Page 2 of 2 ASIA
HAND Thai reshuffle exposes
cracks in military By Shawn W
Crispin
last year's coup and the
military's pledge to return to the barracks after
new democratic elections. Politically rather than
seniority-motivated promotions orchestrated by
former prime minister Chatichai Choonhavan were a
major factor behind the 1991 military coup that
ousted his democratically elected government.
Thaksin paved the way for his own military
ouster through a series of controversial rotations
that leapfrogged his Class 10 associates
over
more senior-ranking officers. Last year's coup
came against the backdrop of a similarly contested
scheduled reshuffle, in which Thaksin had
controversially vied to elevate a clutch of his
Class 10 loyalists to the pivotal units.
That would have crucially given the
embattled premier an unbroken chain of command
over crack troops responsible for Bangkok's
security at a time anti-government protests were
rocking his administration. That particular
reshuffle list reportedly brought Thaksin into
direct conflict with senior members of the top
brass and Privy Council, and his refusal to back
down from the proposed personnel changes appears
to have been a major factor behind last year's
coup.
New complications The
impending reshuffle, this time driven solely by
the CNS and Privy Council, is being complicated in
new ways. The three career soldiers now vying for
the army's top spot are all cut from distinctly
different cloths.
Saprang, glorified in
certain Thai media outlets, including the Manager
Media Group that owns this website, for his tough
talk and dashing good looks, is by all accounts
the CNS's designated maverick. Since the coup, he
has publicly challenged and on occasion crudely
threatened anti-junta and pro-Thaksin groups that
have protested against military rule.
At
the same time, his critics claim he has besmirched
the CNS's corruption-fighting credentials by
appointing himself chairman of two big state-owned
enterprises, the Airports Authority of Thailand
and Telephone Organization of Thailand. He came
under heavy media fire for revelations that the
TOT had made a secret 800 million baht (US$25
million) "donation" to the army for undisclosed
reasons of national security.
The
telephone enterprise's union had called for
Saprang's dismissal for alleged mismanagement, and
the general stepped down ahead of schedule from
both agencies' boards this week as what he
referred to as a "matter of etiquette".
By
contrast, Anupong has maintained a lower public
profile and is considered the more politically
savvy of the two senior officers. Rather than
forming alliances with influential media groups to
do his bidding, Anupong has from behind the scenes
drummed up support for his candidacy. Military
insiders say he is so tight-lipped on crucial
issues, including the military's future role in
politics, that his personal views are often
unknown.
As a Class 10 officer, he was
widely viewed as a Thaksin loyalist up until the
night of the coup - when he joined in lockstep
with the other coup makers and famously failed to
return the ousted premier's frantic calls from New
York as the plot unfolded. He has since been
instrumental in watching for pockets of
pro-Thaksin resistance inside the armed forces and
was key in making personnel decisions in last
year's lightning reshuffle that rotated scores of
his Class 10 mates out of command positions.
Anupong rose to prominence as an
on-the-ground soldier, and his consensual style of
management has reportedly won him widespread
respect among the army's rank and file. He also
served as commander of Queen Sirikit's 21st
Regiment Guard, and his exemplary performance in
the position has reportedly put him in the
palace's good graces - always a crucial credential
for assuming the army's leadership.
Montri, meanwhile, has risen through his
performance in policy and planning positions and
is widely viewed as a clear-headed military
reformer. He is known to be especially close to
outgoing commander Sonthi, who after the coup put
him in charge of revamping the Internal Security
Operations Command, which since the coup has
functioned as a sort of shadow government and will
continue to do so in the transition toward
democracy through the unit's power to appoint
deputy governors to every province.
The
current commanders of the 1st, 3rd and 4th
divisions all hail from Montri's Class 9, which
during Thaksin's tenure put a check on rival Class
10 officers. Military insiders say he lacks
Anupong's cut-and-thrust political sophistication
and rank-and-file support and is seen as less
ambitious than the hard-driving Saprang.
Whether the top brass and Privy Council
members deciding the reshuffle consider Montri a
compromise candidate who could both bridge
Anupong's and Saprang's competitive camps and work
constructively with the next elected government is
still a wild card. "The three cannot be divided,"
said military expert Panitan. "They must join
forces to keep Thaksin from returning. That's very
crucial."
Indeed, the final decision will
be a reflection of how confident Sonthi and his
CNS advisers are that the military has after one
year in power successfully consolidated its future
political role and protection from prosecution
through new laws and legislation and through
various court actions hobbled Thaksin's ability to
make a political comeback. It is also the first of
many crucial appointments that the military and
its proxies will make in deciding the course and
composition of Thailand's new era of managed
democracy.
Shawn W Crispin is
Asia Times Online's Southeast Asia Editor. He may
be reached at swcrispin@atimes.com.
(Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
