From chaos to order in
Cambodia By Verghese Mathews
Historians and political commentators will
look back at 2006 as a defining year for Cambodian
politics - the year Prime Minister Hun Sen
substantially consolidated his own and the ruling
Cambodian People's Party's political power and set
the country on a more stable political course.
The changes were long in the offing and,
in hindsight, there was a definite political
strategy that escaped scrutiny, given all the
usual distractions - the never-ending infighting,
the ever-present
treachery, the underlying
political deviousness and the debilitating
one-upmanship that have been characteristic of
Cambodian politics since the United
Nations-sponsored elections of 1993.
To
appreciate the political shift, revisiting the
aftermath of the July 2003 general elections is
instructive. That post-election period, a repeat
of the chaos and bickering of the previous two
elections, was particularly significant. The 11
wasted months of frustrating negotiations to form
a coalition government deeply upset Hun Sen and
his Cambodian People's Party (CPP) cadres, who won
73 of the possible 123 seats at the polls but were
unable to form a one-party government.
His
party bitterly claimed that the opposition Sam
Rainsy Party (SRP) and royalist Funcinpec Party
(FCP) took unfair advantage of the democratic
process to hobble the country's administration,
and at some point apparently made the decision
never again to allow election losers to hold the
winners to ransom because of a constitutional
loophole that required a party to win a two-thirds
majority to form a government by itself.
Despite some late spirited campaigning,
the royalist FCP, which went into elections badly
factionalized, limped home with a mere 26 seats -
a far cry from the 53 seats it secured in 1993 and
the 43 seats in 1998. The SRP, the smallest of the
three parties, meanwhile did comparatively well,
capturing 24 seats, a creditable jump from the 15
seats it held in 1998. After the elections, the
SRP and the FCP formed a loose alliance to prevent
the CPP from forming a government without granting
them substantial political concessions.
What followed were the 11 wasted months
before the FCP finally broke ranks and joined the
CPP in a ruling coalition in July 2004. However,
the good personal and working relations Hun Sen
and FCP leader Prince Norodom Ranariddh shared
after the formation of the coalition government
quickly deteriorated. In a state of pique,
Ranariddh resigned as chairman of the National
Assembly, leaving his party embroiled in ugly
infighting and weakening his authority as party
leader.
Meanwhile, all was not well inside
the SRP after party leader Sam Rainsy was stripped
of his parliamentary immunity and two other senior
party members in February 2005 faced criminal
defamation charges filed by Hun Sen and Ranariddh.
Rainsy fled Cambodia and remained abroad for a
year; he only returned after Hun Sen accepted his
apology and the unconditional withdrawal of his
earlier allegations against the prime minister.
Rainsy's long period of self-exile
likewise weakened his position as party leader,
and some political analysts believe he decided on
the compromise with Hun Sen when it became obvious
that some credible aspirants inside his party were
eyeing his senior post. Rainsy's compromise,
however, arguably represented an important turning
point in Cambodia's political history.
At
the time, it suited Rainsy's immediate personal
and political needs, but also dovetailed superbly
with the CPP's long-term political strategy to
consolidate its power. Under that bargain, Rainsy
would endorse a constitutional amendment through
parliament to lower the two-thirds seat
requirement to form future governments.
In
return, Hun Sen agreed to drop all court charges
against his longtime nemesis, amend the criminal
code to drop jail terms for defamation
convictions, and seek the king's pardon to absolve
Rainsy from the 18-month term of imprisonment for
defamation he already faced in absentia. On March
2, the National Assembly overwhelmingly voted in
favor of an SRP resolution allowing for a new
government to be formed with a simple majority.
New political calculus That
changed the CPP's political calculus, freeing it
from the troublesome two-thirds electoral
requirement and, judging from past election
results, the need to include the contentious FCP
in future ruling coalitions. Indeed, the CPP seems
set for a long term in political power. It has
largely shed the baggage of its past and arguably
has a better parliamentary track record than the
other two parties. Moreover, the CPP has recently
taken to promoting at least the language of
democracy, until now the reserve of the
opposition.
Employing divide-and-rule
tactics, it is in the CPP's strategic interest to
see the FCP rebuild and become a viable political
counter to the SRP, which has recently emerged as
the biggest long-term potential threat to
sustained CPP rule. The SRP is vigorously
rebuilding the party's infrastructure and support
base to contest the April commune elections and
the 2008 general elections.
The party
recently appointed former FCP women's affairs
minister Mu Sochua, who crossed over to the SRP,
as its new secretary general - a popular personnel
move that some Cambodia watchers perceived as the
party's best political maneuver in 2006. Although
the SRP has undoubtedly lost some of its previous
reform luster and appeal, it remains the only
credible opposition at the moment and can be
expected to renew its strident support of populist
causes.
By mid-2006, on the other hand,
the FCP was an almost totally dysfunctional party,
with insiders alleging that Ranariddh's long
periods of absence from the country, his falling
out with Hun Sen and his preoccupation with
personal problems were grave impediments to the
party's growth. In October, a rival faction,
reportedly with strategic advice from friends in
the CPP, removed Ranariddh from the party's
presidency and replaced him with his comparatively
sober brother-in-law, Ambassador Keo Puth Rasmey.
Ranariddh, now heading a new fledgling
small party, is being sued by his wife for
adultery and by his former party colleagues for
allegedly misappropriating funds he had obtained
by unilaterally disposing of party assets.
Ranariddh's lawyers have challenged this claim and
have pointed out that the sale was not unilateral
and that the funds were fully accounted for.
Neutral observers see the charges as politically
motivated, but the prince's standing has
nonetheless been badly damaged in the fracas.
The overall result of these seemingly
almost choreographed political developments is
that Hun Sen is without question the most powerful
politician in Cambodia. If any challenge should
emerge in 2007, it will only come from within his
own party, but to date no such personality or
opportunistic faction is in sight.
Meanwhile, Hun Sen will now face much less
internal opposition to move up more competent
second-echelon party members, many of whom are
arguably more reform-minded than some of the
current batch of CPP leaders.
The
albatross still hanging around Hun Sen's neck is
the need to rein in pervasive official corruption
and the broader challenge of moving toward better
overall governance. Though Hun Sen's still-many
detractors will watch him eagle-eyed as he further
consolidates his political power, those close to
the premier privately suggest that he has an eye
on raising Cambodia's international image and in
the process burnish his controversial legacy.
Indications are that he and his party have
manufactured the long-elusive political command
and stability necessary to pursue those loftier
aims.
Verghese Mathews, a
visiting research fellow with the Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, is a former ambassador to
Cambodia and may be reached at
mathews@iseas.edu.sg.
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