The roots of Thailand's tension
By Charles E Morrison
Street politics appear to have become the norm in Thailand, a country once
noted for its relative social stability, where even coups - Thailand has had 18
since 1932 - have often been genteel affairs.
Earlier this month, red-shirted demonstrators supporting former Thai prime
minister Thaksin Shinawatra caused the cancelation of an Asian summit in
Pattaya and disrupted daily life in parts of Bangkok in hopes of forcing the
resignation of current Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva. This comes after the
events of last November, when yellow-shirted demonstrators opposing the
then-government of Thaksin's brother-in-law occupied government
buildings and closed Bangkok's two international airports.
Thaksin lost the latest round of violence. Military forces contained the
protests, forced the leaders to surrender or flee, and supplied buses to take
rural demonstrators back home. But "victory" is surely only a respite, since
the larger issues that are dividing Thai society and fueling the unrest remain
unresolved. Power has already shifted back and forth three times since the
September 2006 military coup, with enormous disruptions to Thailand's society,
economy, and international standing.
Thaksin and Abhisit represent opposing forces, both claiming to promote
democracy. Now living abroad to escape jail time for a conflict of interest
conviction, Thaksin is the central, polarizing figure on the Thai political
stage. A former policeman and telecom tycoon, he is the first Thai politician
to fashion a power base independent of the traditional elite, Bangkok-centered
institutions. He accomplished this by becoming a hero to many underprivileged
Thais during the time he was prime minister through the lavish disbursal of
money for rural health, education, and grants or loans to villages.
Thaksin was so popular in the countryside that he or his supporters have
decisively won the past three national elections, and they are likely to win
any new one. In Thaksin's view, his last two victories have been stolen by
agents of the urban middle- and upper-classes, allied with high echelons in the
military, the courts, and some royal advisors. During the recent
demonstrations, his almost daily video messages to his red-shirted United Front
for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) supporters called for restoration of
government elected by the majority.
British-born, Oxford-educated Abhisit represents Thailand's traditional elite.
He heads the country's most venerable civilian political party, the Democrats,
but is also the beneficiary of military support and street protests by the
People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD). Founded four years ago, the
yellow-shirted PAD led urban protests against the Thaksin government, helping
to trigger and justify a military coup in September 2006.
Following the coup, the military governed ineptly and had to step aside. When
pro-Thaksin forces won new elections in December 2007, the PAD went back into
action, culminating in last November's airport occupations. Although ultimately
a Constitutional Court decision banning the pro-Thaksin People's Power Party,
followed by political defections allegedly engineered by the military, brought
Abhisit to power in December, the disruptive demonstrations and occupations by
PAD provided the enabling environment.
Many in the urban and traditional elite regard Thaksin as a dangerous populist
who gained personal fortune and won elections through bribery, vote-buying, and
corruption. They assert that his governing methods were undemocratic, and his
extra-judicial, draconian methods toward drug peddlers and insurgents in
Thailand's turbulent south lacked accountability.
But Thaksin's opponents also have a democracy deficit, not having won a
national election and even proposing a new, non-democratic constitution to
perpetuate elite control. Political conflict is hardly new in Thailand, but in
years past, the crisis might have been resolved by Thailand's respected
monarch, King Bhumibol Adulyadej. Now the 81-year-old king is in fragile
health, and some close to the palace are regarded as partisans.
With legitimacy problems plaguing both camps, along with the pressure of
mobilized street mobs and determined adversarial leaders, an early resolution
to the current crisis is unlikely. In fact, economic distress and longer-term
uncertainty as the king ages may intensify the conflict.
The Thai political crisis reflects powerful forces that are reshaping the
political landscape of parts of Southeast Asia. Increased levels of education
and awareness, economic development, and new technologies are all helping to
bring demanding new voices into politics, often threatening established elites
and traditional power-sharing arrangements.
Although true reforms have eluded the Philippines, and Myanmar has remained
mired under military rule, Indonesia has already undergone a major - and so far
quite successful - democratic transformation, and Malaysia seems poised for
change.
The introduction of new political and social forces often comes with serious
disruptions, as are now occurring in Thailand.
But hopefully in the long run they will be accommodated in a new, more
legitimate and democratic social contract that will endure long after the
current political players have departed from the stage.
Charles E Morrison, president of the East-West Center, once taught
Southeast Asian politics at the Johns Hopkins University.
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