Page 2 of 2 US plays both sides in the Philippines
By Herbert Docena
US demands. Although she withdrew from the "coalition of the willing" in Iraq,
the Philippine contingent was small (a little over 100 soldiers) and she has
more than made up for that withdrawal in other ways.
True, Arroyo has lately expanded relations with China. But with all the
economic opportunities China offers so have many other pro-US allies. The
Philippines may have welcomed $6.6 million in military assistance from China
last year. But it's still unlikely to grant China what it gives the US - a
military presence on its territory - nor is it likely to promise China the
removal of US troops from the country. In any case, dropping the Philippines as
an ally
would likely ensure that the country falls into the Chinese embrace.
Finding new friends
There is no shortage of Moros ready to outbid Filipinos in offering Bangsamoro
territory and cooperation in support of US foreign policy goals. Indeed, the US
has been busy identifying, grooming, and financing Moro leaders - showering
them with scholarship opportunities, bringing them to the US, employing them,
and funding their nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). As in other sites of US
political intervention, the work of USIP and other agencies in "strengthening
intra-Moro communication and unity" is a deliberate political project to build
relations with, build the capacity of, and build unity among those moderate
pro-US Moros in an attempt to make them better resourced and more influential
than the alternatives.
Similar to Moro leaders in the past who preferred being part of a separate
colony or protectorate of the US to being part of the Philippines, some Moro
leaders today can be expected to justify supporting the US - or at least, not
antagonizing it - as a pragmatic policy for advancing Moro nationalist goals.
For instance, neither the MNLF nor the MILF leaderships have categorically
opposed the expanding US military presence in Mindanao.
After faintly making noise against US military activities in Mindanao last
February, for example, the MILF turned suddenly quiet after a visit from US
ambassador Kristie Kenney. A number of influential Moros, many of whom have
benefited from US patronage, have unsurprisingly come out in support of US
military intervention in Mindanao.
However, assuming that they succeed in getting their own state with US support,
Moro elites would still want foreign patrons to preserve their power like other
elites. But they would also need to win elections and otherwise retain
legitimacy. Prolonging an alliance with the US under these circumstances would
become harder to sell to the Moro people, sensitized as they are to the plight
of fellow Muslims from Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan who face US military
aggression.
A more likely outcome is a Bangsamoro like many other Muslim-majority
countries, such as Indonesia or Malaysia, where support for US foreign policy,
while not impossible, has become a political liability that few politicians are
willing to bear. Hence, betting on a pro-US Bangsamoro state would be a risky
gamble for Washington.
Still, the United States might take such a gamble if it expects to gain more
from the creation of a new state than it loses from dumping an old reliable
ally. Consider the US need for basing. Although the US military presence has
expanded for the first time to Mindanao in recent years, a quick look at the
map shows that this presence covers the entire country. In Mindanao, it extends
even to areas that are not to be covered under the proposed Bangsamoro
sub-state.
The US Special Forces' Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines'
(JSOTF-P) headquarters, for instance, is in Zamboanga City, whose mayor Celso
Lobregat has been at the forefront of opposition to the MOA-AD and has made no
secret of his "wish" for the US to build a permanent base in his city. The
JSOTF-P is not necessarily in Mindanao in preparation for the rise of a new
Moro state.
Rather, Mindanao is where the designated "terrorists" are - rather than, say,
in Batanes, which is closer to Taiwan and mainland China. The JSOFT-P is
assured of remaining - and could even choose to expand - in Zamboanga City with
or without the consent of the Moros as long as the Philippine government
agrees. The US is not likely to abandon the Philippines for a pro-US Bangsamoro
state if it means giving up its control of or access to all the ports and
facilities in Subic, Nueva Ecija, Batanes, Cebu, and General Santos City just
to have bases in Mindanao.
It's plausible that the US is just hedging its bets - not necessarily
abandoning the Philippines now but just establishing a contingency plan in case
the country moves closer to China. It's also possible that Washington is
pitting Manila against the Moros so that they will outbid each other for US
support. But again, such a hedging strategy might backfire as Filipino elites,
not sure of US loyalty, lean more toward China. Also, the Moro fighters,
realizing that Filipino soldiers are using US bullets to kill them, could turn
against Washington.
US involvement in the peace talks and its openness to the solution posed by the
MOA-AD could simply reflect a need for its Philippine ally to be stronger and
more stable in order to advance US interests more effectively. A Philippines
bogged down fighting various separatist and communist movements is less able to
participate in the "war on terror" and more broadly in containing China.
As such, only by addressing what the US Institute of Peace dares to correctly
describe as the Moros' "legitimate grievances" can the Philippines disarm the
MILF, move on to other enemies, and become the stable reliable ally that the US
wants and needs. In so doing, the US is also able to reward, co-opt and
strengthen certain Moro elites who would otherwise be antagonistic to its
objectives or who could lose out to those with more radical social and economic
programs should war persist.
Faced with the possibilities of an antagonized pro-China Philippines or an
independent Bangsamoro state with leaders who have uncertain loyalties, the US
strategy seems clear. A more stable Philippines - with a Mindanao that is
"peaceful" and open for business and with pliant but less subordinated Moro
elites at its helm - fits the overall US geopolitical strategy for the region.
Herbert Docena wrote Focus on the Global South's special report on the US
military presence in the Philippines, "At the Door of All the East: The
Philippines in US Military Strategy".
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road,
Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
