Page 1 of 2 Ins and outs of a China courtship
By H H Michael Hsiao and Alan Yang
Among United States-led like-minded alliances, a nascent China policy position
has been formulated based on the idea of "international socialization" [1]. The
idea is to enmesh states in a compound network structured by international
organizations, conventions and norms. Accordingly, the process of socialization
will push China to comply with the normative values of the international
society.
For countries like the United States, an "internationally socialized" China has
become a necessity for at least two reasons. First, international norms
constraining any potential irrational behavior of this rising power will ease
the threat perceptions emanating from its rise. Second, engaging China - rather
than isolating it - in the near term may be more constructive and plausible to
ensure greater transparency of a regional
hegemony. The propositions reflect, undeniably, the universal anxieties over
China's emerging threats and the uncertainty that its rise poses to regional
and international regimes.
This "taming China's rise" strategy, however, overlooks the People's Republic
of China's (PRC) "agency" of influencing world politics. Even though China
evinces its appreciation of multilateralism, what really concerns China is not
the matter of its "internationalization" to the status quo, but ways to improve
Beijing's international reputation while securing its national interests.
Beijing has been more practical in making strategic arrangements with partners
and more flexible in attracting international supporters [2]. New policy
initiatives such as "smile diplomacy" (weisiao waijiaou), "public
diplomacy" (gonggong waijiaou), and "good neighbor diplomacy" (mulin
waijiaou) have been instrumental in Beijing's pursuit of a benign
hegemony. These initiatives have one thing in common: a sophisticated use of
soft power resources.
Take China-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) relations, for
instance: China and ASEAN established official links since 1991. For China,
ASEAN is a close neighbor and encompasses a strategically important region for
China's national security. ASEAN also serves as an ideal platform for China's
participation in East Asian international politics, while China provides ASEAN
states' an option to hedge its dependence on the United States and Japan [3].
This relationship had all the trappings of a win-win partnership.
Although ASEAN has been long aware of the possibility for China's potential
dominance over regional issues, most of its members believe that a regional
socialization process is capable of regulating this rising power [4]. Following
the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, however, it has become increasingly
difficult for ASEAN states to resist China's overwhelming influence in economic
assistance and soft power. Moreover, in recent years, most ASEAN states have
been assuaged by Beijing's assertion of "peaceful ascendancy" and its image as
an amiable supporter [5].
Soft power strategies
Soft power is an art of persuasion - and Chinese wielding of soft power has
expanded its Western definition as well as extended its scope. Since the 1990s,
China had advanced its relations with ASEAN states in fields of foreign aid,
trade, finance, infrastructure, business, labor, environment, development as
well as tourism. China's strategies for soft power diplomacy are intricate and
comprehensive.
Beijing's soft power diplomacy can be broken up in three levels: first,
establish solid political and fiscal connections with Southeast Asian
governments via increasing foreign aid; second, explore a comprehensive
cooperative framework through FTA-plus plans; third, enhance cultural
attractiveness and promote pro-China understanding among ASEAN states through
quasi-governmental projects. Foreign aid, comprehensive economic networking and
cultural transmission form the core of its soft power resources.
China's transformation from a development aid recipient to a bilateral donor is
a recent development and a significant mark of accomplishment for a nation of
1.3 billion people. According to Chinese official statistics, its annual aid
figure is US$970 million, but the real number is probably more [6]. In
Southeast Asia, the sum of Chinese foreign aid has surpassed the amount of the
United States. For example, in 2002, China's aid to Indonesia was double that
of the United States. In 2006, China's aid to the Philippines was four times
that of the United States, while the amount to Laos was three times the US aid
[7].
Most of this financial assistance contributes to local infrastructure and
capacity-building programs. More recently, Beijing provided over $10 million to
the government of Burma to assist regional reconstruction in areas that were
devastated by Cyclone Nargis in 2008 [8]. Through foreign aid, China has set
itself up as a reliable partner of its Southeast Asian neighbors. On the other
hand, this government aid has facilitated Chinese state-owned-enterprises
(SOEs) in commercial navigation within Southeast Asia, such as the exploration
of Indonesian natural gas reserves, the investing in infrastructure in the
Philippines, and the establishment of transportation links through Cambodia and
Thailand to Singapore [9]. Ostensibly, these projects, based on Beijing's
guideline of "going out", seem to align with local economic and developmental
needs, but the lack of transparency casts a cloud over China's underlying
motives as its geo-political and geo-economic interests expand.
Co-prosperity or economic mercantilism? A comprehensive economic network
is another soft power resource of China since the substance of China-ASEAN
relations is mainly based on trade. For ASEAN states, China is regarded not
only as the center of economic gravity but a potential market with business
opportunities as well. Therefore, China leverages its comparative advantage by
employing economic diplomacy with soft power resources to formulate a
multilateral framework based on free-trade agreements.
Beijing attempts to chart a win-win partnership based on the China-ASEAN Free
Trade Area (FTA) for the purpose of easing regional anxieties about the
intensified competition in the export market (ie high-valued manufacturing
goods) [10], and foreign direct investments. In 2007, the GDP of the
China-ASEAN FTA has exceeded $2 trillion while its total trade figure was more
than $200 billion. According to China's official statistics, from January to
September 2008, bilateral trade between China and ASEAN has reached $180
billion, an increase of 23% compared to last year. These large numbers are used
by Beijing to demonstrate China's crucial role in regional integration.
China's economic diplomacy toward ASEAN is highly sophisticated. It straddles
business investment, tourism and new development initiatives. Within the
business realm, expanding China's business network is correspondent to
Beijing's economic and strategic interests in Southeast Asia. In October 2008,
China held the 5th China-ASEAN Expo and China-ASEAN Business & Investment
Summit, fruitfully inviting 1,154 ASEAN-based companies to participate in the
exhibition, signing 1,372 investment agreements, and attracting a turnover of
$1.6 billion. Meanwhile, people-to-people interactions among young leaders and
business elites from ASEAN and China are conducted through 16 different forums
and meetings.
Strategically, this annual China-ASEAN Expo promotes various business links
with the goal of helping Chinese SOEs and small and medium enterprises invest
in and cooperate with the Southeast Asian business community. This expo, as
with other PRC government backed initiatives, is very important for Beijing's
soft power diplomacy. By linking with local business in Southeast Asia, these
bottom-up efforts have successfully drawn more attention from ASEAN states,
promoted China as a window of commercial opportunities and expanded Beijing's
sphere of economic influence in the ASEAN markets.
Besides business and investment, promoting tourism is another way to bolster
Chinese soft power. In the 1980s, there were only tens of thousands of Chinese
(per year) traveling to Southeast Asia. However, China's rapid economic growth
has resulted in more than 15 million arrivals/per year in the ASEAN region
(especially in Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia) during the 2000s. Over the
last decade this figure has experienced an annual growth of 30%. In 2007, there
were 3.4 million Chinese tourists visiting the ASEAN region, a number that, for
the first time, has surpassed the amount of Japanese tourists [11].
Although such a rapid influx of Chinese tourists has created problems for
ASEAN, the increasing amount of voyagers represent capital flows which have
become important income sources to the region. Moreover, a flourishing tourist
industry will provide a sound basis for ongoing projects such as the Open Sky
Initiative, ASEAN Common Area, and ASEAN Cruise Tourism. For China, its
activism in tourism cooperation seems to create a win-win situation of
co-development.
Currently, several China-ASEAN cooperative programs are proceeding. For
example, an ASEAN-China Center for Trade, Investment and Tourism promotion is
currently being negotiated and will be established in the near future [12].
This center is expected to work within the current ASEAN+3 track in order to
upgrade the quality and collaboration of tourism. Otherwise, initiatives of
cultural and eco-tourism are emerging domains of further cooperation. In the
region of the Mekong River basin, for instance, China says that it will comply
with ASEAN states in the project of ADB-GMS-Xishuangbanna Biodiversity
Conservation Corridors. This corridor project will connect nine ecological
zones scattered in the Indochina Peninsula to ensure economic, cultural and
environmental development in a sustainable manner. Beijing, having abundant
economic and political resources in hand, keeps reminding Indochinese states of
its importance in shaping the network of the eco-tour complex.
As bilateral relations progress and recession in the advanced economies
elongates, ASEAN states will need more Chinese participation in its economic
development. Take Singapore for instance: Singapore has worked upon an
"eco-city" project with China since 2007. This ongoing project aims to build a
modern town in Tianjin based on the idea of ecological sustainability. This new
initiative represents an integral plan of economic, environmental and
investment collaboration for both sides.
For Singapore, this joint project will both gain considerable profits and
consolidate political partnership with China. For Beijing, the Singaporean
experience in economic advancement is of particular interest to its
enthusiastic investment in sub-regional economic zones. The increasing amount
of similar proposals not only accounts for a closer relationship between China
and the ASEAN region, but also illustrates China's practice of "economic first"
approach which integrates geo-economic strategy and domestic needs.
In 2008, the global financial crisis caused, in part, by the US sub-prime
mortgage crisis has resulted in financial and market turmoil in Asia. Leaders
from ASEAN states such as Cambodia, Laos, and the Philippines have called upon
China to invest more in ASEAN to stabilize the economic growth of the region.
Such appeals from ASEAN states signify that a rising China has been regarded as
a promising land of many economic opportunities.
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