major oil and gas
reserves that China is eager to tap - including in
Myanmar. Thailand and Malaysia have big
concessions in Myanmar's off-shore oil and gas
fields, deals forged through their ASEAN links. As
Myanmar moves closer to China and Russia and
potentially away from ASEAN, Beijing and Moscow
could conceivably receive preferential treatment
in bidding on new concessions.
Senior
Myanmar officials, however, play down the notion
of any significant strategic realignment. Nyan
Win, Myanmar's foreign minister, told Asia Times
Online that his government is not concerned about
international sanctions or Western threats to have
the UN Security Council push the country's
military leaders to respect human rights and
implement political reform. "We have good
relations with all our neighbors and that is what
is important, especially China, India and
Thailand," Nyan Win said.
Myanmar analysts
and diplomats beg to differ. "[Myanmar] knows that
it is going to come under increasing international
pressure in the coming months and wants to
strengthen the protective umbrella around it -
ASEAN to the east and south, China to the north,
India to the west and now Russia to the north and
west," said Win Min, an independent Myanmar
analyst based in Thailand.
Friends no
more In the current international
environment, Myanmar's reclusive generals appear
to have belatedly grasped the notion that they
need powerful friends in high places to fend off
Western criticism and maintain their grip on power
at home. Since joining ASEAN in 1997, Yangon had
relied on its Southeast Asian brethren as a
bulwark against Western pressure. Thailand, while
vigorously pursuing commercial interests in
Myanmar, has recently stood firm against US
criticism of economic engagement with the SPDC.
More recently, however, ASEAN's members
have sounded similar notes of frustration about
the utter lack of reform. Last December ASEAN
appointed a new special envoy, Syed Hamid Albar,
to assess the status of the junta's so-called
"roadmap to democracy" and other reform promises.
General Than Shwe, the SPDC's leader, reportedly
felt threatened and piqued by ASEAN's recent
attempts through quiet diplomacy to push for
change. Leaks to the international media about
those discussions, however, have recently
embarrassed the SPDC and the generals have since
obstructed ASEAN's diplomatic overtures.
Hamid Albar visited Yangon in late March
but notably was not granted an audience with Than
Shwe, nor was he allowed to visit Suu Kyi.
According to ASEAN diplomats, the trip was a
monumental disaster. "Syed Hamid's visit was a
complete fiasco and achieved absolutely nothing,"
said a senior Southeast Asian diplomat who was
previously based in Yangon. "He was forced to
leave early to save some face when it was obvious
that the regime were not going to make any further
concessions."
Political analysts predict
the high-level snub signals Myanmar's intention to
withdraw altogether from ASEAN, particularly now
that ties appear to be warming with Moscow and
deepening with Beijing. Thailand had earlier
offered up its own version of a "roadmap to
democracy", which was paid short shrift by the
generals. Indonesia's more recent overtures,
likewise, have had little traction.
"The
contempt shown to Syed Hamid during his visit
reflects Than Shwe's utter disregard for
diplomatic niceties and his lack of concern about
ASEAN," said Win Min. "It also suggests that
Burma's [Myanmar's] leaders may be prepared to
leave ASEAN if they come under increased
pressure," he added. ASEAN foreign ministers are
scheduled to meet in Bali in mid-April and some
member countries have privately suggested taking a
hard-line stand against the regime at the meeting.
Than Shwe has repeatedly told his
ministers and other military leaders that he would
prefer to withdraw from ASEAN - and certainly
would do so before they were formally suspended or
thrown out. "Burma may be preparing to withdraw
from ASEAN later this year, for fear of what might
happen at the leaders summit in Manila at the end
of the 2006," said a Western diplomat based in
Yangon.
Emboldened by their new strategic
alliance with Russia and China, Myanmar may be
tempted to turn away from a more critical ASEAN
that appears to be taking its diplomatic cues from
the West. But the junta could similarly be tempted
to overplay its new diplomatic hand - with the
potential to completely alienate their ASEAN
regional neighbors. Both Beijing and Moscow have
assiduously avoided publicly criticizing the
regime as they draw closer together.
But
while Myanmar represents an important regional
toehold, it's also one of many budding
relationships Beijing, and now Moscow, are
nurturing across Southeast Asia. Against the US
and Europe, China and Russia are more willing to
come to the junta's defense for balance of power
purposes. Against other Southeast Asian allies,
however, it remains unclear how firmly China and
Russia would stand up for the regime if it
detracted from other budding economic and
strategic interests.
For all the
handshakes and agreements, Myanmar's isolationist
generals are still very much alone in the world,
at least for now.
Larry Jagan
previously covered Myanmar politics for the BBC.
He is currently a freelance journalist based in
Bangkok.
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