Page 2 of 2 'Triborder sea' is SE Asian
danger zone By Ian
Storey
fishermen hostage off
Mindanao - neither incident was reported to the
IMB. The IMB received just six reports of maritime
crime in Philippine waters in 2006, a grossly
inaccurate figure.
Both the ASG and MILF
have established linkages with JI, and a recent
RAND study noted that the Sulawesi-Mindanao arc
provides the terrorist organization with a "key
logistical corridor" and "theater for jihadist
operations" [1]. JI members Umar Patek and
Dulmatin, both suspected of planning the 2002 Bali
bombings, are believed to be
in the Sulu Archipelago after escaping from
Indonesian authorities. JI operatives are known to
undertake training in camps in the southern
Philippines, and travel from Sulawesi to Mindanao
via Sabah which is just a short boat ride from the
Sulu Archipelago.
Sulawesi itself
constitutes an important base of operations for JI
as the organization has grafted itself on to
sectarian and communal violence in Poso over the
past few years. Sabah is also important to JI and
the ASG for another reason: it provides a place of
sanctuary. Sabah is home to more than half a
million illegal immigrants from the Philippines
and Indonesia, allowing operatives from both
groups to blend in and lie low.
States
lack capacity to handle threat Tackling
transnational security threats in the triborder
sea area is hindered by the lack of state
capacity, especially in the Philippines and
Indonesia.
Starved of funding for years,
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is one
of the weakest military forces in Southeast Asia.
As the country's primary security threats are
land-based - separatist, communist insurgent and
terrorist groups - the army has received priority
funding. The operational effectiveness of the
Philippine Navy (PN) and Philippine Coast Guard
(PCG) has suffered accordingly, leaving the
country's sea lanes largely unprotected.
In October 2006, Philippine National
Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales summed up the
situation: "We cannot check every boat that
travels between Indonesia and Mindanao. Over
26,000 trips are made by these boats [every year]
and it is impossible to monitor each of them given
the government's meager resources" (The Philippine
Star, October 16, 2006).
The PN's
inability to effectively monitor the sea lanes in
the Sulu Sea enabled ASG and JI operatives to flee
from Jolo and Basilan in the wake of a major
US-backed AFP offensive earlier this year. In
early September, for instance, Philippine
authorities arrested six alleged ASG members on
Palawan Island, who were believed to have escaped
the dragnet around Jolo.
The Indonesian
Navy faces similar problems. In the wake of the
1997 Asian financial crisis, Indonesia's defense
budget was slashed, and by 2003 it was estimated
that less than 30% of the Navy's 113 vessels were
operational. Since 2004, improved economic
conditions have enabled the navy to purchase new
corvettes and patrol boats, but it is still
significantly below strength and incapable of
monitoring the country's 34,000 miles of coastline
and 4.9 million square miles of territorial waters
and exclusive economic zones.
The navy
estimates it needs another 262 warships to
adequately patrol the country's vast maritime
domain (Antara, September 18). Moreover, due to
international pressure, the navy has been required
to concentrate its limited resources on the Strait
of Malacca. Indonesia's participation in the MSP,
and increased naval patrols in its territorial
waters adjoining the strait, have put severe
pressure on the navy's aging and fuel-thirsty
vessels.
Malaysia is in a better position
to deal with the problem. The Royal Malaysian Navy
(RMN) is more professional and better equipped
than its Philippine or Indonesian counterparts,
and after the 2001 raid on Sipidan its presence on
Sabah was beefed up. In 2005, Malaysia launched
its national coast guard, the Malaysian Maritime
Enforcement Agency (MMEA), which is responsible
for enforcing maritime law in both east and west
Malaysia. However, both the RMN and MMEA have
focused their efforts on the Strait of Malacca for
the past several years to the detriment of
security in the waters around Sabah.
Security cooperation among the three
countries is very limited. The naval forces of
Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia conduct
coordinated patrols but their effectiveness is
limited by infrequency and lack of available
assets. Indonesia and the Philippines conduct
operation "Corpat Philindo" four times a year, but
each patrol involves only one vessel from each
country and lasts for only 10 days. Nevertheless,
Manila and Jakarta have agreed to strengthen the
patrols in an effort to stem arms trafficking into
Poso, but resources are very limited. Malaysia and
the Philippines conduct just two coordinated
patrols (Ops Phimal) each year.
In 2006,
the Philippines proposed year-round coordinated
naval patrols like the MSP, as well as designated
sea lanes for all maritime traffic to facilitate
easier monitoring and inspection by the three
navies, but so far no agreement has been reached
(Associated Press, March 13, 2006). The
Philippines has, however, recently announced a
program designed to enhance the PN's ability to
conduct surveillance and interdiction of security
threats in the country's "southern backdoor"
called Coast Watch South.
The concept,
developed with help from Australia, envisages the
establishment of 17 Coast Watch Stations from
Palawan to Davao provinces, equipped with fast
patrol boats and helicopters. Funding the US$380
million program, however, will be a
challenge.
If maritime security threats in
the triborder sea area are to be effectively
addressed, Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia
will require sustained assistance from external
powers in the form of capacity building. Capacity
building efforts need to focus on improving the
communication, surveillance, and interdiction
capabilities of regional maritime law enforcement
agencies such as the navy, coast guard and marine
police.
So far, the focus has been on the
Strait of Malacca, but this is gradually changing.
The United States has agreed to supply Indonesia
with 12 radar stations, some of which will be
situated in North Sulawesi, as well as 30 patrol
boats for the Marine Police. Australia, meanwhile,
has agreed to supply the Philippines with 28
high-speed boats for Coast Watch South. This is a
good start, but much more needs to be done in the
coming years to undo decades of neglect and rein
in this ungoverned space.
Note 1. Angel Rabasa, "Case
Study: The Sulawesi-Mindanao Arc," in Angel Rabasa
et al, Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and
Reducing Terrorism Risks (Santa Monica: RAND,
2007), p. 116.
Republished with permission
from The Jamestown Foundation.
Copyright 2007, The Jamestown Foundation.
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