COMMENT Myanmar and the loss
of legitimacy By David I
Steinberg
The tragic recent events in
Myanmar, whose true magnitude remains unknown, are
one more indication to the international community
of the illegitimacy of the military junta. This
position, however, is far more complex when
internally viewed. To the Western world, popular
elections and the delivery of goods, services and
security are those elements that comprise
legitimacy. Thus, to the external world Myanmar
has miserably
failed.
Although
there is a dispute about what the May 1990
elections were for, there is no question that the
National League for Democracy (NLD) swept the
field with about 80% of the seats and 59% of the
votes, but were denied recognition. Even though
the macro-economic position of the country since
1988 has vastly improved, from foreign exchange
holdings of perhaps US$30 million then to some
$770 million last year and increases are likely
due to newly explored offshore gas reserves, the
living standards of ordinary citizens has
declined, and at last half are either below or at
the poverty line.
The standards of
education and health are abysmal and Myanmar has
the lowest per capita income in the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations. So by all Western
measurements, the military regime has no
legitimacy. Even the name of the country is a
surrogate indicator of legitimacy: the United
States and some international news outlets such as
England's BBC still choose to use "Burma" while
the United Nations and much of the rest of the
world use "Myanmar".
Yet internal
measurements of legitimacy are more complicated.
Although Western measurements may be accepted by
some of the urbanized elite and those exposed to
the outside world, many in Myanmar may believe the
traditional view of the sorry state of their
lives: that this is due to the Buddhist concept of
reincarnation where deficiencies in past lives
have affected, even caused, their present
problems.
Although there are traditional
Buddhist views of the proper attributes of
kingship or administration, which the present
regime has lacked, belief in the personal
responsibility for one's sorry state may still
carry weight. So the failure to deliver goods and
services may be somewhat mitigated by a
traditional view of the cycle of life.
The
essential element of legitimacy in Myanmar has
been Buddhism. As someone once wrote, "To be
Burman is to be Buddhist," and virtually all of
the Myanmar population (some two-thirds of the
national population) are Buddhist. Buddhism looms
large in the political equation. Buddhism is a
matter of profound belief and an administrative
necessity for virtually all higher levels of
government, for under the military (but not the
previous civilian government) one must be Buddhist
and Burman to rule. There are virtually no
Christians or Muslims in the higher ranks of the
military or civil service.
The military
leaders, as well as U Nu (first prime minister of
independent Burma and prime minister overthrown by
Ne Win in 1962) and his entourage and opposition,
have been devout Buddhists, but they have also
used Buddhism as a political tool as well as an
individual credo. U Nu built a pagoda to establish
legitimacy for the state and for his
administration. U Nu won the 1960 elections by
promising to make Buddhism the state religion. Ne
Win and every military leader have built pagodas,
and hundreds have been repaired in Pagan and other
areas, much to the horror of archeologists and art
historians because of inappropriate methodologies.
Practically every day in the New Light of
Myanmar, the official publication (and previously
known as the Working People's Daily), there are
stories and pictures of the military paying
obeisance to the monks, making offerings, or
performing some other appropriate act. There has
been a calculated policy of associating the
military leadership and rule with Buddhism.
In addition, the Buddhist hierarchy is
administratively controlled by the military. What
is taught in Buddhist institutions, the number of
Buddhist sects, and other administrative aspects
are under military control. All monks are
registered with the government. What is not
subject to their immediate command are individual
monasteries and the younger monks. The past two
weeks have seen these younger monks in the
streets.
We do not know how many have been
killed, and the military in its usual manner will
doctor statistics, either to report fewer deaths
and detainees or in another case to inflate school
enrollment. But this "saffron revolution", as some
have called it, changes the equation. There was a
revolt of monks in Mandalay in 1992 that was
quickly squelched by the military. But today's is
different, not only because it was broadcast to
the world, but perhaps more importantly because
the BBC and CNN images that we saw were evident
through the ubiquitous Burmese urban phenomenon of
satellite dishes reporting those networks.
The military profoundly believe in its
role in society, however badly they may have
carried out their responsibilities. They think of
themselves as the only force holding the country
together, having in effect destroyed any other
significant institution in the country. Yet now,
because of this crackdown on the Sangha (Buddhist
monkhood), they may have lost the modicum of
support they once had among the population. Their
role may be as strong as before, but their rule
may be less secure.
It would be remarkable
if these actions by the junta do not cause
disquiet among members of the military itself.
Many may be profoundly disturbed by the actions of
their colleagues. This may be an important factor
in military discontent because the suppression
since 1988 has resulted in political, economic and
social malaise, and this particularly egregious
suppression may feed festering internal military
concerns about their own leadership.
We
know that there have been policy and personality
differences among the top commanders, with
rivalries among their children for economic
spoils, but the recent protests may bring on the
military's worst fears - division among the ranks,
which the military, aware of the propensity in
Myanmar society for personalization of power and
factionalism, has abhorred. It may not be the
monks that directly effect change in Myanmar, but
they may have contributed to its strengthening.
The legacy of this revolt will not be stilled by
the enforced quiet that pervades the cities.
The frustration of the monks is not only a
result of the apparent disrespect for Buddhism by
the top of the military hierarchy, but also
because these younger monks are also affected by
the general social miasma, as many customarily
move in and out of the Sangha. The military
controls all effective avenues of social mobility
- it determines who goes to university and what
positions are available in the private sector
beyond petty trading in the bazaars.
It
controls the quasi-political organizations, the
media, and influence strongly the non-governmental
organizations. The military is the primary source
of social mobility, and all this must frustrate
the young, who see no future outside of a
military-controlled society. They have little to
lose. This feeds discontent. Although the present
military seems powerful, and has more than doubled
in size since 1988 and is far better equipped, its
hold on society and on its own members will become
more tenuous as this frustration mounts and finds
expression in some other incident, not necessarily
mandated from the top of the hierarchy, but more
likely from the lower echelons where unthinking
attempts are made to please their superiors at any
cost.
One cannot predict when this might
happen, but the likelihood exists, and this could
help trigger discontent within some of the
military, who feel the reputation of the
tatmadaw (armed forces) itself has been
besmirched, and must be restored to the historical
glory that the military has rewritten to justify
its claim to power.
David I
Steinberg (yonsan1@gmail.com) is distinguished
professor, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown
University, and is on sabbatical during the autumn
semester 2007 as senior visiting research scholar
at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
Singapore.
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