Page 2 of 2 Vietnam's generational
split By Long S Le
2005 for
nearly nine months without trial for participating
in a pro-democracy chat forum at www.PalTalk.com
supported by overseas Vietnamese in Canada. The
e-mails and voice discussions that took place on
the forum were recorded by a government ministry
and the three were later charged of violating
article 19 of the criminal code, which relates to
charges for attempting to overthrow the
government.
Muted protests Internet
communications have recently been brought under
the
country's press law, criminal
code, executive orders and constitutional
provisions related to national security. Such
crackdowns and penalties reinforce the dominance
of the party's one-party politics among the
post-war generation and sends a clear signal that
any displeasure with the political status quo
cannot be displayed in an organized manner. That
explains in party why student demonstrations and
protest politics are almost never seen on
Vietnam's streets.
This is not to say that
the majority of the post-war generation is not
open to Western concepts of democracy and human
rights. But the "localizing" of democratic values
is complex and often contradictory. For example,
the 2001 World Values Survey-Vietnam showed
overwhelming support among Vietnamese youth for
the idea that democracy is the best form of
government. However, the same survey also found
that an even greater percentage of the population
endorsed and supported democracy as it was
constrictively defined in the state's development
plan.
My fieldwork shows that a number of
urban young professionals, who would sincerely
recite the benefits of communism, are very
optimistic about the domestic political changes
now taking place. Many of them possess an
undeniable entrepreneurial spirit and believe
their success will be based primarily on
individual effort - independent of politics. There
are also those who hold more independent political
thoughts, but are nonetheless cautious about
joining alternative political groups or movements,
including those led by overseas Vietnamese.
Moreover, thousands of Vietnamese students
are now studying overseas at Western universities.
A large number of them are bidding to extend their
stay in the US, and a good many want to stay in
the US permanently. Those that have become
particularly conscious of some aspects of
democratic norms and values are among those trying
to put off returning to Vietnam.
However,
the majority of these students I have encountered
tend to shy from criticism of the one-party
system, either because they are the beneficiaries
of the status quo or that they fear causing
trouble for their families and relatives back in
Vietnam. Many still lack the ability to think
critically and independently, due perhaps to their
formative educational training in Vietnam which
stressed rote learning.
One important
question concerns how many of those who return
from the West to Vietnam will end up working for
the government, where salaries are low and
merit-based promotions slow. Many of course would
prefer to work for higher-paying Western firms
which are in growing numbers establishing their
presence in Vietnam. That market process is slowly
but surely undermining the party's constitutional
claim to be "the force leading the state and
society".
To be sure, the post-war
generation increasingly expects the government to
deliver the economic conditions that will allow
for an improved standard of living. The party's
strategy to manage these growing expectations
seems to be: "Leave us to run the state as we see
fit and we'll allow you to grow rich in the
process."
For many Vietnamese youth, as
long as the party's modernity program creates
better tertiary education, jobs and allows them to
uninhibited pursue personal wealth, for now they
can live with the one-party political system and
the party's economic reforms that revolutionize
the prevailing socialist order rather than
converting it to full-blown capitalism.
To
be sure, not all those expectations are being met,
specifically concerning the education system.
Party leaders still dictate curriculum, including
which textbooks should be used at all school
levels. At the university level, the courses
offered are seldom relevant to the skills needed
to compete in the local market. There is still a
significant gap between the public call for
education reform and the government's view that
education policy must be an integral part of its
wider socio-political policy.
But as more
and more of the post-war generation start to
benefit economically, fewer and fewer seem willing
to question whether the party's should be the only
force allowed to represent the common interest.
Vietnam's recent economic progress, as well as its
extraordinary untapped potential, have
overshadowed the importance of supporting a
younger generation of Vietnamese political
leaders, unaffiliated with the party and willing
to challenge the one-party status quo.
Unfortunately, this won't make the agenda
when Triet and Bush meet at the White House.
Long S Le is the director of
international initiatives for the Global Studies
Program and also a lecturer of Vietnamese studies
at the University of Houston in the United
States.
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