Page 1 of 2 Indonesia-Russia: Arms, atoms and oil
By Bill Guerin
JAKARTA - The United States, China and now a resurgent Russia are all competing
for regional influence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesian President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono is shrewdly playing his diplomatic cards among all three
suitors.
Yudhoyono visited Moscow early this month and signed a wide raft of bilateral
agreements, including big new arms, energy and trade deals. Most significant
was a broad agreement to develop
stronger military cooperation over the period spanning 2007-10, an arrangement
that, if fully implemented, promises to tip the region's current strategic
balance.
According to news reports, Jakarta has expressed its desire to purchase about
US$3 billion worth of Russian armaments, and Moscow has provisionally offered
$1 billion in five-year loans to facilitate the purchases. The
multibillion-dollar arms deal is expected to be finalized when Russian
President Vladimir Putin visits Indonesia next June.
The agreement follows up on a $192 million bilateral deal in 2003, where
Jakarta purchased assault rifles, armored personnel carriers, military
helicopters, and Sukhoi fighter jets, some of the most sophisticated aerial
defense technology available on global markets. The new multibillion-dollar
deal includes plans for purchasing six more Sukhoi jets, submarines, amphibious
tanks and anti-aircraft missiles for the Indonesian navy.
To be sure, major Russian-Indonesian arms deals are nothing new. In the 1950s,
Indonesia was almost totally reliant on the Soviet Union for its arms supplies.
After the 1965 coup that replaced independence leader Sukarno with military
general Suharto, Indonesia's military was firmly reoriented toward the West.
Data from the New York-based Arms Trade Resource Center show that as of the
mid-1980s, Indonesia relied on the US and Europe for more than 90% of its
armaments.
In 1991, Indonesian military abuses in the occupied province of East Timor
prompted the US to impose restrictions on arms sales and military-to-military
cooperation with the Indonesian armed forces. Russia, one of the world's
largest arms dealers, was set to fill Indonesia's arms gap in 1997 when the
regional financial crisis depleted Jakarta's national coffers and put various
half-negotiated deals, including for fighter jets, on hold.
The US scaled back military cooperation with Jakarta again in 1999, after
Indonesia-backed militias and security forces killed thousands of people during
the aftermath of East Timor's 1999 vote for independence from Indonesia. When
Indonesia's economy started to bounce back in 2003, Moscow restarted previous
stalled negotiations, which resulted in the fighter jet, armored personnel
carriers and assault helicopters brokered under president Megawati
Sukarnoputri's administration.
In November 2005, the US lifted its arms embargo on Indonesia after Jakarta
showed a stronger commitment to US counter-terrorism policies in the region,
including the recent imprisonment or killing of more than 200 suspected Muslim
militants. Washington has since dangled the prospect of new arms deals, but so
far Jakarta has received the offer coolly.
Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono said last month that the planned Russian
purchase would wean Indonesia from its historical dependence on US military
products, which he noted was compromised by the United States' 1991 and 1999
embargoes. Indonesia's top generals have long been frustrated by the US
embargoes, which have hindered their ability to acquire spare parts for crucial
military equipment.
Moreover, they have frequently complained that complex US-manufactured hardware
is prohibitively expensive and difficult to maintain compared with equivalent
Russian armaments. Yudhoyono has recently also pushed for defense-cooperation
agreements with other nations, including China, to reduce dependence on US and
European weapons systems. Beijing has recently supplied Jakarta with
short-range missile technology. And the recently proposed $3 billion arms deal
will tie Jakarta to Moscow closely in a long-term supplier and
technical-assistance relationship.
Currently, US-armed Singapore is widely believed by strategic analysts to have
the strongest power-projection capabilities in the region, particularly with
its F-16-ready air force. Singapore's leaders have repeatedly expressed their
strategic concerns about possible Muslim terrorist attacks, including from the
Indonesia-based militant group Jemaah Islamiyah, which allegedly plotted a
foiled multi-target attack on Singapore in December 2001.
As US-China competition heats up in the region, Indonesia's strategic
significance is growing - and Russian arms dealers are set to profit. China has
repeatedly expressed its concerns that in a potential regional conflict, the US
Navy would likely attempt to choke Chinese fuel shipments from the Middle East
in the narrow Strait of Malacca, through which an estimated 80% of China's
energy imports now flow. Indonesia, which represents one of the strait's land
barriers, would be crucial in that hypothetical strategic scenario.
Indonesia's decision to acquire Russian rather than US arms represents a
significant diplomatic hedge, one that apparently aims to keep warming
diplomatic and trade relations with China on track. The Russian deal also
appeases a growing domestic constituency, including significantly among
moderate politicians, that favors distancing Indonesia from the US
administration's
