Page 3 of
4 How the US got its Philippine bases
back By Herbert Docena
responsiveness while decreasing its
overseas footprint and exposure. In place of
traditional overseas bases with extensive
infrastructure, we intend to use smaller forward
operating bases with prepositioned equipment and
rotational presence of personnel ... We will
maintain a smaller forward-presence force in the
Pacific while also stationing agile, expeditionary
forces capable of rapid responses at our power
projection bases." [44]
As evidenced by
the fact that most Filipinos are not even aware of
their presence and their
actions, the JSOTF-P has managed to circumvent
public opposition and legal restrictions governing
the presence of foreign troops in the country.
Hence, as Kaplan noted, "The JSOTF had succeeded
as a political mechanism for getting an American
base-of-sorts up and running ..." [45] C H
Briscoe, command historian of the US Army Special
Operations Command, under which the units of the
JSOTF-P belong, concurs: "After more than 10
years, PACOM has reestablished an
acceptable presence in the Philippines ..."
[46] (Italics added.)
Though the Abu
Sayyaf Group and other "terrorists" are the
self-avowed targets of the JSOTFP, its location
and capabilities allow it to aim much farther. In
fact, the JSOTF-P's "area of operations" covers
places in Mindanao in which the communist
paramilitary group the New People's Army (NPA) is
also active. The US had also tagged the NPA as a
"foreign terrorist organization" and therefore as
a legitimate target of the "war on terror". In
fact, the US has also directly offered to more
actively help in fighting the NPA. [47] As it is,
US military assistance and training are directly
contributing to the Philippine military's war
against them.
Strategically positioned
between two routes at the entrance of a major sea
lane, the Makassar Strait, at the southwestern rim
of the South China Sea, closer to Malaysia and
Indonesia than most of the rest of the
Philippines, the JSOTF-P, according to C H
Briscoe, the unit's official historian, is "now
better able to monitor the pulse of the region".
[48] Indeed, Major General David Fridovich,
commander of the US Special Operations
Forces-Pacific, has stated that the area including
the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia is the
"key region where we presently focus our indirect
efforts". [49]
Rommel Banlaoi, an analyst
with the National Defense College of the
Philippines, finds, "The American war on terrorism
has provided the US an excellent justification to
hasten its reestablishment of a strategic presence
in Southeast Asia." [50] Having secured that
presence, the US has become closer to that country
with "the greatest potential to compete
militarily" with the US.
By getting the US
"semi-permanently" based south of Luzon for the
first time since World War II, Kaplan notes that
"the larger-than-necessary base complex" in
Zamboanga has delivered more than tactical
benefits. [51] In the minds of the US Army
strategists, Kaplan notes, "Combating Islamic
terrorism in this region [Southeast Asia] carried
a secondary benefit for the United States: it
positioned the US for the future containment of
nearby China."
Notes 1.
Carolyn O Arguillas, "Q and A with US Ambassador
Francis Ricciardone: Ops-Intel-fusion is not
spying," MindaNews, February 28, 2005; Jojo Due,
"Biggest RP-US military exercise starts next
week," Philippine Business Daily Mirror, February
17, 2006. 2. Carolyn O Arguillas, "Q and A with
US Ambassador Francis Ricciardone:
Ops-Intel-fusion is not spying," MindaNews,
February 28, 2005. 3. Admiral Thomas Fargo,
Transcript of Hearing of US House of
Representatives Committee on International
Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,
June 26, 2003. 4. Karl Wilson, "US force in
Asia to become smaller but deadlier," Daily Times,
August 22, 2004. 5. United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) Growth with
Equity in Mindanao project website; Embassy of the
United States of America, Manila, Republic of the
Philippines, "Securing Peace in Mindanao through
Diplomacy, Development, and Defense," August 2006.
6. In October 2005, for example, a huge US
military ship, later identified as a high-speed
vessel, was spotted off Basilan near Zamboanga
City. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Department of Foreign Affairs gave conflicting
versions as to the nature and mission of the ship,
with the DFA spokesperson even initially
indicating that they were not informed about its
arrival only to subsequently claim that the US
Embassy had actually requested permission for the
ship's entry. ("US military ship sneaks into
Southern RP, Sunstar, October 12, 2005, Manila
Times, October 13, 05, Phil Star, October 28, 05.
7. US Department of Defense, National Defense
Strategy 2005, Washington DC, pp. 18-19. 8. US
Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy
2005, Washington DC, pp. 18-19. 9. Mark Lander,
"Philippines Offers US its Troops and Bases," New
York Times, October 2, 2001; Rufi Vigilar,
"Philippines opens its ports to US military," CNN,
September 18, 2001; Angel M Rabasa, "Southeast
Asia After 9-11: Regional Trends and US
Interests," Testimony presented to the
Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific House of
Representatives Committee on International
Relations on December 12, 2001. 10. Thomas Lum
and Larry A. Niksch, "The Republic of the
Philippines: Background and US Relations,"
Congressional Research Service Report for
Congress, January 10, 2006; Sheldon W Simon,
"Theater Security Cooperation in the US Pacific
Command," National Bureau of Asian Research
Analysis, Volume 14, Number 2, August 2003. 11.
Mutual Logistics Support Agreement Between the
Department of Defense of the United States of
America and the Department of National Defense of
the Republic of the Philippines, November 21,
2002. 12. Sheldon W Simon, "Southeast Asia
solidifies antiterrorism support, lobbies for
postwar Iraq reconstruction," Pacific Forum CSIS
Comparative Connections, Second Quarter
2003. 13. Overseas Basing Commission, Report to
the President and Congress, Arlington, Virginia,
August 15, 2005, p. H11. 14. Al Jacinto, "NGOs:
Probe US military facilities," Manila Times,
August 29, 2007. 15. Robert D Kaplan, Hog
Pilots, Blue Water Grunts: The American Military
in the Air, at Sea, and on the Ground (New
York: Random House, 2007), pp. 88-90. 16.
Thomas Fuller, "Subic Bay May be Up for Rent,"
International Herald Tribuna, July 13, 2001; "US
Briefs RP on plans for using Subic, Clark,"
Inquirer, September 28, 2001. 17. Frida
Berrigan, "Halliburton's Axis of Influence," In
These Times, March 28, 2003. 18. Halliburton,
"Press Release: Halliburton KBR to Evaluate Subic
Bay Facilities," November 21, 2001. 19. Admiral
Dennis Blair (Commander in Chief, US Pacific
Command), Transcript of Press Conference, Manila,
July 13, 2001. 20. Thomas J Garcia, "The
Potential Role of the Philippines in US Naval
Forward Presence," Thesis for US Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California,
December 2001, p. xiv. 21. Thomas J Garcia,
"The Potential Role of the Philippines in US Naval
Forward Presence," Thesis for US Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California,
December 2001, p. 30. 22. "US Briefs RP on
plans for using Subic, Clark," Inquirer, September
28, 2001. 23. Council on Foreign Relations, The
United States and Southeast Asia: A Policy Agenda
for the New Administration, July 2001, pp.
47-48. 24. Robert Kaplan, Imperial Grunts:
On the Ground with the American Military from
Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and
Beyond, New York: Vintage Books 2006,
p.147. 25. In August 2007, Focus on the Global
South publicized the granting by the US Department
of Defense, through the US Naval Facilities
Engineering Command (NAVFAC), of a six-month
$14.4-million contract to a certain "Global
Contingency Services LLC" of Irving, Texas for
"operations support" for the Joint Special
Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P).
According to its own website, the NAVFAC is the
unit within the US military that is in charge of
providing the US Navy with "operating, support,
and training bases". It "manages the planning,
design, and construction and provides public works
support for US Naval shore installations around
the world". Among their business lines are "bases
development" and "contingency engineering".
According to the announcement by the Pentagon, the
contract awarded to Global Contingency Services
LLC includes "all labor, supervision, management,
tools, materials, equipment, facilities,
transportation, incidental engineering, and other
items necessary to provide facilities support
services." Global Contingency
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road,
Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
