Myanmar's losing military
strategy By Clifford McCoy
CHIANG MAI, Thailand - Despite its newer,
more modern weaponry, Myanmar's ambitious
military-modernization campaign is proving
ineffectual in fighting the various ethnic armies
along its borders. Myanmar's army, also known as
the Tatmadaw, remains the same light-infantry
force that it was 50 years ago, as evidenced by
its current offensive against the Karen National
Union (KNU) and other armed insurgencies along its
eastern border with Thailand.
There is no
end in sight for Myanmar's grinding 57-year-old
civil
war, despite the extensive
military upgrades. Rather than win over
the ethnic-minority population
through political dialogue, providing sustainable
economic opportunities and building and equipping
schools and health facilities, the army has
launched repeated military offensives into areas
where ethnic groups resist the rule of the State
Peace and Development Council (SPDC). These
operations, because of the accompanying
human-rights abuses, have over the years only
fueled the insurgencies.
Although
ceasefires have been agreed with some of the
ethnic insurgents, several, including the KNU, the
Karenni National Progressive Party, the Shan State
Army (South) and the Chin National Front, are
still fighting the regime. Meanwhile, the SPDC
junta's relations with some of the ceasefire
groups are shaky. Many ceasefire groups are
unhappy with the lack of political progress and
there is the possibility that, if pressured, some
or all of the groups could go back to armed
struggle.
Despite this, the SPDC seems to
believe that its counterinsurgency strategy is
working and is instead concentrating on protecting
itself from foreign invasion. It has bought
expensive military hardware, expanded conscription
into government-run militias in both the
countryside and the cities and, in its most
extravagant move, relocated the capital from
coastal Yangon to inland Pyinmana.
Aggressive spending In the past
decade, the SPDC has spent hundreds of millions of
US dollars on military hardware and greatly
expanded its artillery and armored units with an
eye toward developing a conventional defense
capacity. Over that period, military-related
expenditures have accounted for nearly half of
Myanmar's annual budget. Yet counterinsurgency
capacities have not evolved commensurately.
In the field, the typical soldier is still
fighting the same battle, with substandard
equipment, inadequate supplies of food and
medicine, and the knowledge that if he is
seriously wounded in combat, he will likely die
before reaching the nearest hospital.
Nowhere in evidence are the tanks and
armored personnel carriers (APCs) that the SPDC
purchased from Ukraine and China. According to
Australia-based military analyst Andrew Selth, the
junta has acquired 50 T-72 tanks from Ukraine and
more than 200 Type 69II, Type 59D, Type 80 and
Type 85 main battle tanks in addition to 105 Type
63 light tanks from China.
The regime has
also obtained more than 300 Type 85 and Type 90
tracked APCs from China. Another 1,000 BTR-3U
wheeled APCs are to be assembled in Myanmar over
the next 10 years from parts sent by Ukraine. Yet
all of these vehicles are next to useless in the
forested and mountainous terrain where most of the
counterinsurgency operations take place and are
more likely to be used against a possible urban
uprising of pro-democracy protesters.
The
army's new artillery units are equipped with more
than 100 155-millimeter WP52 and 122mm Type 54
howitzers and 30 107mm Type 63 multiple rocket
launchers from China, 16 155mm Soltam field guns
from Israel, 16 130mm Type 59 field guns from
North Korea, and 80 75mm mountain howitzers from
India, according to military analyst sources. The
only apparent use of heavier artillery, according
to reports by the independent Karen Human Rights
Group, has been a battery of 120mm mortars being
used to shell the area around Ler Mu Plaw camp in
northern Karen state.
Nor have the
much-talked-about MiG-29s purchased from Russia,
nor the older F-7s and A-5s purchased from China,
so far been seen in the skies over Karen state.
The SPDC purchased 50 Chengdu F-7E/K/M "Airguard"
fighters and 48 NAMC (Nippon Aircraft
Manufacturing Corp) A-5C/M ground-attack aircraft
from China in the 1990s. These were later joined
by 10 MiG-29 air-superiority fighters from Russia.
Technicians were brought in from Serbia in
2004 to repair the 12 SOKO G-4 Galeb ground-attack
aircraft that had been grounded for many years
because of a lack of spare parts. Of little use
against mobile guerrilla units, they are also too
valuable to risk being shot down by a lucky Karen
soldier. Poor maintenance and the lack of spare
parts also hinder their use. The same can be said
for the Tatmadaw's helicopter fleet, which has
carried officials to visit camps and to move
supplies to large secure camps.
The air
force has also purchased 12 PZL Swindik W-3 Sokol
multi-purpose helicopters and 18 Mil Mi-2
"Hoplite" helicopters from Poland and 12 Mil Mi-17
medium-lift transport helicopters from Russia. All
of these helicopters can be configured for a
ground-attack role, and according to Andrew Selth,
there has been discussion in the Tatmadaw about
the use of helicopters in assault operations. To
date, however, helicopters have not been used in
attacks and generally do not move infantry around,
rescue wounded soldiers or send supplies to units
in the field either.
Despite all the money
being spent on expensive hardware, the common
Tatmadaw infantryman is still poorly equipped.
Deserters have commented that their backpacks and
webbing are of a low quality and the uniforms are
so bad that many soldiers try to purchase their
own as soon as possible. Many soldiers wear
Chinese-style jungle shoes, which wear out after a
couple of months and are much inferior to jungle
boots.
Since 1996, the SPDC's weapons
factories have produced new assault rifles and
light machine-guns for the infantry. The MA series
of weapons were designed to replace the old
German-designed but locally manufactured Heckler
and Koch G3s and G4s that equipped Myanmar's army
since the 1960s. After more than six years, some
units still have not received the new weapons. The
ammunition supplied by the regime's munitions
factories, especially the 5.56mm for its new
rifles, is reportedly very poor and burns too hot.
Ethnic opposition sources such as the Karen and
Shan say they try not to use captured Tatmadaw
ammunition, if possible.
The insurgents
have to make do with a motley collection of mostly
old automatic rifles and carbines backed up with a
few mortars and machine-guns. With the exception
of the now-defunct Burmese Communist Party, which
received most of its weapons from China, the rebel
groups buy their weapons, ammunition and equipment
on the black market or capture them from Tatmadaw
units during ambushes or raids on encampments. The
lack of ammunition has forced some of the
insurgent groups to rely very heavily on land
mines to protect their camps, supply routes and
civilian populations.
The only really
useful procurement in fighting ethnic insurgents
has been thousands of trucks and four-wheel-drive
vehicles obtained from China. In addition, the
Tatmadaw has obtained numerous Nissan trucks and
Patrol four-wheel-drive vehicles from Japan and
locally produces Hino trucks. Using these
vehicles, the army has been able to move large
numbers of units and concentrate them in eastern
Pegu division and northern Karen state.
Elements of six different divisions from
various parts of Myanmar, including as far away as
Kachin and Arakan states, have been carried on the
trucks. These divisions have also been able to
rotate their battalions from home areas into and
out of the front line. The army has also been able
to keep its stockpiles supplied with food and
ammunition. Although the use of motorized
transport is limited in the rainy season, the
trucks are still useful for bringing supplies up
to forward staging bases from where they can be
portered up to the front-line camps. Before the
monsoon rains began, even some of the front-line
camps could be supplied by vehicle.
Out
of step At the front, however, Tatmadaw
soldiers still must march by foot up steep
mountain trails to seek out the soldiers of the
Karen National Liberation Army and hunt down its
civilian supporters. Expanded road networks and
large numbers of trucks have enabled the Tatmadaw
to build up large stockpiles at rear bases.
However, units at the front line still find
themselves short of rations, medicine and
sometimes ammunition. Most of the supplies for
units on operations must still be carried over
mountain trails that are impassable to vehicular
transport.
The use of civilians as porters
has become common operational practice despite
frequent protests by international rights bodies
such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International
and the United Nations-sponsored International
Labor Organization. Frequent reports have
documented the mistreatment and killing of
villagers and convicts carrying supplies for the
army. This inefficient practice also ties the
soldiers to long columns and the use of trails,
limiting their operational capabilities. Without
the use of helicopters or air drops, the army is
almost completely reliant on how much the porters
can carry.
Soldiers of the various ethnic
armies, although equipped with old weapons, often
without enough ammunition, are frequently able to
get the better of Tatmadaw units in combat. That's
because they are fighting for a homeland cause,
and many ethnic insurgents have years of combat
experience. They know the terrain intimately, and
are conditioned to fight in mountainous and
forested areas.
They also usually have the
support of the civilian populations where they
operate. Most civilians are willing to share food
with the guerrillas and help them with carrying
supplies. They view the soldiers from same ethnic
group as fighting to protect them from the
Tatmadaw. This support from the civilian
population is also their weakness, and the army's
counterinsurgency strategy has long sought to
exploit it by targeting them.
Strategy and
tactics likewise remain relatively unchanged from
decades ago. The guiding strategy is still the
so-called "four cuts", which seeks to deprive
armed resistance of food, funds, intelligence and
recruits by separating them from civilian support.
The army implements this strategy by targeting
villagers, razing their jungle communities and
forcing them out of the hills and mountains. The
SPDC has notably shown very little inclination to
dedicate resources toward winning the "hearts and
minds" of ethnic civilians.
Recent reports
from the Free Burma Rangers and the Karen Human
Rights Group indicate that army columns have been
conducting sweeps of KNU-controlled territory,
shooting villagers on sight and destroying their
food supplies and crops. True to form, the great
majority of casualties inflicted by the army's
current year-long operations have been Karen
civilians, providing yet further fuel to the fire
of Myanmar's long war.
Clifford
McCoy is a freelance journalist based in
Chiang Mai, Thailand.
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