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2 Thailand intensifies crackdown on
militants By Ian Storey
Government efforts to resolve the ongoing
violence in Thailand's four southern provinces of
Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat and Songkhla - which has
claimed the lives of 2,400 people since January
2004 - continue to emphasize a three-pronged
strategy of reconciliation, improving
socioeconomic conditions, and counterinsurgency
operations.
Over the past three months,
the counterinsurgency element has been the most
pronounced, resulting in the detention of nearly
2,000 suspected separatists.
At the same time, Malay Muslim militants continue
to achieve success in their campaign to polarize
society and destroy the governmental and economic
system of the deep south.
Meanwhile, the
authorities continue to send out confusing signals
concerning the involvement of foreign elements. In
mid-June, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, chairman
of the Council for National Security (CNS), which
ousted prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra on
September 19, 2006, indicated that the armed
forces would soon "adjust" existing security
policies in the south to achieve "tangible
results" before the interim government ended its
tenure at the end of the year.
Little was
made of the comment at the time, but it is now
clear that Sonthi's statement foreshadowed a major
operation against militant networks. A week later,
a series of large-scale combined army and police
operations were launched in villages across
southern Thailand suspected of harboring militant
operatives. The operations, typically conducted by
several hundred police and army personnel at dawn,
were aimed at flushing out suspected insurgents
and seizing weapons and bomb-making equipment.
On July 2, for instance, the police and
army raided the Islam Burapha School in
Narathiwat, arrested seven suspected bomb-makers
living in the school compound, and collected DNA
from teachers and students. The school's license
was subsequently revoked by the authorities.
According to police, the seven suspects later
admitted to carrying out bomb attacks in more than
20 locations.
On July 30, 50 suspected
militants were detained in raids across
Narathiwat, including alleged leaders of the Runda
Kumpulan Kecil (RKK), the armed wing of the
Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi (BRN-C), the
group credited with carrying out the majority of
attacks in the south. By the end of July, the
security forces had detained nearly 2,000 people,
of whom 360 were alleged to be wanted militants,
with the rest labeled as collaborators and
militant sympathizers destined for "re-education"
camps. The raids also netted a large number of
weapons, bomb-making equipment, maps, camouflaged
jackets, and lists of names.
According to
Colonel Akkara Tipparoj, the Royal Thai Army's
(RTA's) main spokesman in the south, the raids
were the result of three main factors. First, the
population in the southern provinces had more
faith in the security services, and they were more
willing to come forward with information
concerning the location of militants. Second, the
security forces were acting on information
provided to them by detained members of the
BRN-C/RKK during interrogation sessions. Third,
militants were turning themselves in because of
growing divisions within the separatist movement.
The RTA's claims have been met with
considerable skepticism within Thailand. Some
question how it is that the security forces have
been able to discover the identities of so many
militant leaders and operatives when only a few
months ago Sonthi admitted that the government did
not know who was behind the attacks. Others have
suggested that the large-scale offensive is simply
a public relations exercise designed to allay
growing public frustration - particularly among
Thai Buddhists in the south - over the
authorities' lackluster performance during the
past four years and inability to contain the
violence.
A third theory is that the
shakedowns and detentions were launched to justify
a massive increase in defense spending demanded by
the armed forces. In July, the cabinet agreed to
boost defense spending by 24% to US$4.4 billion;
this comes after a 34% increase for the 2006-07
financial year. The increase in defense spending -
the lion's share of which will go to the RTA -
will be used to purchase more modern equipment,
including 96 armored personnel carriers from
Ukraine, unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicles,
and bomb-disposal robots. The shortage of
equipment for counterinsurgency operations was
highlighted on July 17 when an explosive device in
Yala claimed the life of a bomb-disposal expert
who was not wearing any protective clothing.
Rights groups have also been critical of
the recent crackdown. According to the Thai Muslim
Lawyers' Association, the authorities have
insufficient evidence to charge those detained,
while non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such
as US-based Human Rights Watch have pointed to the
real potential for extrajudicial violence against
detainees. A major concern is that the arrests and
detentions will simply widen the trust deficit
between Malay Muslims and the Thai authorities,
thus fueling separatist sentiment.
In
response to these concerns, the body charged with
conducting counterinsurgency operations in the
south, the Internal Security Operations Command,
has issued an order to the police, army and
paramilitary rangers warning of disciplinary or
legal action against those who commit abuses
against detainees. Under the emergency decree that
covers the south, however, detainees can be held
for 30 days without charge and members of the
security forces are immune from prosecution.
Push for
reconciliation Intensive counterinsurgency
operations against southern militants are only one
part of the government's strategy to resolve the
violence. Since being appointed by the CNS last
October, Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont has
stressed the need for reconciliation. Despite
criticism that this policy has not been paying
dividends, Surayud has reaffirmed his government's
commitment to it. Since the coup, Surayud has also
expressed willingness to talk to the leaders of
the insurgent groups. The extent to which the
government has made progress toward achieving that
end remains unclear, however.
In late
April, for example, it was reported that Defense
Minister Boonrawd Somtas had held talks with
insurgents. In May, the prime minister's security
adviser, General Wattanachai Chaimuanwong, alleged
that secret talks had begun with high-level
militant leaders. In June, however, Surayud
conceded that
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