Myanmar's junta fears US invasion
By Samuel Blythe

BANGKOK - Myanmar's armed forces, commonly known as the Tatmadaw, are increasingly reorienting themselves to defend against a possible US-led foreign invasion, as revealed in a top-secret internal document leaked exclusively to Asia Times Online.
This official Ministry of Defense document represents the first concrete evidence that Myanmar is reacting militarily to recent US official statements referring to the hardline regime as an "outpost of tyranny".

The minutes of an October 2005 meeting in which battalion commanders were briefed about a high-level meeting at the War



Office in Yangon delineates three ways in which the United States might invade Myanmar - through agitating its citizens, in an alliance with insurgents and ceasefire groups or through a multinational coalition-led invasion. The Burmese-language document, which is more than 40 pages in length, is stamped "Top Secret".

The document further identifies Thailand, a staunch strategic ally of the United States, as Myanmar's "nearest enemy" and takes particular umbrage at the US-Thai joint Cobra Gold military exercises held annually in Thailand. In the past, the highly public joint military exercises have focused on counter-narcotics operations to help stem the flow of drugs from Myanmar into Thailand.

The document also indicates that the Tatmadaw has been closely studying US military strategy and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and is preparing an "Operation Other No War" plan (as the document's English-language translation calls it) to defend against a possible US invasion through a war of attrition. Exact details of the defensive contingency plan are not included in the document, however.

Quelling the masses
Since the bloody crackdown on democracy demonstrations in 1988, Myanmar's army has expanded dramatically, Billions of dollars have been spent to modernize its armaments and adopt more outward power-projection capabilities. Over the subsequent decade and a half, the armed forces' defense orientation was primarily focused inward to suppress urban-based dissidents and quash the many ethnic insurgencies operating along Myanmar's borders.

The army's core fighting units, which back in 1987 consisted of 104 infantry and 150 light-infantry battalions, has expanded over the subsequent 15 years to 200 infantry battalions and more than 300 light-infantry battalions. Light-infantry divisions, the army's shock troops, also increased from eight to 10.

Beginning in 1994, the War Office also established Operation Control Commands (OCCs), which have gradually expanded in scope over the years. There are currently as many as 22 OCCs based throughout the country, each comprising 10 infantry battalions that are deployed wherever needed.

The doubling of combat units has allowed the army to establish a permanent presence throughout much of the country, to secure more than a dozen still-tenuous ceasefire deals and to hem in the remaining insurgencies along the border with Thailand. Myanmar now boasts one of the largest standing armies in all of Asia.

Nonetheless, the regime remains ever vigilant about urban unrest, and ceasefire agreements with groups, such as the Kachin Independence Army, often appear shaky. Ultimately, though, the military junta, known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), will be able to quell domestic opposition to its heavy-handed rule only by instituting political reforms and sharing, if not relinquishing, political power.

Shifting threat perceptions
Although the domestic security imperative remains, there has been a clear shift in Myanmar's defense orientation since 2000, after a tit-for-tat border dispute in which the two historic foes shelled border towns and Thai fighters allegedly violated Myanmar's airspace. With the junta now fretting about possible US armed intervention, those strategic recalibrations take on new significance.

Myanmar's War Office reacted to its armed exchange with Thailand by implementing a series of administrative reforms, and shifting its procurement priorities to acquire modern fighter jets, including 12 MiG-29s from Russia, as well as other artillery and air defense systems. The junta is currently in talks with Moscow to obtain more undisclosed military hardware, which some strategic analysts believe includes missile technology. The Tatmadaw has also initiated a significant modernization of its navy. Notably, neither the air force nor the navy serves significant counter-insurgency functions.

The War Office also subordinated its regional commands under four bureaus of special operation. These BSOs are responsible for joint forces integration among the Tatmadaw's three service branches, and have conducted several high-profile combined operations along the Thailand-Myanmar border - some speculate in reaction to the annual US-Thai joint military operations.

BSOs, which exercise operational oversight over all military operations in their designated areas, report directly to the War Office and are under the command of General Thura Shwe Mann, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Yangon division remains under the direct command of the Ministry of Defense through the Yangon regional commander.

The Directorate of Artillery and Armor was also divided into separate directorates in 2001, and the Office of Chief of Air Defense created. A dramatic expansion of forces under these directorates followed. Most of the equipment for these units was procured from China.

Armored divisions were expanded in number from one to 10, five equipped with tanks and five with armored vehicles. In mid-2003 the army is believed to have acquired 50 Type 72 tanks from Ukraine. According to Jane's Defense Weekly, the respected global defense and military technology publication, Ukraine also signed a deal to build and equip a factory in Myanmar to produce 1,000 armored personnel carriers (APCs) in 2004.

Units are also armed with T-69 II tanks and Type 63 light tanks. Although APCs and tanks might serve some function in suppressing urban dissent or a renewed outbreak of insurgency, they are not useful in counter-insurgency jungle warfare, and represent further evidence of the regime's broader strategic reorientation.

Since 2000, the Directorate of Artillery has overseen the expansion of Artillery Command Controls (ACCs) from one or two to 10 or more. The army's stated intention is to establish an ACC in each of the 12 regional commands. An ACC is reportedly composed of 10 batteries, each armed with three guns. Armaments include heavy mortars, recoilless rifles, mountain guns and multiple rocket launchers.

The army continues to deploy and equip air-defense battalions throughout the country. Regarded as the first line of defense against a foreign invasion, these units reportedly rely on a variety of radar to suppress jamming, shoulder-launched artillery, and short-, medium- and long-range artillery and missiles. Procurement has included at least 100 Igla-1E low-altitude surface-to-air missiles from Bulgaria and air-defense equipment from Sweden and Ukraine.

Bunkered down, looking outward
These recent acquisitions, significantly, are also externally oriented. A high-ranking officer of the Karen National Liberation Army, an armed insurgent group, based in the Thai border town of Mae Sot claims that the SPDC has recently deployed artillery outposts along the entire border with Thailand. Between Mae Sot and Mae Samlep alone there are 10 or more such outposts, he contends. Such artillery is relatively useless against mobile, hit-and-run guerrilla forces operating in the jungle-covered area, and are clearly intended to provide a defensive perimeter against foreign attack from Thailand or the US, or both in cooperation.

Many also view the regime's recent establishment of the new bunker-fortified, inland capital in Pyinmana as partly motivated by the junta's fears of a possible US invasion. The leaked Defense Department document confirms that analysis in stark detail.

That said, the Tatmadaw's defense policies, which some strategic analysts contend are costing the impoverished country more than US$1 billion per year, seem self-defeating. While spending billions of dollars to procure more advanced weaponry, the military lacks the wherewithal to operate and maintain this equipment.

Soldiers rarely are able to practice with the foreign technology, raising hard questions about their capabilities in the event of a conflict. Purchases have also drained resources away from developing and motivating personnel, and the army continues to rely on forced recruitment; soldiers are poorly paid, and desertion is rife.

Although it still seems unlikely that the US, bogged down in Iraq, hard-focused on Iran and fretting about North Korea's nuclear program, will ever invade Myanmar, the junta's recent procurements would serve little if any deterrent value against America's military might if it did invade. One Western military official familiar with Myanmar's defensive capacities, requesting anonymity, stated that if the US were so inclined, it could take control over Myanmar's urban areas, transportation and communications infrastructure in a matter of days.

Western advocates of engaging rather than isolating the junta have argued that the present US economic sanctions make the ruling generals more xenophobic and paranoid. Ironically, perhaps, pre-1988 economic engagement with the junta flowed predominantly to the military and its senior officers' personal interests, and it continues to do so with the countries that have retained commercial relations with the regime. Analysts have estimated that about 50% of the central government's budget has been spent on defense since 1988.

Since seizing power in a military putsch in 1962, the Tatmadaw has frequently attempted to drum up nationalist sentiment and domestic fear by invoking the threat of foreign invasion. So it is still unclear whether SPDC leader General Than Shwe and other senior officers are really gripped with paranoia over a US invasion, or whether they are resorting to well-worn fear tactics to rouse nationalism among a dispirited army and beleaguered population.

In reality, the biggest security threat to Myanmar is still the Tatmadaw itself and its spendthrift ways. If the US were ever to strike preemptively and invade the increasingly isolated country, it might find a different reception from the one it received in Iraq. This time US forces just might be welcomed with rose petals and hugs in Myanmar.

Samuel Blythe, a Thailand-based independent political analyst, is a pseudonym.

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