US, Vietnam scratch each other's
back By Sergei Blagov
MOSCOW - Former war adversaries and now
growing trade partners, the US and Vietnam, are
slowly but surely engaging in a strategic
relationship that if fully consummated will have
significant implications for Asia's regional
balance of power, particularly toward
counterbalancing China's growing military might in
the region.
In an unprecedented gesture
toward Vietnam's Communist Party-led government,
Admiral William Fallon, head of the US Pacific
Command, traveled to Vietnam in mid-July to
discuss the possibility of conducting joint
military maneuvers and also urged his Vietnamese
counterpart, Defense Minister Colonel Phung
Quang Thanh, to allow for
more US naval visits to Vietnamese ports.
Fallon also suggested that the two
countries' navies conduct future joint
search-and-rescue exercises at sea. Thanh did not
offer an immediate reply and impressed upon the
senior US military official that he was reluctant
to cause any misunderstanding with regional
neighbors - presumably China - yet he promised to
pass the proposal along to top Communist Party
officials.
US-Vietnam military-to-military
exchanges have quietly and rapidly intensified in
recent years. On July 4, two US naval ships, the
USS Patriot and USS Salvor, called on Vietnamese
ports, the fourth such US naval visit to Vietnam
since 2003. In the wake of the December 2004
tsunami in Southeast Asia, Hanoi allowed US
military cargo planes unlimited flyover rights to
assist in conducting rescue and supply missions.
The two sides now cooperate closely with
the United States' counter-terrorism campaign,
counter-narcotics operations and military
medical-training programs. Hanoi recently agreed
to exchanges under the Pentagon's international
military education and training program, and its
senior and middle-ranking military officials now
participate in professional development programs
with US allies in the region. The US and Vietnam
also conduct an annual defense dialogue among
mid-level military officers, which will hold its
third session this year.
Early last month,
US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited
Vietnam for talks aimed specifically at boosting
bilateral security ties, and both countries agreed
at those meetings to increase "exchanges at all
levels of the military and in various ways to
further strengthen the military-to-military
relationship". As part of that agreement, two
Vietnamese officers are now studying English in
the US.
Rumsfeld said after his visit that
"we have no plans for access to military
facilities in Vietnam", a diplomatic statement
made clearly to allay China's concerns about the
budding US-Vietnam military relationship along its
southern border. The United States is widely
believed to want access to a major Vietnamese air
terminal and a deepwater port, with the former US
military facility at Cam Ranh Bay the most obvious
option.
Strategic calculus China's growing military might in the region
is drawing the US and Vietnam closer together.
Engaging Vietnam is an important part of
Washington's greater strategic realignment in
Asia, which has historically relied heavily on
military bases in South Korea and Japan to
maintain a strategic balance of power favorable to
US interests.
With the United States'
significant military commitments to Afghanistan
and Iraq, the Pentagon has in recent years
announced plans to redeploy some of its force
commitments in Asia to the island of Guam. The
United States' massive military presence in South
Korea and Tokyo has at times stressed bilateral
relations, and since the US lost access to
military facilities in the Philippines in 1991-92,
the Pentagon has sought to establish a new
military footprint in Southeast Asia.
A
sizable US presence at Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay
would profoundly alter Asia's strategic calculus.
China's acquisition of anti-ship missiles and its
buildup of ballistic missiles overtly aimed toward
Taiwan also present a grave threat to US bases in
the region. To counterbalance China's growing
military capabilities, particularly its aggressive
stance toward Taiwan, the US will require a joint
force dependent on both naval and air power. A US
presence at Cam Ranh Bay would also allow the US
Navy to pressure China's fuel shipments in a
future conflict, security analysts say.
Vietnam obviously harbors suspicions about
China's regional intentions. The two countries
fought a brief but brutal border war in 1979, and
the two historical antagonists supported opposite
sides in Cambodia's civil war throughout the 1980s
and into the 1990s.
Notwithstanding, US
access to Cam Ranh Bay is not a done deal. Hanoi
has so far been extremely careful not to pique
Beijing through its engagement with the US. Recent
critical statements by Rumsfeld and US Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice have called on Beijing
to "demystify" its military spending and clarify
its strategic intentions for the region, which
have annoyed Chinese leaders. That will make it
trickier for Hanoi to convince Beijing that its
rapprochement with the US is not actually aimed at
strategically containing China.
The
strategic relationship is being promoted through
vigorous, high-profile diplomacy. This year many
top US officials have held or plan to hold
high-level meetings with their Vietnamese
counterparts, including US House Speaker Dennis
Hastert, Rumsfeld, Rice, and President George W
Bush. The US president is due to visit Vietnam
while attending the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) leaders' meeting to be held in
November in Hanoi.
Last week, Hanoi said
Rice's visit to Vietnam late this month would
boost "mutual understanding and cooperative
relations" between the two countries.
"The
continued exchange of delegations between Vietnam
and the United States, including Rice's trip, will
help promote mutual understanding and stable,
long-term and win-win relations between the two
countries," the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry said.
On July 12, Hanoi publicly marked the 11th
anniversary of its normalization of diplomatic
relations with the US, which has gradually evolved
from cooperation in locating the remains of
missing-in-action US soldiers to recent full-blown
bilateral trade agreements. Last year, then-prime
minister Phan Van Khai met with Bush in Washington
and pledged to raise bilateral security relations
to "a new level".
The more recent
bilateral trade agreement, signed last month, will
pave the way for Vietnam's accession to the World
Trade Organization this year. The last remaining
hurdle to full-blown normal relations is the
ongoing debate inside the US Congress over whether
to approve permanent normal trade relations (PNTR)
with Vietnam. Some US Congress members have
expressed reservations about Vietnam's
human-rights record, particularly in relation to
religious freedoms.
The Foreign Ministry
has said PNTR is the final, important step for
complete normal bilateral relations, which
presumably will allow the two sides' emerging
multi-level strategic relationship to evolve
further, including possible joint military
maneuvers.
US fills Russia's
gap The US is quickly moving to fill the
gap left behind by Russia, until recently
Vietnam's most important strategic ally.
Throughout the Cold War, Moscow provided Hanoi
with generous dollops of military and economic
aid. Tens of thousands of Vietnamese, including
senior military officers, studied in the Soviet
Union and many still speak fluent Russian.
Russia has supplied Vietnam's army with
most of its military hardware, and Moscow's
armaments sales to Hanoi still amount to roughly a
third of the two countries' trade. At the same
time, military-to-military contacts have not
developed in recent years. And Russia's joint war
games with China last August sent a clear message
to Vietnam that it needs to look elsewhere for
future strategic assurances.
With the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, economic
relations were badly strained over the massive
debts Hanoi owed Moscow. Against that backdrop,
economic ties have sagged over a period that
bilateral US and Vietnam trade has grown
exponentially. In July 2002, Russia rushed to
withdraw its military presence at Vietnam's Cam
Ranh Bay, even though Moscow still had two more
years on its 25-year contract to use the naval
facilities for free.
Officially, the
Kremlin explained its Cam Ranh Bay closure as a
cost-cutting measure, but many strategic analysts
saw the move as an attempt to appease and please
China as a new strategic partner. After the
Russian withdrawal, Hanoi originally indicated new
plans to turn Cam Ranh Bay into a sort of economic
hub, similar to what the Philippines has attempted
with its Subic Bay facilities. Provincial
authorities now plan a number of projects,
including a cement factory in Cam Thinh Dong,
shipyards in Cam Phu and Cam Phuc Nam, industrial
zones in Nam Cam Ranh and Bac Cam Ranh, and
tourism areas for Bai Dai and Cam Lap.
Vietnamese authorities are also mulling
other projects, including upgrading Cam Ranh Bay's
airport into an international gateway and
rebuilding Ba Ngoi seaport into a container
terminal. These plans would appear to indicate
Hanoi's intention to scale down the military and
build up the economic uses of Cam Ranh Bay's
facilities. But if the US pushes for military
access, and China doesn't openly demur, there are
growing indications Vietnam would warmly entertain
any and all US proposals.
Sergei
Blagov covers Russia and post-Soviet states,
with special attention to Asia-related issues. He
has contributed to Asia Times Online since 1996
and was based in Southeast Asia from 1983 to 1997.
Nova Science Publishers, New York, has published
two of his books on Vietnamese history.
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