Page 2 of 2 Asian ports still open
to terror By Alan Boyd
information in 2002 on about 2
million people who had learned to scuba-dive
during the previous three years.
Shipping
companies and insurance agencies have countered
the potential economic disaster of an attack on
shipping in the congested Strait of Malacca and
Strait of Hormuz by strengthening hulls and
instituting protective measures on board
vessels.
But they have
been less successful in changing the culture of
complacency in ports, which handle millions of
tons of cargo each year and collectively have to
monitor more then 1.3 million seamen and
longshoremen.
At least 46,000 ships called
at more than 4,000 ports worldwide and carried 7.1
billion tons of goods in 2006, including 15
million containers that made 230 million journeys.
This constituted 85% of global trade volume.
The International Maritime Organization
launched an International Ship and Port Facility
Security Code (ISPS Code) after the USS Cole
attack, aiming to deny terrorists the means of
accessing vessels and their loads.
All
ports and ships are required to meet minimum
security procedures, including the installation of
an automatic identification system that provides
authorities with a vessel's identity, position,
course and speed.
When the code was
implemented in 2004, only 53% of ships and 50% of
ports were believed to be in full compliance.
Although that proportion has since risen, there
continues to be resistance from governments and
shipowners alike because of the substantial cost.
Ships that do not comply can be turned
away by ports, but relatively few governments have
chosen to enforce this provision. In any case, the
code is only binding on vessels of 500 tons or
more, which excludes thousands of smaller ships
that operate in Asia.
Another barrier is
that the ISPS Code, like the complementary
Container Security Initiative (CSI) and
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), is viewed
as a US initiative tailored to protect US ports
from offshore terrorism threats.
The CSI,
which was introduced in 2002, is a bilateral
measure to detect potential threats to US ports by
screening cargo at embarkation points through the
forward deployment of American customs officials.
Only about 40 ports worldwide are partners
in the CSI, including 12 in Asia: Yokohama, Tokyo,
Nagoya and Kobe in Japan; Singapore; Hong Kong;
Busan in South Korea; Port Klang and Tanjung
Pelepas in Malaysia; Laem Chabang in Thailand;
Shanghai in China; and Dubai in the United Arab
Emirates.
Washington has hailed the
initiative as a success, noting that 11 of the top
20 ports in terms of cargo containers shipped to
the US are involved. But this perspective only
reinforces the widespread belief that the CSI is
designed to serve US interests by shifting the
terrorism threat elsewhere.
As it is a
bilateral measure, the CSI is difficult to
enforce, but the US nonetheless applies subtle
pressure on ports and shipowners by dictating that
cargo from countries outside the initiative be
subjected to more thorough checks, often leading
to long delays in processing.
More than
45,000 companies have taken the hint and submitted
to an examination of their cargo at the last port
of embarkation before they reach US shores.
There is similar skepticism over the PSI,
designed to combat the spread of weapons of mass
destruction by allowing the warships of
participating countries to board and, if
necessary, seize vessels suspected of smuggling
such arms.
Of the 15 nations that have
signed up, only two - Japan and Singapore - are in
Asia. Notable absentees include China, South Korea
and India, which all harbor doubts over the
legality of the searches; Beijing and Seoul are
especially worried over how North Korea might
react if it became a target.
As the PSI
has no basis in international law, a ship can only
be stopped in international waters when there is
consent from the country where it is registered.
Liberia, Panama and the Marshall Islands, the
three main flags-of-convenience states, have
signed the PSI.
Beijing's mistrust dates
back to an incident in 1993, a decade before the
PSI came into operation, when the US tried to
intercept the Chinese vessel Yinhe on suspicion
that it was carrying thiodiglycol and thionyl
chloride to Iran. The chemicals can be used to
manufacture toxic agents. Eventually boarded in a
Saudi port, the ship was found to be carrying a
legitimate cargo.
And South Korea was
unnerved by an interdiction of the North Korean
ship So San in 2002 by Spanish vessels - at the
United States' request - that unearthed Scud
missile parts hidden under cement. After finding
they were to be delivered to Yemen, a key ally in
anti-terrorism efforts, Washington allowed the
parts to be delivered.
When the PSI was
set up shortly afterward, critics had plenty of
ammunition to support their contention that the
initiative, and other anti-terrorism measures
aimed at preventing maritime attacks, were merely
extensions of US foreign policies.
Alan Boyd, now based in Sydney,
has reported on Asia for more than two
decades.
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