Page 1 of 2 COMMENT Myanmar's failed non-violent opposition By Norman Robespierre
YANGON - The one-year anniversary of Myanmar's military crackdown on
non-violent protests in Yangon and several other cities calling for political
change came and went without incident.
While the Buddhist monk-led demonstrations briefly raised global awareness of
the Burmese people's plight, it also highlighted the failure of the
opposition's long-held non-violence strategy as the best means to bring change
to the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) regime that views the
failure to use violence as a sign of weakness.
While outwardly a spontaneous gesture in reaction to economic woes, the
demonstrations were the culmination of years of planning by opposition forces
inside and abroad for non-violent
action to confront the regime. Opposition to the ruling regime is figuratively
headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of General Aung San, the founding
father of Burmese independence. Her commitment to non-violent struggle for
political change has earned her the Nobel Peace Prize and global admiration,
but two decades since soldiers opened fire on unarmed pro-democracy
demonstrators, there is little else to show for her two decades of non-violent
struggle.
The resounding victory of Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) party
in the 1990 elections was the political high-water mark for the opposition.
While the regime refused to honor the poll's results, the election provided
political legitimacy to the NLD and a handful of opposition activists. Many of
those elected still cling to demands that the election's results be honored,
but with each passing year those claims to legitimacy become less germane.
Close to 40% of the elected members of parliament have been dismissed or
resigned and a full 20% have died.
The opposition defined broadly is comprised of a plethora of political
organizations. Among the best known are the National Coalition Government for
the Union of Burma, headed by Dr Sein Win, Suu Kyi's cousin, the All-Burma
Student's Democratic Front (ABSDF), Democratic Alliance for Burma, National
League for Democracy-(Liberated Areas).
Additionally, there are several umbrella organizations such as the democratic
Alliance for Burma (DAB) and the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB),
which count membership from various political groups and ethnic insurgent
armies. These organizations receive substantial backing from Western
organizations, such as the Open Society Institute and National Endowment for
Democracy.
The vast majority of the opposition follows Suu Kyi's guidance that political
change can and should be achieved through non-violence. That doctrine was
further promulgated by the Albert Einstein Institute of Geneva and New York. In
1994, it sponsored a consultation on political defiance for Burmese democracy
leaders. Included in the audience were representatives of ABSDF, NLD-LA, DAB,
and the NCGUB, represented by Dr Sein Win. A key speaker at the pivotal event
was the institute's founder, Gene Sharp.
Sharp's involvement with the Burmese opposition was specifically mentioned in a
June 1997 press conference condemning foreign support to terrorists by then
Secretary-1of the SPDC, Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt. In hindsight, rather
than condemnation, Khin Nyunt should have heaped laurels on Sharp for promoting
non-violence.
The opposition's adherence to non-violence has given the regime a monopoly on
fear that allowed it to solidify its position, condemning generations of
Burmese to life (and in some cases, death) under the military regime.
Additionally, limiting the prospect of violent consequences removed one aspect
which may have motivated the regime to negotiate change.
Further, the promotion of non-violence undermined the united opposition against
the regime. Under the tutelage of Khin Nyunt, the regime succeeded in enticing
numerous armed ethnic opposition groups to surrender their arms and "enter the
light" - or at least accept a ceasefire. Khin Nyunt used a variety of
incentives to the groups and particularly their leaders to gain their
cooperation. The elevated principle of non-violence made it easier for group
leaders to accept the bribery.
The success of the regime's effort to pursue ceasefire deals continues to haunt
the opposition with fragmentation and conflicting interests. Ethnic armies
whose cooperation could have tilted the "Saffron" revolution to effect real
change, sat and watched, perhaps out of concern that armed rebellion would
jeopardize their lucrative mining or other concessions. As a result, the regime
was able to focus its military might on the unarmed protesters and monks.
Incentives and self-interest affect not only limited ceasefires and peace
groups, but also some ethnic armies that continue to put forces in the field
against the Myanmar military, or Tatmadaw. According to a senior Thai military
officer, the SPDC is able to continue to benefit from the vulnerable
Yadana-Yetagun gas pipelines because the Mon insurgents in the area are
receiving payoffs from both the regime and the Thai authorities. Construction
of a third foreign exchange earning pipeline in the same area is reportedly
slated for this dry season.
A valuable experience
The Einstein Institute's website comments that while the non-violent struggles
in Myanmar, China and Tibet "have not brought an end to the ruling
dictatorships or occupations, they have exposed the brutal nature of those
repressive regimes to the world community and have provided the populations
with valuable experience with this form of struggle".
How 20 years of mostly ineffectual resistance can be summed up as a "valuable
experience" is a mystery. One wonders to what valuable experience those sitting
comfortably in their ideological ivory towers refer: languishing in a Myanmar
prison, being knocked senseless by a police truncheon, having family members
disappear, torture, death? How much longer before the Burmese people realize
the opposition's strategy of non-violence is ineffective against those who have
the means and determination to kill to maintain control and decide to pursue a
different, more assertive course?
Opposition optimists say that the regime was weakened by last year's crackdown,
arguing that the violence police and soldiers perpetrated against Buddhist
monks irked the populace and many military officers, the majority of them
Buddhist. Further, they cite perennial rumors of infighting among the generals
and lower ranks that could lead to fractures in the leadership and eventually a
democracy-promoting mutiny.
However, earlier leadership struggles in which top generals fell from grace -
including Tun Kyi, Saw Maung, Ne Win and Khin Nyunt - only brought changes in
military personalities, not a transformation of the military-dominated system.
Indeed, the system is highly resilient and endures with a new crop of military
officers entering the top ranks of the Tatmadaw each year. Although many of the
officers are not enthusiastic that monks were beaten, most believe that the
majority of the protesters were recent novices who had donned monk's robes
expressly to carry out illegal political demonstrations.
The optimists also claim that the regime's inadequate response to Cyclone
Nargis, which killed over 80,000 people and adversely affected the livelihoods
of over 2 million, also weakened the SPDC. As evidence, they mention that many
military personnel and government workers had relatives in the worst-hit
Ayeyawady Division and were upset at the delayed response. The actual intensity
of disenchantment caused by the slow reaction to the killer storm, of course,
is hard to quantify without public opinion polls.
However, the fact that Burmese people are used to being self-sufficient and not
in the habit of relying on the government for anything likely means the fallout
from such a callous official response was less severe than it would have been
in other countries. Whatever disenchantment the government's limp response to
Nargis and the September 2007 crackdown may have sown, to date it has not been
exploited to cause the Tatmadaw to split or the military government to fall.
From another perspective, it could just as easily be argued that Cyclone Nargis
made the regime stronger by opening up a new tap of foreign aid. Millions of
dollars of humanitarian aid poured into the economy as foreign nations rallied
to assist the storm's survivors. The regime's multi-tiered foreign exchange
system allowed them to extract an estimated 20% to 25% from all foreign
exchange certificates converted into the local kyat currency.
The diversion of United Nations (UN) funds alone resulted in at least US$1.5
million (some estimates are as high as $10 million) of humanitarian aid being
delivered straight into the regime's coffers. The tilted exchange system also
affected non-UN aid agencies for an undetermined amount of donations. Hard
currency intended to relieve the suffering of cyclone survivors instead
directly benefited the regime.
Nargis also brought a recent call from the International Crisis Group (ICG) to
repeal sanctions and provide more aid than beyond what is necessary to recover
from Nargis to develop the impoverished country. While few share the ICG's
sentiment, which in the past was criticized by the Open Society Institute for
its unscholarly approach with respect to Myanmar, its call would allow the
regime to reap even more foreign money to consolidate its position.
Nargis brought not only financial benefit, but also is believed to have
increased the regime's confidence. Certainly, the regime's confidence soared
when French and US warships withdrew from waters off Myanmar's coast in the
aftermath of the killer storm. While the vessels were sent to deliver
humanitarian aid, antagonistic rhetoric about the humanitarian "right to
protect" Myanmar's citizens by Western diplomats preceded the vessels'
arrivals, raising the regime's suspicions about their mission.
Rather than appear to submit to Western threats, and fearful of a possible
uprising by opposition activists should foreign forces land on Myanmar soil,
the regime barred the aid from being delivered by other than their own naval
personnel. Eventually the vessels withdrew without a shot being fired and much
of the aid went undelivered. The regime's ability to diplomatically ward off
the perceived threat posed by French and American warships is believed to have
boosted the regime's confidence in its ability to stand up to neo-colonialist
adversaries.
Confidence in the regime's decision-making, often portrayed as daft or worse in
the international media, has recently reportedly grown among the rank and file.
In particular, the decision to move the political capital to Naypyitaw from
Yangon is - after the cyclone which hit the old capital - viewed in a favorable
new light. Prior to Nargis, the abrupt move in late 2005 was widely criticized
for its exorbitant expense and ridiculed for its reliance on astrology. It is
now looked at by many Burmese as cosmic confirmation of the wisdom and even
prescience of the senior leadership - or at least that of their astrologers.
More important is the regime's growing confidence in the reliability of
government forces to deploy as instruments of control. The ability to
successfully extinguish the pro-democracy protests in September 2007, without
notable dissension within the ranks of the police and military, left the
Tatmadaw stronger and the regime more self-assured. According to several
foreign diplomats based in Yangon, the regime is now reportedly more confident
in the loyalty of its forces and its ability to control unrest.
On the other hand, the position of the political opposition is decidedly
weaker. More opposition members are in prison than before, while countless
others have fled the country due to very real concerns for their personal
security. An untold number have perished. Despite the overwhelming support of
the populace, the opposition was unable to capitalize on social discontent in
2007, when the junta removed fuel price subsidies and fuel costs shot up 500%
overnight. Nor have they been able to leverage the chaos and suffering brought
on by the junta's inept handling of the cyclone disaster this year into a
renewed call for political change.
Instead of maintaining offensive pressure and preparing adequate defensive
measures to protect their supporters, they have blindly clung to the gospel of
non-violence in the hope that international pressure would eventually lead to
democratic change. As many Saffron Revolution demonstrators can attest, hope is
a weak defensive shield against a police baton, a charging truck, or the
ammunition of soldiers trained to kill.
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