Page 2 of
2 The loss of Myanmar's democratic
voice By Brian McCartan
reportedly behind several violent
attacks on NLD members. This includes the
much-publicized attack on Suu Kyi's motorcade in
Sagaing division in 2003, in which dozens of NLD
supporters were beaten to death and many more
injured or disappeared. Club-wielding members of
the USDA were also reported to be involved in the
crackdown on the recent protests, some
participating in the violence before the army's
direct armed involvement.
Since annulling
the 1990 election results, junta members have
been
reluctant to meet with Suu Kyi. The reclusive
junta leader Than Shwe, who reportedly intensely
dislikes the pro-democracy icon Suu Kyi, has only
met her once, and that more than five years ago in
2002. Many of the previous meetings between the
two sides were carried out by former intelligence
chief and SPDC Secretary No 1 General Khin Nyunt,
who was later appointed prime minister, then
arrested, and finally placed under house arrest on
corruption charges in October 2004. Since, talks
between the two sides have halted.
Off
the pulse What recently happened in Yangon
and other cities across Myanmar was largely the
result of widespread grassroots discontent.
However, the opposition group with its finger most
on the public pulse and the ability to focus that
discontent into large-scale protests was not the
NLD, but rather the newer 88 Generation Student
Group. Formed in 2006 by democracy activist Min Ko
Naing, who spent 16 years in prison for his role
in the 1988 demonstrations, the group includes
other veteran activists from that period who are
now in their late 30s and early 40s.
Almost the entire leadership of this group
was immediately arrested, leaving the protests
leaderless. The Buddhist clergy, fired up by the
beating of monks in a monastery in the town of
Pakokku on September 5, took over the protest
movement. The monks, however, were largely
leaderless, outside of the individual leaders of
each protest march. Without a central leader
figure, the monks were still able to organize
100,000-strong marches in Yangon and galvanize
tens of thousands of protesters in other cities
across the country.
With this large-scale
movement calling for political change, it would
have been logical for the NLD to come to the
forefront, but instead the party remained on the
sidelines. Individual members participated in
certain marches, but nowhere was party senior
leadership in evidence leading protests. On
September 14, the NLD released a public statement
blaming the SPDC for Myanmar's economic
deterioration, popular discontent and the upshot
protests. In the same statement, the party called
for dialogue with the regime, but that was as far
as the NLD was willing to stretch itself.
Indeed, the NLD appeared to have been
initially caught off-guard by the protests. This
may be an indication of how distant in recent
years it has become from the grass-roots
population. Most of the NLD leadership is in their
70s or 80s and in recent years they have been
repeatedly criticized for being too conservative
and unwilling to up the ante of their resistance
to the regime.
To a large degree, they
have performed as a sort of caretaker
administration, inactive in the hope that Suu Kyi
and Tin Oo will one day be released and have
operated only within the tight strictures on
activities and association set by the SPDC. In
recent years, in apparent response to the rash of
forced resignations of its members, the party has
shown a marked aversion to pressing the boundaries
of those junta-set limitations.
This has
played into the SPDC's hands, affording it a limp
opposition movement that it can alternately blame
for the country's ills and hold up to the world to
show that it does allow some form of political
dissent, despite the over 1,100 political
prisoners it held before the recent arrests. The
dedication to the detained Suu Kyi has become an
excuse for junior party members to do nothing in
maintaining their campaign of civil disobedience.
The international community is now calling
for dialog between the generals and the democratic
opposition. Those calls have urged some form of
talks between Suu Kyi and Senior General Than
Shwe, despite the fact she has been cut off from
her party and the outside world for over four
years. The NLD has shown it is not willing to
press for demands and defers to Suu Kyi's
authority. Yet for the generals, Suu Kyi is a
relatively safe option, in that they can and
likely will revert to their time-tested claim that
she, and not they, is unwilling to compromise.
They can also be assured that the NLD is
not going to make much noise in the meantime. For
the NLD, it has weathered the recent storm
organizationally intact and without another viable
political alternative the generals will likely at
some point have to talk to the party. For ordinary
Myanmar citizens, however, while many still have
hope for Suu Kyi, the NLD's stature has suffered.
U Lwin's tepid public statements in
particular resulted in frustration among many
locals who risked life and limb by taking to the
streets and the NLD's inaction in the aftermath of
the crackdown has not gone unnoticed among
democracy agitators. The question remains: can the
pro-democracy movement that asserted itself in the
streets move forward without effective and
experienced leadership to focus, articulate and
negotiate its demands? At least so far, the NLD
has demonstrated an impotence in serving that
crucial role.
Brian McCartan is
a Thailand-based freelance journalist. He may be
contacted through brianpm@comcast.net.
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