Page 2 of
4 How the US got its Philippine bases
back By Herbert Docena
hosts a fleet of US Orion
reconnaissance planes, [14] is reported to be one
site where Pentagon officials intended to
establish such a facility, [15] but this has not
yet been officially acknowledged or independently
confirmed. Yet Arroyo herself had earlier in July
2001 raised the idea of renting out naval
facilities in Subic Bay, an oft-used venue for
joint exercises to the US military.
Lockheed Martin, a company often
contracted by the US military, was reported to
have been waiting for approval to establish a
regional aircraft maintenance
facility at Clark Air Base. [16] Halliburton KBR,
another US corporation that has secured US
military contracts, was reported as having been
granted in November 2001 a US$100 million contract
to convert Subic Bay into a modern commercial
port. [17] The company had earlier announced that
it was exploring redeveloping the former US Navy
Ship Repair Facility in Subic Bay for maritime
logistics and ship support services. [18]
Arrangements that combine commercial with
military activities, noted then US PACOM Admiral
Dennis Blair, "opens up possibilities for the
sorts of things that we can work together on in
the future". [19] Indeed in a recent thesis for
the US Naval Postgraduate School, these
arrangements are precisely what were recommended
by Thomas Garcia: "not a return to the grand
infrastructure of the past" but "the use of only a
small logistical facility currently utilized by
the commercial ship industry, and the port
infrastructure of berths and airfield already in
place." [20]
Another option suggested by
Garcia was to locate the Philippine Navy in Subic
and then allow the US to position its ships inside
the nominally Philippine-owned base. [21] Former
US PACOM chief Admiral Thomas Fargo had in fact
announced plans to use Subic and Clark for the
transit of personnel and trans-shipment of
equipment, as well as a re-fueling post for US
ships from Honolulu, Guam, or the US West Coast
bound for the US base in Diego Garcia. [22] Though
nothing has since been heard of these plans, the
reports indicate that such options are still on
the table. Given the US government's policy of
partial disclosure, it's also possible that such
plans have gone ahead unannounced and possibly in
other places, in the manner that Kaplan had
described above. [23]
The terms of the
MLSA and the establishment of CSLs reflect the
US's increasing emphasis on just-in-time logistics
support and pre-positioning of equipment to ensure
that US forces - dispersed as they are around the
world, often far away from main bases where they
store equipment and tap all kinds of services -
are always ready and rearing to go. It is not so
much the size of the base that matters, but
whether it can provide the US military with what
it needs and when it's needed.
As the
Council on Foreign Relations recently pointed out,
"While host nation support often carries the
connotation of basing, its role of staging and
access is perhaps more critical. Support for port
visits, ship repairs, over-flight rights, training
areas and opportunities, and areas to marshal,
stage, repair, and re-supply are no less important
for both daily US presence in the region and for
rapid and flexible crisis response." [24]
Forward operating unit Third,
the US has already succeeded in stationing
indefinitely a US military unit in the
Philippines. Since 2002, a unit now called the
Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines
(JSOTF-P) has been deployed to and based in
Zamboanga, Basilan, Sulu and other areas in
Mindanao in the southern Philippines.
While initially presented as part of
on-again, off-again temporary training exercises,
it has since been revealed that this unit has
continuously maintained its presence in the
country for the past six years. With the
Philippine government not giving a definite exit
date, and with US officials stating that this unit
will stay on as long as they are allowed by the
government, it is presumed that it will continue
to be based in the Philippines for the foreseeable
future.
In an apparent effort not to draw
attention to the unit, the US and Philippine
governments have publicly revealed little about
the real nature and mission of the JSOTF-P, except
to project it as part of the US-led "war on
terror" and to highlight the humanitarian and
civil engineering projects that it undertakes. The
media, for the most part, have through the years
uncovered little about the unit and have reported
on it by following the description offered by the
US and Philippine governments. Most of what has
since been gathered about the unit has come from
US military publications and specialist sources
not intended for general public consumption.
Headquartered in the Philippine military's
Camp Navarro in Zamboanga City, [25] but with its
personnel sent to various locations, the JSOTF-P
has effectively established a new form of US
military presence and basing in the country. When
it was publicly revealed in August 2007 that the
US Department of Defense via a US military
construction unit had granted a contract to a
company providing "base operations support" for
the JSOTF-P, [26] the US Embassy admitted that the
US was setting up allegedly "temporary"structures
for "medical, logistical, administrative
services"and facilities for "for them to eat,
sleep and work" [27].
The Philippine's own
Visiting Forces Commission also confirmed that the
US maintains "living quarters" and stock supplies
inside Philippine military camps. [28] Renowned US
military historian Robert Kaplan, who revisited
the JSOTF-P inside Camp Navarro in 2006 described
these structures as signifying a "more hardened,
permanent arrangement".[29] According to a US
military publication, the JSOTF-P's area of
operations covers about 20,000 square kilometers,
covering the entire island of Mindanao and its
surrounding islands and seas. [30] According to
various media reports, the number of troops
attached to the unit has ranged from between 100
and 450, but it is not clear what the actual total
number is for any specific period. [31] US
Lieutenant Colonel Mark Zimmer, a JSOTF-P public
affairs officer, said it varies "depending on the
season and the mission." [32]
US officials
have consistently maintained that US troops
belonging to the unit "train, advise and assist"
the Philippine military in their war against
alleged terrorists in the country. Though denying
that they are involved in "actual combat", US
officials also repeatedly assert that they have
the right to shoot back when under fire. In US
military publications, US troops belonging to the
unit have characterized their mission as
"unconventional warfare", "foreign internal
defense" and "counter-insurgency". [33]
In
fact, they have been reported to have exchanged
gunfire with and to have been attacked by alleged
insurgents. [34] There have also been numerous
sightings of US troops in the vicinity of active
military operations, some of which have been
confirmed by Philippine military officials. [35]
At the height of Philippine military offensives
against insurgent targets in August 2007, US
soldiers were photographed by a press wire agency
leading a military convoy in Sulu. [36]
All of this has served to challenge
Philippine government claims that the US troops
are not involved in the fighting. As Colonel Jim
Linder, former head of JSOTF-P, has stated, "We're
very much in a war out here ... We'll spill
American blood on Jolo. It's only by luck, skill
and the grace of God we haven't yet." [37]
Referring to their bases in the southern
Philippines as "forward operating base-11" and
"advanced operating base-921", [38] the JSOTF-P
corresponds to the new kind of forward-deployment
that the US has introduced as part of its ongoing
effort to realign its global posture and overhaul
its offensive capabilities.
In terms of
profile and mission, the JSOTF-P is similar to the
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
(CJTF-Horn of Africa), which was established in
Djibouti in eastern Africa in 2003 and also
composed mostly of Special Forces. Like the
JSOTF-P, the CJTF-Horn of Africa has also been
conducting "humanitarian"missions and aid
projects. Similar to the Philippines, Djibouti has
also seen a dramatic increase in the amount of
military aid it receives from the US. [39] As a
sample of the US's new austere basing template,
the CJTF-Horn of Africa has been described as the
"model for future US military operations". [40]
Indeed, more deployments similar to that
of the JSOTF-P and CJTF-Horn of Africa are planned
in other locations around the world. [41] In 2004,
former PACOM commander Thomas Fargo talked about
expanding Special Operations Forces in the
Pacific. [42] Apparently referring to the JSOTF-P,
former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld also
announced that the Pentagon would establish more
"nodes for special operations forces". [43]
In his 2005 Annual Defense Report,
Rumsfeld said that the US military "will improve
its global force posture to increase strategic
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