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Aussie posse gunning for Gloria's foes By Herbert Docena
countries. The ones with the US and Australia will just be one of many. It
remains to be seen, however, whether the Philippines will actually grant non-US
allied countries the same privileges as the ones it gives to fellow US allies.
The Pacific posse
If ratified, the SOVFA will further tighten the links between two pro-US allies
in the region. By guaranteeing Australia that its troops will be well taken
care of in the country, the SOVFA will
usher in more Australian military deployments to the Philippines - whether for
military exercises or for the kind of missions described by US special forces
themselves as "counter-insurgency" or "unconventional warfare" operations in
the southern Philippines. Such joint missions among allies will enhance what
the military calls "inter-operability" as they share military doctrine,
information, techniques and equipment.
In bringing together two close allies in the southwestern rim of the Pacific,
the SOVFA will strengthen the chains of the pro-US bloc in the region and
reinforce what one analyst calls the "new Pacific wall" [10]. This wall already
spans South Korea and Japan to the north, Mongolia to the northwest, Guam in
the center and Thailand and Singapore further west.
Incidentally, just six weeks before the signing of the SOVFA, Australia also
inked what a report described as a "historic" security pact with Japan, a
country that hosts over 90 US military bases and facilities housing over 30,000
US troops. [11] Australia had also earlier joined Japan and the US in forming
the so-called Trilateral Security Dialogue in 2002.
While the threat of "terrorism" is often invoked to explain the growing
cooperation between allies in the region, this explanation would only be
accurate to the extent that so-called "Islamic terrorists" are actually seen as
threatening larger and enduring security interests. This does not appear to be
the case with groups such as the Abu Sayyaf - the supposed target of US
military action in the Philippines - which, despite repeated projections to the
contrary, arguably does not have the capacity to be considered a primary threat
to US national security.
In contrast, the US's own 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, widely seen as
articulating official government thinking, has unequivocally identified China
as having "the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States"
[12]. It is China which the new Pacific wall surrounds.
Without a common enemy
And, as with all alliances, it is on this, on the existence of a perceived
common threat, where the pro-US bloc in the region could flounder. While the US
under Bush, after vacillating for years on whether to walk the path of
engagement or containment, may have now positively identified China as its
potential enemy, the Philippines has not - and may not.
It is telling that just as Arroyo was inviting Howard to sign the SOVFA,
Filipino generals were holding official talks with Chinese security officials
in Manila and getting pledges of US$1.2 million in military engineering
equipment from Beijing [13] - a pittance compared to the $96 million they stand
to get from the US this year, [14] far from enough to tip the scale of
allegiances for now.
But with exports to China growing five-fold between 2001 and 2005 and with
investments from China recording a dramatic 12,000% increase between 2001 and
2006, [15] the Philippines' attitude toward its neighbor is now more ambiguous
- if not more conciliatory - compared with the time just a decade ago when
Manila had a diplomatic row with Beijing over the Spratly Islands.
Whether the Philippines' interests will be served more by being on the side of
the US and Australia in a potential confrontation with China is expected to
weigh heavily on the minds of the Philippine Senate as its members begin to
debate whether or not to ratify the SOVFA.
For it is not China that is on Filipino leaders' minds. Arroyo herself has not
been shy in saying that the benefits of closer ties with the mates from Down
Under - including 28 high-speed gunboats and about $3.28 million in inducements
for signing - will be unleashed on alleged communist rebels and Moro
separatists in the south. [16]
Indeed, while the Philippine military consistently claims that the subjects of
their foreign-assisted offensives in Mindanao are "al-Qaeda linked" members, it
has repeatedly turned out that they have actually been targeting members of a
separatist movement that forged a peace agreement with the government in 1996.
Defense Minister Brendan Nelson for his part has stated that Australia will
support the Philippine Defense Reform Program, [17] known to be the partly
US-drafted and US-funded long-term master-plan of the new drive to finally
eradicate the state's internal enemies and which is blamed for the current
spate of political killings and other human-rights violations. For now, as it
has been for a long time, the enemy in the minds of the Philippine ruling class
and security establishment is within; the alliance, a commercial transaction
with the highest bidder.
Notes
1. "Defense Strengthens Counter-Terrorism Cooperation with the Philippines,"
Australian Government Department of Defense media release, July 4, 2004;
"Australia, Philippines to hold navy exercises," Agence France Press, August
19, 2004.
2. Charles Miranda, "Aussies target Philippines terror," The Daily Telegraph,
June 20, 2005; "DFA says Aussie anti-terror forces in RP covered by
"agreements," The Philippine Star, June 22, 2005; "Elite Australian troops join
hunt for JI terrorists in RP," October 11, 2005; Greg Sheridan, "SAS in hunt
for Asia's terrorists," The Australian, October 14, 2006.
3. Notes from a presentation delivered by Frank Stone, director of Military
Foreign Affairs Office, April 10, 2002, Orlando, Florida.
4. "Status of Forces Agreements."
5. Project for the New American Century, Rebuilding America's Defenses:
Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century, September 2000.
6. Phil Mercer, "Australia beefs up military for action overseas," Voice of
America, August 24, 2006; Esther Pan, "Australia's Security role in the
Pacific," Council on Foreign Relations, June 18, 2006.
7. Max Boot, "Howard's end: Australia's prime minister no longer connects with
voters," Weekly Standard, June 4, 2007.
8. "Unconventional warfare: Are US special forces engaged in an 'offensive war'
in the Philippines?" Focus on the Global South special report, January 2007.
9. Overseas Basing Commission, report to the president and Congress, August 15,
2005.
10. Conn Hallinan, "The new Pacific wall," (Silver City, NM and Washington, DC:
Foreign Policy In Focus, May 30, 2007.)
11. "Howard signs historic security pact with Japan," ABC News Online, March
13, 2007.
12. Office of the Secretary of Defense (United States), Quadrennial Defense
Review 2006, February 6, 2006; see also Office of the Secretary of Defense,
"Military power of the People's Republic of China 2006: Annual Report to
Congress."
13. AHN, "Philippine military to receive $1.2 million in equipment from China,"
May 27, 2007.
14. Philippines Center for Defense Information.
15. National Statistics Office (Philippines), "Direction of trade: 2001 to
2005"; Philippine Board of Investments, "Total FDI by country, 2001 and 2006."
16. Phil Mercer, "Australia, Philippines sign landmark security pact," May 31,
2007, Voice of America; AP, "RP Australia sign security pact allowing joint
counterterrorism," May 31, 2007. "Defense official said these will be used
against Moro and communist leaders," Christine Avendano, "RP-Aussie war games
expected next year," PDI, May 30, 2007.
17. Media release of the Australian Embassy in the Philippines, "Australia and
the Philippines strengthen defense ties."
Herbert Docena (herbert@focusweb.org) is a Manila-based researcher with
Focus on the Global South (www.focusweb.org), an international policy research
and advocacy institute.
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