Why this military coup is
different By Rodney Tasker
CHIANG MAI, Thailand - The conventional
Western perception of coups is of a military
faction or individual seizing power for selfish,
often anti-democratic reasons. There is little
flexibility in this mindset - hence the uniform
denunciation of Thailand's latest military coup by
the US and other Western democracies.
Western media op-ed writers, apparently
relying on precious little on-the-ground
background, have highlighted the fact that ousted
prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra was a
democratically elected
leader and therefore any
non-elective move against him was necessarily bad
for the future of Thailand's democracy.
Such simplistic interpretations, however,
just don't fit with the current Thai situation and
woefully ignore the reform mentality of
professional generals in today's Thai army,
including coup-leader General Sonthi Boonyaratglin
and former army commander, now interim Prime
Minister Surayud Chulanont. Professional in the
Thai context translates to military officers who
take their oath of allegiance to protect the
monarchy and state seriously, overriding any lure
of power and money.
Most of Thailand's 18
previous coups since the constitutional monarchy
was established in 1932 fell into the latter
category and badly stunted the country's
democratic development. But there has been no
indication so far that Sonthi and his coupmaker
associates had any selfish or corrupt motives in
launching their September 19 coup, which they have
painted and the public has accepted as a
last-resort strike to remove the scourge of
Thaksin's government, accused of rapacious,
corrupt and politically divisive ways.
Because of its overtly patriotic motives
to protect rather than undermine Thailand's
democracy under a constitutional monarchy,
Sonthi's coup marks a watershed in Thai military
affairs. Historically, Thai generals have been
heavily political, and coups have often reflected
their views that only the army was capable of
effectively running the country. The financial
perks, of course, came with the job.
Military rule in the 1940s and early 1950s
under fascist Field Marshal Pibul Songkhram, the
late 1950s and early 1960s under Field Marshal
Sarit Thanarat, and throughout the 1960s into the
1970s under Field Marshals Thanom Kittikachorn and
Prapat Charusathien was invariably justified by
the ruling generals that they were bastions
against the threat of spreading communism, which
eventually took root in neighboring Indochina.
After a brief period of civilian rule from
1973-1976, conservative military domination came
back with a bang in 1976 when the army unleashed
the right-wing paramilitary Village Scouts and Red
Gaur groups on militant students at Bangkok's
prestigious Thammasat University. Scores of
students were tortured and killed by these
military-backed groups in the infamous university
bloodbath. From the chaos the army appointed an
ultra-right wing civilian, Thanin Kraivixien, as
prime minister.
In the 1980s, the
communist threat became less of a bogey -
particularly after a successful military-led
political approach to draw members of the
insurgent Communist Party of Thailand back into
the national fold - and Army Commander General
Prem Tinsulanond followed General Kriangsak
Chomanand as appointed prime ministers. Still, it
was an era rife with intra-military rivalry.
A group of officers led by Colonel Manoon
Roopkachorn from Chulachomklao Defense Academy's
Class 7, popularly known as the "Young Turks",
launched two abortive coup attempts against Prem
in 1981 and 1985. Motivated by a convoluted
nationalist ideology, the upstart officials even
attempted a bungled assassination attempt on Queen
Sirikit at a Bangkok football game in 1982.
The coup in 1991 was at first a smooth
affair as it was widely regarded by Thais as
removing a hugely corrupt democratically elected
government led by former General Chatichai
Choonhavan. Only later did the truth sink in that
the successful coup-makers from Chulachomklao's
Class 5, led by General Suchinda Kraprayoon, were
intent on maintaining political power for
themselves. As one Western military analyst in
Bangkok put it at the time: "Class 5 officers feel
they have a divine right to rule. They are a law
unto themselves."
Burnishing the
brass Since the downfall of the Class 5
coup leaders in 1992, two army commanders in
particular have successfully burnished the army's
image. The first was General Vimol Wongwanich,
whose promotion to army chief in October 1992
coincided with a return to democracy under prime
minister Chuan Leekpai. The second, current
interim premier Surayud, served as army commander
from 1998 to 2002, over which he oversaw a
sweeping reform program aimed at permanently
pushing the military out of business and politics.
Sonthi, a former Surayud subordinate,
arguably represents a new breed of Thai brass.
Western governments have only reluctantly accepted
this and will keep on the new military-appointed
government's back to first remove martial law and
then bring forward the planned October 2007 date
for new general elections. According to one
analysis quietly making the rounds in Bangkok, new
democratic polls have been set in the distant
future for a reason - to allow the Thai military's
professional soldiers the power and space to
defend the monarchy from any potential threats.
Many Western observers still fail to
appreciate the essential role played by King
Bhumibol Adulyadej in maintaining Thailand's
enviable political stability, economic progress
and social harmony. Look across Thailand's borders
to the comparative political repression and
economic deprivation in neighboring Myanmar, Laos
and Cambodia and one striking historical
difference is those countries' lack of a figure of
moral authority that genuinely looked after
national rather than particularistic interests.
Still, outsiders wonder why in this modern
era a king can be so highly idolized by his people
and the palace so widely regarded as the one
institution that will keep the country on track in
times of trouble.
Thailand's current
generation of ruling generals are fully aware of
this, of course, and remain mindful of their oath
of allegiance first to the crown and second to
elected politicians. They may also be aware of one
of King Bhumibol's main priorities - to perpetuate
into the future the integrity and centrality of
the monarchy in Thai society. A popular
international view in the aftermath of the bloody
Bangkok street confrontations of May 1992, when
troops opened fire on pro-democracy protesters,
was that Thailand's military was at last being
marshaled back to its barracks.
But that
can't realistically happen in Thailand's political
culture so long as King Bhumibol plays such a
prominent role in holding the nation together. To
be sure, many professional military officers are
still not happy to be subservient to a civilian
leadership run by political parties who often
exploit the trappings of democracy for their own
personal gain. For good reason, Thaksin's Thai Rak
Thai ruling party fatally fell into that category.
So if the current generation of coupmaker
generals is as professional as they are now widely
viewed by Thais, they will likely want to play a
central political role as long as King Bhumibol,
who turns 79 on December 5, is seen to be in
fragile health. The highly revered monarch
recently underwent serious surgery on his spine,
and while he emerged from hospital looking in good
health, it is significant that he will not
personally open the new National Legislative
Assembly (NLA) on October 20.
Speculation
has centered not only on his health, but also on
the apparent current process of rehabilitating his
son, Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn, who will
stand in for King Bhumibol at the NLA's opening
ceremony. While the Crown Prince is next in line
to the throne, he does not enjoy anything like the
genuine adulation and near religious respect most
Thai people have for King Bhumibol. Therefore, one
theory goes, if the king's health deteriorates in
the near future, it would be better to have the
military in a central political role to cope with
any instability which may occur.
This may
also be a reason why the generals decided to
appoint Surayud as interim prime minister, even
knowing that his military background would
inevitably draw flak from Western governments.
Surayud is widely respected as a professional
soldier and strong nationalist, who introduced
bold reforms aimed at depoliticizing the army and
root out corrupt elements.
On his
retirement from the armed services, he was
selected a leading member of the Privy Council,
the prestigious body which advises King Bhumibol.
He is seen as a more powerful administrator than,
say, a brilliant economist or banker, as were a
handful of the other prospective candidates for
the top post. As some political analysts see it,
Surayud will not only serve as a staunch guardian
of the throne, but also a formidable obstacle to
any mischievous attempts by ousted prime minister
Thaksin to return to power aided by his wealthy
cronies, who still wield considerable financial,
if not political, power.
Rodney
Tasker was a long-time correspondent for the
Far Eastern Economic Review, where he covered the
ins and outs of the Thai military throughout the
1980s and 1990s and famously predicted the 1991
coup. He is currently semi-retired in the northern
Thai city of Chiang Mai.
(Copyright
2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.
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