Philippines: Peace paths and war marches
By Herbert Docena
MANILA - Last year marked a turning point in the decades-long - some say
centuries-long - conflict on the Philippine island of Mindanao. In August, the
proposed Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was catapulted
into the national agenda, triggering the most heated public controversy
regarding the Moro self-determination issue since the 1996 peace agreement the
government signed with the rebel Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).
A product of over 10 years of arduous negotiations, the MOA-AD deeply polarized
the Philippine public. It also revealed rifts within President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo's administration, the political opposition, the church, the
left and peace movement. At the same
time, it succeeded in unifying most Moros behind the proposed deal, while the
landlords and local politicians in Mindanao remained firmly opposed.
Although the agreement has since been junked due to widespread opposition, the
controversy over the MOA-AD illuminated where the protagonists in this
protracted war now stand. By demonstrating that the government could offer much
more to Moros than previously proposed, including terms of control over
territory and resources, the MOA-AD demonstrated how far negotiations could go
towards advancing Moro self-determination.
Whether or not the government intended it, the MOA-AD has reset the bar for
what can now be considered as a negotiation reference point. On the other hand,
by revealing just how fierce and deep-seated opposition from various interest
groups remains, the abandonment of the MOA-AD shows the distance that still
needs to be spanned for a settlement.
While peace talks have in the past broken down almost as a matter of routine,
the MOA-AD's recent failure has thrown the very continuation of talks into
doubt. Not since the end of the most pitched battles of the 1970s have both
sides faced the prospect of all-out war. Some believe the reason that hasn't
happened yet is because neither side is strong enough to launch bigger
offensives than they already have. That is, mutual weakness has averted
full-scale war.
Beyond the MOA-AD's recent failure, the Philippines and the Moro movement enter
2009 at a crossroads. The range of options can be categorized by the degree of
union, or separation, between the Philippines and the Bangsamoro, as well as by
the degree of consent or coercion pursued.
One-state solution
The default solution, of course, is a return to the status quo: a state in
which the Bangsamoro people remain within a unitary Philippines, not because
they necessarily want to, but rather because they have no other choice. As
indicated by the still-widespread support the Moro people give to the armed
Moro movement for self-determination, they continue to express a preference for
greater autonomy within - or even outright independence from - the Philippines.
The degree of support generated by the MOA-AD, which united not only those who
support the Moro Islamic National Front (MILF), but also Moros of other
ideological bents, would seem to confirm this. This status quo will remain
unchanged as long as the relative balance of firepower between the Philippine
military and the Moro movements favors the former.
Assuring this would be the continued stability and unity of the Philippine
military, despite discontent within its ranks. Increasing and more direct US
military assistance, which allows the military to buy more weapons or else
fight more efficiently, also helps. On the other hand, internal fragmentation,
growing weariness among its ranks, and lack of external support militates
against Moro cohesion and consolidation.
This one-state solution by force is the preferred option of hawks in the
military who have always dismissed negotiations as a form of capitulation. The
local landlords and politicians who draw their wealth and power from the lands
they acquired in Mindanao, as well as Filipino chauvinists in Manila and some
Moro leaders who reap profits from the conflict, prefer the status quo.
The Philippine government, however, is not as formidable as it seems; nor are
the Moros as weak as they may appear. That the poorly armed Moros were able to
bring the Ferdinand Marcos dictatorship to the brink of defeat in the 1970s,
and forced it to embark on a peace process that it would rather not go through
if it had the choice, shows that coercion cannot guarantee acquiescence.
The fact that Moro movements have survived despite 40 years of war and
repression attests to the power of Bangsamoro goals and its enduring ability to
mobilize popular support. Even more people now readily identify themselves as
"Moro" compared to the past. This indicates that support for the struggle, if
not for the organizations that claim to wage it, is still growing.
That the Moros continue to be deprived of justice and remain economically
marginalized adds fuel to the conflict's fire. A visit to Mindanao, especially
to MILF strongholds, shows that the process of building a state within a state
is accelerating, as the Moros establish their own political, economic and
cultural institutions outside of Manila's reach. As many have warned, the
recent collapse of the peace talks has convinced more Moros of the futility of
negotiation. Thirty years of talking have not delivered much in the way of
self-determination, but rather a series of disappointments and betrayals.
Autonomy has always been a second-best compromise option that most Moros were
willing to accept if only to end the privations of war. But with even this
offer now spurned, the cry for full-blown independence is once again gaining
resonance. As avenues for political settlement are blocked, a growing number
are forced towards the path of more resistance. Indeed, many claim that a new
generation of Moros - radicalized by their predecessors' failure and their
enemies' intransigence - is coming of age, ready to take over where their armed
progenitors left off.
Compromised co-existence
In the face of this enduring - and possibly strengthening - resistance, the
government's ability to coerce a one-state solution seems increasingly
unlikely. Attempts to defuse one internal political crisis after another while
simultaneously fighting various insurgencies across many fronts, Arroyo's
government arguably cannot afford to keep fighting. With its troops underpaid,
demoralized and restless, the overextended and fractious military cannot assure
victory. As more generals and civilian officials recognize this, more of them
are forced to attempt to try to win the war in the negotiating room, not on the
battlefield.
As such, there are now factions within the government that are willing to
entertain possible power-sharing arrangements that would concede a greater
degree of sovereignty to the Moros. They may be taking this position not
because they are somehow less self-interested, but rather because they have
become more pragmatic. Every bullet used against the Moros, after all, is a
bullet not used against the communist New People's Army (NPA), which many see
as the more worrying threat to national security.
Filipino ruling groups are more likely to countenance a compromise with the
conservative landlords and religious leaders presently spearheading the Moro
movements; they are less ready to tolerate the direct threat to their dominance
posed by the NPA-led armed left. Rational pragmatism may also account for the
US's tolerance - if not active encouragement - of the MOA-AD solution. American
interests would not be hurt and may in fact be advanced by greater stability in
its strategic Philippine ally. Washington's economic interests would also
potentially gain from winning concessions in resource-rich Mindanao.
A two-state solution - whether in an associative or federal arrangement - may
not go according to the government's or the US's design. Sovereignty has always
been a risky proposition in the region. Freed from what they view as a form of
colonial oppression, marginalized Moros could challenge and confront the
conservative groups who have long dominated the area's economy. History is
replete with stories of newly emancipated peoples who aggressively assert their
independence from their former colonial masters.
Unified vision
Ultimately, a one-state solution that is imposed unilaterally by the Philippine
government will continue to prove untenable as long the Moros continue to
assert their right to self-determination. And there is little proof that they
are about to give up: the recent achievement of independence by East Timor and
Kosovo has only served to reinforce the view that theirs is not a lost cause.
The exercise of self-determination, however, is not limited to establishing a
new state; to choose to remain within an existing state is in itself an act of
self-determination. What should not be ruled out, therefore, is that Moros may
still elect to remain within the Philippines - if they may do so on their own
terms.
If the government can guarantee full equal rights in a union where land and
resources are democratically shared among its peoples; if Moro victims are
compensated through reparations and other forms of restitution; if the
perpetrators of massacres and other acts of injustice are brought to justice;
and if the grievances which have driven their desire to secede are fully
redressed, then the Moros just might decide to remain within the Philippine
union.
Statehood is an immense challenge in the context of today's global power
politics and international relations, and there are undeniable benefits in
terms of access to markets, revenue-sharing and freedom of movement from
remaining in a larger union. If the Moros are finally allowed to independently
choose that balance and determine their own democratic fate, a one-state
solution that is built on cohesion rather than coercion is still an option.
But as long as the government relies on force, as it has for decades, it will
be met with resistance and the tragic conflict will grind on.
Herbert Docena is an analyst with Focus on the Global South, an
international policy research institute based at the Chulalongkorn University
in Bangkok, Thailand.
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